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CRITICAL-REFLECTIVE THINKING: 
A PHENOMENOLOGY 
 
This dissertation formulates and describes a type of thinking called critical-reflective 
thinking.  Examples of critical-reflective thinking appear in the works of many major 
Western philosophical figures, including the main thinkers considered here, Plato, Martin 
Heidegger, Hannah Arendt, and Henry David Thoreau.  Although this list of thinkers is 
eclectic, these philosophers come together in describing a common phenomenon, although 
they do not thematically designate or explain it.  Their works illustrate a type of thinking in 
which people are invited by prompting events to consider their presuppositions—notions 
they have taken as true without prior consideration.  I have deemed this phenomenon 
“critical-reflective thinking” to emphasize its dimensions of self-reflection and critical 
consideration.  By exploring examples from the works of the authors listed above (among 
others, such as Ralph Waldo Emerson, Hans-Georg Gadamer, and Elaine Scarry), I 
formulate critical-reflective thinking as a specific phenomenon.   
 
In Chapter One, I formulate this important type of human thought by describing its 
occurrence, especially the invitation of the prompt and the disclosure and examination of 
presuppositions.  In Chapter Two, this dissertation explicates the value of taking part in this 
type of thinking.  Since critical-reflective thinking allows people to consider previously 
unreflective aspects of their understanding (i.e. presuppositions), by taking part in critical-
reflective thinking, people stand to grow in self-awareness and become liberated to new 
possible ways of seeing the world and going about life.  Given the value of such growth and 
liberation, it is important to explore how humans can develop the practice critical-reflective 
thinking.  Chapter Three explores strategies for cultivating critical-reflective thinking.  Plato,
Heidegger, Arendt, and Thoreau suggest five such strategies: spending time in solitude, 
taking leisure, developing an open attitude, practicing wakeful attentiveness, and acquire 
virtues such as humility, courage, and fortitude. 
 
Formulating and exploring the phenomenon of critical-reflective thinking not only 
provides a theory of a type of thinking, but also describes an important aspect of human 
experience.  This dissertation encourages readers to consider their own experiences of 
thinking.  It also poses the challenge of leading a more examined life by critically-reflecting 
on notions we often take as given.    
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 Theorizing human thinking—what it is, how it happens, and its role in human life—
has long been a central concern of Western philosophy.  This attention is hardly surprising 
given that philosophers often engage in the activity.  Throughout the history of the West, 
philosophers have defined thinking in varying ways.  Although most agree that it is a mental 
activity and an important part of human life, disagreement has reigned about whether 
thinking is a process of examining something or merely perceiving it, an active or passive 
occurrence, a categorical description of all mental faculties or one mental faculty among 
others, and whether there are many types of thinking or just one.  Regarding the latter issue, 
this dissertation affirms the idea that there are many types of thinking.  Rather than dealing 
with all types of thinking, however, it takes up the project of describing one type: critical-
reflective thinking.  Critical-reflective thinking is described, though not explicitly theorized, 
in many accounts of thinking, especially those of Plato, Henry David Thoreau, Martin 
Heidegger, and Hannah Arendt.  To situate this type of thinking in the Western 
philosophical tradition, I will provide brief descriptions of the accounts of thinking given by 
certain major figures in the history of Western philosophy, namely, Plato, Aristotle, Thomas 
Aquinas, René Descartes, Thomas Hobbes, Immanuel Kant, Martin Heidegger, and Hannah 
Arendt.  Doing this will also enable me to indicate where my account of critical-reflective 
thinking stands with regard to the distinction of between thinking as perception and thinking 
as examination mentioned above. 
 Socrates, conversing in the 5th Century BCE, says in the Theaetetus that thinking 
(dianoiesthai) is “a talk which the soul has with itself about the objects under its 
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consideration.”1  This is one of the few thematic descriptions of thinking given in Plato’s 
known corpus.  The same definition comes up again in a conversation between Theaetetus 
and a Visitor in the Sophist.  There, thinking is linked to belief and the conversation partners 
agree that “belief [is] the conclusion of thinking.”2  Thinking as talking, that is, as speaking 
with oneself, concludes in belief that can be either true or false because speech itself can be 
true or false.3  Thinking, for Plato, is thus an internal dialogue of the soul that leads to belief 
about whatever one thinks about.  Though it may appear obvious that thinking is an activity 
of the soul (as opposed to the body), it warrants noting that the notion that thinking is a 
mental rather than a bodily activity has characterized much of Western metaphysics.  An 
important way, however, in which the views of Plato’s successors differ from his rests in a 
fundamental distinction between thinking as examination and thinking as perception.  
Examination is an intellectual activity wherein a person consciously considers some matter.  
This is distinct from perception.  To perceive means to have something (for example, an 
idea or a mental image of something one has experienced via the senses) in mind.  
Perception need not be accompanied by examination.  Aristotle and Aquinas describe 
thinking as perceiving.   
In his text, De Anima (On the Soul), Aristotle describes of the soul (or psyche).  His 
psychology describes three faculties that are present in the human soul: the nutritive, 
sensitive, and cognitive.  The capacity for thought is included in the cognitive faculty (or 
intellect), which belongs to humans but not to plants or animals.  Aristotle focuses on 
                                                
1 Plato, Theaetetus, trans. M.J. Levett, rev. Myles Burnyeat, in Plato: Complete Works, ed. John 
M. Cooper (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1997), 189e.   
2 Plato, Sophist, trans. Nicholas P. White, in Plato: Complete Works, ed. John M. Cooper 
(Indianapolis: Hackett, 1997), 264b1. 
3 In other words, thinking does not necessarily lead to knowledge since knowledge is justified 
true belief. 
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thinking in particular in De Anima III.  There, he describes thinking as a passive undertaking 
that has parallels to (though it is not the same as) sense perception.  Thinking is passive in 
that thinking something means receiving its form.4  The intellect “has no other nature”—it is 
purely a “place for forms or ideas” and “is nothing at all before it thinks.”5  When the mind 
receives a form, it “thinks in mental images” of whatever it has received.6  In De Anima III, 
Aristotle also refers to thinking as an active undertaking.  His discussion of active intellect is, 
however, a hotly debated topic to which I cannot do justice here.  A follower of Aristotle, 
Thomas Aquinas, contributes further elucidations of the active intellect.  
In the 13th Century, Aquinas takes up the Aristotelian view that thinking is a faculty 
of the human mind, though he focuses more attention than Aristotle did on its active nature.  
In Aquinas’s Summa Theologica (Question 79), he inquires into cognitive intellectual powers.  
According to Aquinas, forms are not perceptible and, thus, not immediately intelligible.  The 
active intellect does the work of “abstracting forms from material conditions.”7  That is, 
thinking, performed by the active intellect, must actively process perceived material objects 
in order to abstract their forms and make them intelligible to itself.  Aristotle’s and Aquinas’s 
views thus agree in describing thinking as an intellectual capacity of the human psyche and in 
defining thinking as the basic power of human intellect.  Thinking allows people to think 
                                                
4 The thinking mind receives the form of something potentially and not actually.  This means 
that the mind does not actually become whatever form it receives but, rather, has its image in 
mind.  Thinking, however, differs from sense perception because whereas one’s sense of 
hearing, for example, may no longer perceive sounds if it has encountered too intense a 
sound, one’s power to think is not dulled by intensely encountering things in thought (see 
Aristotle, De Anima, trans. R.D. Hicks (Amherst: Prometheus, 1991), 429a). 
5 Aristotle, De Anima, trans. R.D. Hicks (Amherst: Prometheus, 1991), 429a. 
6 Ibid., 431a. 
7 Aquinas, A Summary of Philosophy, ed. and trans. Richard J. Regan (Indianapolis: Hackett, 
2003), 77; ST I, Q.79, A 3. Cf. Giorgio Pini, “Two Models of Thinking: Thomas Aquinas 
and John Duns Scotus,” in Intentionality, Cognition, and Representation in the Middle Ages, ed. 
Gyula Klima (New York: Springer, forthcoming). 
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thoughts about whatever their senses perceive.  Conceptualizing thinking as perceiving is a 
trend that continues into modern philosophy.  René Descartes and Immanuel Kant, for 
example, both take it up.  Descartes, however, broadens the concept by making thinking a 
catchall category for all mental activities.     
 In the 17th Century, in addition to following his predecessors by assigning thinking 
strictly to the mind side of the dualism between mind and body, Descartes also describes 
other mental activities as modes of thinking.  This becomes clear in Descartes’ inquiry in 
Meditations on First Philosophy, where he considers what he can know “by putting aside 
everything that admits of the least doubt” and attending to what, if anything, is certain.8  In 
the course of this experiment, he notices that once everything of which he is uncertain has 
been banished, all that is left is thought.  He concludes that the only thing of which he is 
certain is that “thought exists” and that “it alone cannot be separated from” his own 
existence.9  In addition to taking this fact as proof of his own existence as a thinking thing, 
Descartes goes on to use thinking as a catchall category for mental activity.  He writes, “But 
what then am I?  A thing that thinks.  What is that?  A thing that doubts, understands, 
affirms, denies, wills, refuses, and that also imagines and senses.”10  Sensation, here, does not 
refer to bodily sensation but, since thinking is strictly a mental activity, to mental sensation, 
or perception.  For Descartes, being a thing that thinks means being something that doubts, 
understands, affirms, denies, wills, refuses, imagines, and senses, ergo these activities are 
modes of the primary activity of thought.  
                                                
8 René Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy, trans. Donald Cress, in Modern Philosophy: An 
Anthology of Primary Sources, 2nd ed., ed. Roger Ariew and Eric Watkins (Indianapolis: Hackett, 
2009), 43. 
9 Ibid., 44. 
10 Ibid., 45. 
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 Two hundred years after Descartes, Immanuel Kant, too, describes thinking as 
perceiving.  Kant’s account significantly differs from Descartes’s account, however, in two 
fundamental ways.  First, Kant situates thinking in a more systematic account of mental 
processes and assigns it a highly specific function (rather than describing thinking as the 
encompassing category of all mental activities).  Second, in contrast to Cartesian mind-body 
dualism, Kant posits an intimate connection between sensation and thought.  In the Critique 
of Pure Reason, Kant states that thinking is one of the key activities of the faculty of the 
understanding and explains that sensation provides content for thought.  Whereas sensation 
allows a person to intuit the manifold of appearances, thought perceives things by 
predicating concepts of intuitions: “thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without 
concepts are blind.”11  Bringing intuitions under concepts makes them intelligible and, 
thereby, knowable.  As Kant defines it: “Thought is knowledge by means of concepts.”12  
Later in the book, in the “Transcendental Deduction,” Kant clarifies the importance of the 
“I think.”  He writes that the “I think” must “accompany all my representations.” 13  
Whatever a person mentally represents to herself must also be thinkable by that person.  The 
“I think,” thereby, conditions the synthetic unity of apperception.  In order to experience 
mental representations (i.e. to perceive things) in a unified way, where one’s consciousness is 
identical to itself and persists through time, all of one’s representations must occur to a 
singular “I” that thinks them.  Kant, thus, describes thought as perception, as a faculty that 
renders appearances knowable, and notes its fundamental importance for the identity of 
consciousness. 
                                                
11 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (New York: St. 
Martin’s, 1965), 93; KRV A51/B75. 
12 Ibid., 106; KRV A69/B94. 
13 Ibid., 152; KRV B131. 
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 So far, I have illustrated how Aristotle, Aquinas, Descartes, and Kant conceptualize 
thinking as perceiving.  It is important, however, not to reduce their theories to this.  Kant, 
for example, also discusses thinking in his 1784 piece, “What is Enlightenment?”  There, he 
describes independent thinking as an activity that helps humans progress and thrive in 
society.  Though Kant does not offer an explicit characterization of thinking in “What is 
Enlightenment?,” it is clear that he does not mean thinking as perceiving but, rather, 
thinking as examining.  He endorses the importance of thinking as an activity that enables 
humans to emerge from “self-incurred minority,” breaking free from prejudice, dutifully 
contributing to the welfare of their societies, and valuing the dignity of their rational being.14  
These are not the achievements of mere perception.  They come about through 
consideration of oneself and the world.  This is much closer to the Platonic concept of 
thinking as examining than to thinking as perceiving.  This way of thinking is also important 
to Aristotle, Aquinas, and Descartes in that they take up thinking as examination in carrying 
out their own work (each of them was doubtless involved in thinking as examination), even 
if their explicit theories of thinking tend more toward describing it as perception.  With the 
rise of phenomenology in the 20th Century, however, philosophers such as Martin Heidegger 
and Hannah Arendt more readily define thinking as examination. 
This shift is due, in part, to Heidegger’s interpretation of Aristotle, Aquinas, 
Descartes, and Kant.  He finds their views to be entrenched in the metaphysical tradition 
that, according to him, envelops all Western philosophy up through Nietzsche as well as 
                                                
14 Immanuel Kant, “An answer to the question: What is Enlightenment?” in Practical 
Philosophy, ed. and trans. Mary J. Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge, 1996), 17. 
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aspects of his own early work.15  This tradition privileges objectivity over subjectivity and 
tends to rely on dichotomies such as that between mind and body.  In turn, these stances 
orient metaphysical investigations of thinking toward discovering how it works universally, 
in all human minds, divorced from subjective experiences of it.  Metaphysicians often 
describe thinking as a human mental faculty that performs certain functions (such as 
perception) for every person by virtue of its place in the human mental apparatus.  Besides 
the fact that in the history of metaphysical philosophy, some accounts of the mind miss the 
mark of achieving a universal theory simply because they exclude some humans—for 
example, women, people of color, or people of certain socio-economic status—from the 
group they attempt to describe, 16  the metaphysical approach to examining thinking 
overlooks other ways of characterizing it.  Metaphysics ignores other aspects of the 
occurrence of thinking that may be revealed by attending to how people experience it.   
The imperative of the phenomenological tradition, “To the things themselves!”—an 
imperative posed by Heidegger’s teacher and the founder of phenomenology, Edmund 
Husserl—aims to orient philosophy toward phenomena (that is, things that show 
themselves17).  Though in Being and Time, Heidegger’s main objective was to reawaken the 
question of the meaning of being by investigating the phenomenon of Da-sein, Heidegger 
later explored the phenomenon of thinking.  Rather than continuing the definition of 
                                                
15 In The Event, written fourteen years after Being and Time, Heidegger critiques the earlier text 
because, according to him, it remains “still within the broadest sphere of ‘metaphysics.’” 
(Martin Heidegger, The Event, trans. Richard Rojcewicz (Bloomington: Indiana, 2013), 75.  
16 Aristotle, for example, though he attributes them with humanity, maintains that slaves and 
women have weak souls by nature and cannot rule themselves by rational principles.  In The 
Politics, he writes that “the deliberative faculty in the soul is not at all present in a slave; in a 
female it is present but ineffective…” (Aristotle, The Politics, trans. T.A. Sinclair (London: 
Penguin, 1981), 1260a).  
17 In Being and Time, Heidegger describes the meaning of “phenomenon” through the Greek 
term, phainesthai.  Phainesthai is a verb that means, “to show itself” (see Martin Heidegger, 
Being and Time, trans. Joan Stambaugh (Albany: SUNY, 1996), 25-30). 
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thinking as perception, in his 1944 lecture course, Introduction to Philosophy—Thinking and 
Poetizing, describes philosophical thinking as an essential part of human life, as an activity 
proper to human beings “as reflective-thinking” beings.18  Thinking brings humans closer to 
the phenomena around them and this determines whether they will be “at home or not at 
home in this place where they sojourn.”19  For Heidegger, thinking has to do with examining 
phenomena and, people, by thinking, can dwell more authentically in the world into which 
they are always already thrown.   
Heidegger’s student, Hannah Arendt, treats thinking exemplarily as examining.  She 
does this by employing Heideggerian phenomenology and explicitly adopting Plato’s 
description of thinking from the Theaetetus.  Although she identifies thinking as one of the 
three primary activities of the life of the mind and describes its bearing (or lack thereof) 
upon willing and judging (the other two primary activities), for Arendt thinking is not 
primarily a matter of perceiving.  Instead, Arendt describes it as a process of examination.  
Echoing Socrates’s description of thinking, Arendt holds that people think when they 
consider matters in conversation with themselves.  She also describes what thinking is 
phenomenologically by discussing how it appears (or, rather, does not appear) in the world 
and what the experience of thinking is like from a first-person perspective.  Arendt’s 
examination of thinking, though present throughout the corpus of her work, fills out the 
first volume (Thinking) of her final work, The Life of the Mind.  According to Arendt, thinking 
(and other activities of the mind) are utterly “invisible,” or non-apparent, in a world of 
                                                
18 Martin Heidegger, Introduction to Philosophy—Thinking and Poetizing, trans. Phillip Jacques 
Braunstein (Bloomington: Indiana, 2011), 3. 
19 Ibid. 
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appearances.20  Since thinking is invisible, it can take place only when one withdraws from 
the world, though it remains temporally situated in the now of the present moment.  
Thinking is motivated, moreover, by the essential human need for meaning that people seek 
to fulfill when they experience wonder or conflicting ideas that are in need of 
reconciliation.21  Beyond making sense of thinking through both her own experience and 
others’ written accounts of it (especially those of Socrates, as reported by Plato), Arendt 
deems thinking important vis-à-vis human morality.  She is particularly concerned with the 
question of whether thinking can stop a person from doing evil.  She thereby locates the 
work thinking does in social and political life.  In sum, for Arendt, thinking is an activity in 
which people converse with themselves, often to examine matters pertinent to morality. 
    In this dissertation, I, too, consider, from a phenomenological perspective, a type 
of thinking that can be classified as examination.  My project, however, differs from those 
discussed so far in that I do not attempt a general characterization of thinking.  All the 
authors discussed above characterize thinking in its entirety, at its most basic and general 
level.  Though it could be argued that thinking as perception and thinking as examination are 
two different types of thinking, the above authors characterize thinking as either essentially 
perception or essentially examination.  It is also possible, however, to analyze the different 
ways of either perceiving or examining.  My dissertation, rather than analyzing thinking as a 
whole, as either perception or examination, describes how a certain type of examination, 
namely, critical-reflective thinking, takes place.  Critical-reflective thinking is thinking 
because, in line with the traditional characterization of thinking, it is a mental activity.  Yet, it 
                                                
20 Hannah Arendt, Thinking, vol. 1, The Life of the Mind (San Diego: Harcourt Brace 
Jovanovich, 1978), 72.  In addition, thinking deals with invisibles (ideas and thoughts), which 
also do not appear in the world. 
21 Ibid., 150-153. 
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has particular phenomenological characteristics that set it apart from examination (and 
perception) in general as well as from other activities that can be classified as thinking.   
Types of thinking might be better described as ways of thinking, distinguished from 
each other by virtue of what their aims are and/or how they occur. Two prominent types of 
thinking are deliberating about decisions and ruminating about past events.  Each of these ways 
of thinking has a particular goal: whereas deliberation aims at making a decision, rumination 
recollects and contemplates a day’s events.  Deliberation is ends-oriented, since it aims at 
making a decision (something that must be completed beyond the activity of thinking) while 
rumination, whose only goal is to participate in the activity of thinking itself, is an end in 
itself.  A variety of types of thinking such as these have been described by other authors in 
the history of Western philosophy.  Thomas Hobbes, for example, describes a further type 
of ends-oriented thinking in the Leviathan for example under the name “reasoning” or 
“reckoning.”  Reckoning is a type of thinking that aims at calculating consequences or 
working backwards to find the causes of some consequence.  Hobbes defines reckoning as: 
“conceiving of the consequence of the names of all the parts, to the name of the whole; or 
from the names of the whole and one part, to the name of the other part.”22  Reckoning 
might appear to be the same as mathematics, but it exceeds this subject area and is relevant 
to all circumstances in which parts and wholes are involved.  Such circumstances include 
logical argumentation, physics, and prediction (a practice wherein consequences must be 
projected from present factors).23  Reckoning is distinct from deliberating about a decision, 
pondering a problem, and ruminating because it has particular aims (i.e., discovering 
consequences or conditions) that are not pursued by these others.  In contrast to reckoning 
                                                
22 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. C.B. Macpherson (Penguin: New York, 1968), 110. 
23 Ibid., 110-112. 
 11 
and deliberating, critical-reflective thinking (though it is accompanied by positive bi-products 
including growth in understanding) does not take up aims beyond itself and, in this, it is 
similar to rumination.    
Different types of thinking can also be distinguished from each other by virtue of 
how they take place (e.g. whether they begin when a person chooses to perform them or 
whether they simply befall a person) or the aims people pursue in taking them up (e.g. 
whether they are oriented toward achieving certain ends or not).  For instance, some types of 
thinking can be chosen and carried out at will while other types befall a person.  Deliberating 
about a decision, for example, is a mental activity a person can simply choose to perform 
whereas the event of spontaneously having an idea happens precisely when one does not 
compel its occurrence.  Still others types of thinking might be instigated through external 
provocation emanating from a gadfly or stingray, or, as for Socrates, through internal 
provocation by one’s daimon.  Considering what one thought one knew, for example, may 
occur only when one discovers that one never knew it in the first place.  This can occur 
when someone else, Socrates for instance, demands that one give an account of something 
and one discovers that one cannot.  Critical-reflective thinking, too, requires a type of 
provocation: an invitation to think, which is issued by a prompting event.  Since such 
prompts cannot be compelled, critical-reflective thinking is also distinct from deliberating 
about a decision.   
“Critical-reflective thinking” is a term I have coined to describe a phenomenon that 
appears in many experiential accounts of thought.  It is a mental activity in which a person 
critically considers something that she has been taking as true without prior reflection, i.e., a 
presupposition.  Plato, Henry David Thoreau, Martin Heidegger, and Hannah Arendt all 
provide examples of its occurrence, although they do not theorize critical-reflective thinking 
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thematically.  Due, however, to their descriptive approaches to philosophy, these authors 
provide examples that are rich in detail and ripe for analysis.  My account of critical-reflective 
thinking has been deeply influenced by their works.  This dissertation, however, examines 
only the pertinent aspects of each of these authors’ works rather than fully explicating the 
thought of any one of them.  Thoreau, Arendt, Heidegger, and Plato each have their own 
rich and sophisticated theories about thinking more broadly.  Though I engage with their 
wider theories of thinking throughout the dissertation, these theories are not the main topic 
under consideration.  Instead, I formulate a notion of critical-reflective thinking and describe 
how it shows up in their writings.  
This dissertation is composed of three chapters: “The Phenomenon of Critical-
Reflective Thinking,” “The Value of Critical-Reflective Thinking,” and “Cultivating Critical-
Reflective Thinking.”  The first chapter explores the event of critical-reflective thinking by 
analyzing similarities among accounts of it in the works of Plato, Thoreau, Arendt, and 
Heidegger.  These accounts provide rich material for specifying presuppositions as what 
comes under consideration in critical-reflective thinking and for describing the prompts that 
invite people to critically-reflectively think.  Presuppositions are not just ideas people have; 
people are usually not conscious of their presuppositions, and these presuppositions deeply 
undergird how they see the world and go about life.  Presuppositions are notions people take 
as true and that function as frameworks providing understandings that underlie how they 
lead their lives.  A presupposition might undergird what a person values, endorse a way of 
living, or inform how she sees the world.  Presuppositions are often shared among people 
who exist in the same historical time, place, community, or family.  Sometimes, however, 
people have somewhat idiosyncratic presuppositions that have been formed through their 
personal histories, on the basis of their own thoughts and experiences.  In critical reflection, 
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a person both becomes aware of a presupposition and considers its truth or worthiness.  The 
result of this process need not be the destruction and abandonment of the presupposition.  
Though this does sometimes happen, critical-reflective thinking can also reinforce a 
presupposition’s hold. 
 In everyday life, people are not often aware of, let alone critically concerned with, 
their presuppositions.  Presuppositions instead operate in the background, always already 
forming one’s prior understanding of the world, oneself, and others.  An event that brings a 
presupposition to awareness must occur in order for a person to critically reflect upon it.  I 
call such events “prompts.”  Prompts can take place at any time and place, and they issue an 
invitation to consider a presupposition.  Some people can be prompted by their own 
thoughts, while others are prompted through conversations or events.  People cannot, 
however, compel prompts to occur.  The person affected by a prompt responds to its 
invitation to think by either thinking or not thinking.   
 There are great benefits to accepting a prompt’s invitation to critically and 
reflectively think.  In chapter two, “The Value of Critical-Reflective Thinking,” I consider 
how critically reflecting on presuppositions can facilitate growth in understanding and 
liberation from unreflective ways of seeing and going about.  To explore how growth and 
liberation take place, I bring Hans-Georg Gadamer and Ralph Waldo Emerson into 
dialogue.  Gadamer and Emerson contribute to the discussion by offering a dynamic account 
of the “horizon of understanding.”  Horizons delimit a person’s possibilities for 
understanding and going about.  Horizons can, however, be reshaped and expanded through 
critical-reflective thinking.  I argue that horizons are partly delimited by presuppositions.  
When a person considers a presupposition, her horizon expands via awareness of a part of it 
that was previously unnoticed.  Critically considering presuppositions implies greater self-
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awareness that can deepen understanding of what underlies one’s view of the world and 
open other ways of seeing, though it never makes a person completely transparent to herself.  
In addition, the telos (ultimate endpoint or aim) of critical-reflective thinking is not reaching 
or striving toward any particular understanding, but continual growth and liberation with 
respect to one’s own previous understanding (or horizon). 
 Because critical-reflective thinking is valuable, people might want to practice it more 
often or more deeply.  In the final chapter, “Cultivating Critical-Reflective Thinking,” I 
propose that people can enhance their own open receptivity for critical-reflective thinking by 
taking up certain activities.  Since people cannot compel prompts to occur, working on 
developing themselves in ways that encourage acceptance of prompts and critical 
engagement with presuppositions can facilitate, though not cause, the occurrence of critical-
reflective thinking.  Arendt, Thoreau, and Plato suggest the importance of solitude, leisure, 
and attentive wakefulness in this context.  Heidegger advocates a practice of meditation that, 
I argue, allows one to adopt an open and receptive attitude.  I also draw on Plato for a brief 
discussion of how practicing virtues such as courage, fortitude, and humility can facilitate 
critical-reflective thinking. 
 In this dissertation, I treat thinking as examination rather than as perception.  I 
describe critical-reflective thinking as an event in which people examine the presuppositions 
that underlie how they see and go about the world.  Furthermore, I use a phenomenological 
methodology that promotes the analysis of textual examples and personal experience for the 
purpose of theorizing critical-reflective thinking as a phenomenon of everyday life.  By 
conceptualizing its salient features (such as prompts, presuppositions, growth in 
understanding, and liberation to new possibilities), I hope to shed light on a common human 
experience, how it takes place and its significance for self-reflection and -examination.  In 
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addition to illuminating a phenomenon that has, to my knowledge, been left unthematized in 
the history of Western philosophy, this exploration promotes personal reflection on one’s 
own experiences of thinking and the significance of thinking in one’s life. 
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CHAPTER ONE: 
THE PHENOMENON OF CRITICAL-REFLECTIVE THINKING 
 
 
Having bathed after his day’s labor, John Farmer24 sat down and began to consider 
the tasks awaiting him the next day.  In the midst of his thoughts, he heard a flute that 
“came home to his ears out of a different sphere from that he worked in, and suggested 
work for certain faculties which slumbered in him.”25  The strains of the flute summoned 
him from his thoughts and instigated a train of questioning: “A voice said to him,—Why do 
you stay here and live this mean moiling life, when a glorious existence is possible for you?  
Those same stars twinkle over other fields than these.”26  The question directly criticized the 
way of life that he normally practiced.  Farmer discovered that other fields, other 
possibilities, for his life existed: there were other ways for him to live.   
 In the brief account of John Farmer, given by Henry David Thoreau in Walden, 
Farmer’s thinking displays several distinguishing features.  First of all, John Farmer did not 
begin to think critically about his life simply by choosing to do so.  Instead, the music of the 
flute somehow drew him into thoughtful reflection.  Second, in the considerations and 
question that followed from the flute’s prompt, Farmer engaged in deep criticism of his own 
life.  The voice that seemed to speak to him posed a critical question about something he 
had often taken for granted: his normal everyday way of living.  If asked to describe what 
                                                
24 John Farmer was identified in manuscript drafts of Henry David Thoreau’s Walden as John 
Spaulding (Jeffrey S. Cramer, “Editorial Footnotes,” in Walden, ed. Jeffrey S. Cramer (New 
Haven: Yale, 2004), 213f).  Spaulding’s farm is also mentioned in Thoreau’s essay, 
“Walking.”  Thoreau does not, however, detail Spaulding’s life in his writings. 
25 Henry D. Thoreau, Walden, ed. Jeffrey S. Cramer (New Haven: Yale, 2004), 213. 
26 Ibid. 
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John Farmer was doing in this moment, I would say he was thinking.  But, not just thinking 
in general. Rather, a certain sort of thinking was taking place.  
 These features and their apparent connectedness in Farmer’s thinking process are 
not unique to Thoreau’s description of thinking.  Martin Heidegger, Hannah Arendt, and 
Plato all provide similar examples of a type of thinking that (1) is prompted by something 
that invites thinking and (2) leads to the critical questioning of something that the thinker 
normally presupposes.  In fact, examples of this type of thinking appear in the work of many 
different authors, as will become apparent by the breadth of evidence employed in this 
dissertation.  The particular phenomenological attention that Heidegger, Arendt, Thoreau, 
and Plato give to the topic makes their descriptions of and theories about thinking 
particularly rich.  Other notions of thinking prevalent in the history of philosophy describe 
thinking as a subjectively instigated mental activity (e.g. deliberation) or as the constantly and 
automatically occurring mental perception.27   The type of thinking described by these 
philosophers is, however, fundamentally different.  John Farmer did not instigate his own 
thinking.  Rather, it was instigated by the music of the flute.  His thinking was also not just 
the perception of the sounds of the flute.  His thought offered a deep critique of something 
completely unrelated to the music, namely, how he led his life. 
 In the examples of this type of thinking that Thoreau, Heidegger, Arendt, and Plato 
give, a phenomenon that demands its own analysis and explanation is revealed.  I call the 
phenomenon “critical-reflective thinking.”  In critical-reflective thinking, the thinker is 
prompted to reflect on something that she had, up until then, presupposed.  Encountering a 
presupposition opens it to question, and the thinker, then, interrogates it through critical 
                                                
27 See “Introduction” above for comparison of critical-reflective thinking to other historical 
notions of thinking. 
 18 
scrutiny.  Both of these moments take place together in occurrences of critical-reflective 
thinking.  I will refer to these two moments of critical-reflective thinking as (1) the prompt 
and (2) the critical moment.  As I will show, however, one moment does not cause the other.  
Rather, the prompt makes way for the critical moment.  This qualitative relationship 
bespeaks the phenomenological connectedness of the two moments.  Thus, I treat the 
phenomenon of critical-reflective thinking as a unified phenomenon of which each moment 
is a part.    
Thoreau’s example of John Farmer paradigmatically demonstrates these two 
structural moments that are present in all instances of critical-reflective thinking.  In critical-
reflective thinking, Farmer’s way of life came into question following the prompt of the 
flute.  It became apparent to him that his life was “mean” and “moiling” when other, more 
“glorious” ways to live were possible.28  Although the reader does not know whether Farmer 
has had these thoughts before, his subsequent considerations and the question that posed 
itself to him oppose the way of life that he had been affirming simply by continuing to lead 
it.  In turn, this affirmation signaled that he had presupposed its necessity, whether 
intentionally or not.  In what follows, I will examine this prompt-criticism structure through 
examples given by Thoreau, Plato, Arendt, and Heidegger.  In this section, each of these 
philosophers will be introduced through an example of critical-reflective thinking discussed 
in their work.  Although I began with a Thoreauvian example, I turn now to Plato, the first 
philosopher in the chronology of the philosophers of thinking whose work I engage.  
 The Platonic dialogues offer numerous examples of the phenomenon of critical-
reflective thinking.  In the dialogues, Plato paints Socrates as a masterful thinker who is 
often immersed in reflection and who challenges his contemporaries to think as well.  One 
                                                
28 Ibid.  
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example that clearly exhibits the prompt-criticism structure comes from the Apology, where 
Socrates describes how his daimon, or “spiritual sign,” calls him to stop and think.  Socrates’ 
daimon is a kind prompt that is unique to him.29  His experiences of the daimon began during 
childhood, and whenever his daimon calls to him, it stops him from what he is about to do.  
During the course of his defense, Socrates describes the daimon as “a voice, and whenever it 
speaks it turns me away from something I am about to do, but it never encourages me to do 
anything.”30  Although the daimon does not tell him to do anything in particular, it prompts 
him to reflect by giving him pause.  In the Apology, Socrates defends himself in a trial against 
charges of impiety and corruption, but in the end is sentenced to death.  In this dialogue, he 
describes how the daimon’s presence stopped him from taking part in public affairs during his 
adult life and, conversely, how its absence during his trial leads him to think that his 
impending death is not an evil.     
 Although the daimon does not call to Socrates to stop and think in the Apology, when 
he notices its absence, he is given pause.  The absence of the daimon, that is, prompts 
Socrates to think.  Socrates remarks on his “surprise” that his daimon did not call to him in 
the morning or during the trial.31  In the past his daimon had opposed him even in “small 
matters,” yet on the day of his trial, when he is faced with “what one might think, and what 
is generally thought to be, the worst of evils [i.e. a possible death sentence], [his] divine sign 
has not opposed” him.32  When Socrates notices the absence of his daimon, he stops to 
examine this fact and what it means about his conviction and sentence.  Because he trusts 
the daimon entirely, he says to the crowd, “it is impossible that my familiar sign did not 
                                                
29 Socrates also discusses his spiritual sign elsewhere (see the Phaedrus and the Euthydemus). 
30 Plato, Apology, trans. G.M.A. Grube, in Plato: Complete Works, ed. John M. Cooper 
(Indianapolis: Hackett, 1997), 31d. 
31 Ibid., 40a. 
32 Ibid., 40a-b. 
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oppose me if I was not about to do what was right.”33  He believes that if he had been about 
to do wrong during the course of his trial by what he said or did in his defense, the daimon 
would have called him to stop.  So, its absence, too, is worthy of consideration. 
 Socrates interprets the absence of the daimon as an indication that what he said in his 
defense was not wrong even though it led to his death sentence.  In fact, according to 
Socrates, death “may well be a good thing.”34  The presupposition he critically examines is 
precisely that death is the worst of all evils.  Socrates says that, indeed, many would suppose 
that death is the worst evil.  If death were the worst evil, Socrates reasons, his daimon would 
have appeared and stopped him from making a defense that would lead him to a death 
sentence.35  In response to the prompt that is the daimon’s absence, Socrates begins to inquire 
into the nature of death.  He quickly finds that death might be a good thing: it could be a 
state in which one is “nothing” and has “no perception” or it could be “a change and 
relocating for the soul from here to another place…and all who have died are there.”36  In 
the first case, death would be like the soundest, most pleasant sleep, and this is not the worst 
of all evils.37  If death were a relocation, it would be a great blessing because he would have a 
chance to meet, converse with, and examine the great men who had already died.38   In either 
case, the outcome is not the worst of all evils.  In examining this presupposition after having 
                                                
33 Ibid., 40c. 
34 Ibid., 40b. 
35 In the Gorgias and the Phaedo, Socrates argues that the health of the soul is more valuable 
than the health of the body.  He also says that the soul is the most valuable thing of all.  If 
this view can be imported into the Apology, we can imagine that the illness or fracture of the 
soul, rather than the death of the body, would be the worst of all evils. 
36 Plato, Apology, 40c, 40e. 
37 Ibid., 40d-e. 
38 Ibid., 41a, 41c.  Socrates mentions Orpheus, Musaeus, Hesiod, Homer, Agamemnon, 
Odysseus, Sisyphus, “and innumerable other men and women” (Apology, 41c). 
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been prompted by the absence of his daimon, Socrates participates in critical-reflective 
thinking.   
 Arendt deeply engaged the topic of thinking in her own work, notably in her essays 
included in Responsibility and Judgment, observation of Adolf Otto Eichmann’s trial and, later, 
an entire volume of The Life of the Mind.  One of the most striking examples of her own 
experience of critical-reflective thinking is displayed in her narrative account of her own 
project.  She, like Socrates, described how something she experienced prompted her critical 
work, although it was not a spiritual sign like the daimon.  In “Thinking and Moral 
Considerations,” she writes that she was “struck by a phenomenon.”39  This phenomenon 
instigated her critique of the traditional notion of evil.  The phenomenon that struck her was 
Eichmann’s seeming inability to think.  Eichmann worked as a Nazi logistics expert who 
scheduled trains to transport Jewish and other persons to the camps where millions were 
killed.  During his trial, however, Eichmann proclaimed that he never wanted to hurt any of 
these people.  Why, then, did he continue to serve as a transportation expert for the Nazis?  
Arendt thinks it had to do with his inability to thoughtfully confront the real consequences 
of his actions.     
Eichmann’s inability to think was particularly apparent in the way he spoke, using 
clichés and the “Officialese” of the government.40  By using this “pre-scripted language,” 
Eichmann avoided having to autonomously consider the meaning of his actions.41  The 
“standardized codes of expression” allowed him to understand events in terms that gave 
                                                
39 Hannah Arendt, “Thinking and Moral Considerations,” in Responsibility and Judgment, ed. 
Jerome Kohn (New York: Schocken, 2003), 161. 
40 Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil (New York: Penguin, 
2006), 49. 
41 Arendt, “Thinking and Moral Considerations,” 160. 
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meaning in the context of the Nazi regime.42  This “pre-scripted” meaning effectively 
distanced him and many other officers from the reality of their acts.  For example, the term 
“Final Solution” literally meant the eradication of all Jewish people and others targeted by 
Nazi eugenics.  The abominable meaning of such a “solution” was, however, veiled by the 
use of this expression as the “Officialese” of the administration.43  Everyone who took part 
in the “solution” obeyed the official demands of the government in power.  The officers saw 
their official undertakings as “necessary tasks” of their difficult mission.44         
This phenomenon of Eichmann utilizing words imbued with “official” meaning and 
not thinking for himself about the real consequences of his acts “attracted [Arendt’s] 
interest.”45  This attraction prompted Arendt’s “thinking attention.”46  As in John Farmer’s 
experience, a question “imposed itself”: 
Could the activity of thinking as such, the habit of examining and reflecting 
upon whatever happens to come to pass, regardless of specific content and 
quite independent of results, could this activity be of such a nature that it 
“conditions” men against evildoing?47          
 
Arendt’s question asks whether there is a connection between thinking and moral action.  
Can thinking condition humans against doing evil?  Correlatively, is one’s “inability to think” 
related to one’s ability to perpetrate atrocities?48   
Eichmann’s remarkable lack of thought, coupled with the absence of malice with 
which he did his job of organizing trains, prompted Arendt to begin critically reflecting on 
the notion of evil that imbued her society.  Her society took evil to be rooted in the 
                                                
42 Ibid. 
43 Arendt, Eichmann, 48. 
44 Ibid., 105-6. 
45 Arendt, “Thinking and Moral Considerations,” 160. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Arendt, Eichmann, 49. 
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“wickedness, pathology, or ideological conviction of the doer.”49  Evil people were thereby 
defined as those who are somehow monstrous or demonic because they sadistically and 
purposively harm others.50  Eichmann, however, was not purposively wicked in perpetrating 
atrocities.  Instead, he just could not think about the suffering he was helping to inflict.51  
Arendt criticized the traditional definition of evil because she saw Eichmann as evil too, 
though in a different way.  She described how evil can also be present in behaviors 
performed carelessly and without thought.  Evil can take place in the everyday: it can be 
banal.  As in Nazi Germany, evil behaviors can even be institutionally allowed and 
recommended by government and society.  When the government not only condones, but 
also requires such actions, the fact that they are evil might, for some, be occluded.  Doing 
evil can, thus, become mundane.  Eichmann’s behavior prompted Arendt to think, and she 
thereby critically examined the traditional notion of evil, which many around her 
presupposed.     
 Heidegger, in Being and Time, offers a poignant example of critical-reflective thinking 
in which a human Da-sein is called by its conscience into reflection upon itself.  Da-sein, 
literally translated, “being there,” is the way of being of human beings and not itself a being.  
Humans, “being there,” always find themselves in a world, among other beings with which 
they are concerned.  Da-sein, however, is different from the way of being of other beings in 
the world: while humans are essentially concerned with their own being, other beings are 
not.  Though humans have this essential concern, they often forget about the importance of 
their own being.  They often do not expressly concern themselves with their way of being, 
                                                
49 Arendt, “Thinking and Moral Considerations, 159. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Although Arendt famously says that Eichmann had the “inability to think” (Eichmann in 
Jerusalem 47) elsewhere, she also says that thinking is a possibility for every person.  Humans 
are and always have been “thinking beings” (Arendt, Thinking, 11).    
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Da-sein, which grounds their nature (Wesen).  When, then, the “call of conscience” prompts a 
human to think, the human can notice that it has become lost in a way of being that is 
unreflective and not expressly concerned with its own being.  Heidegger calls this way of 
being the way of a they-self.  Having fallen prey to the they (das Man), Da-sein leads an 
inauthentic existence and does not consider its own being.  When, by contrast, it is called by 
its conscience, a human Da-sein is prompted to encounter its being a they-self.  
Everyday Da-sein, for the most part, has the character of a they-self.52  It primarily 
leads an unreflective, average, everyday existence.  Da-sein, moreover, always already 
understands itself and others within the worldly context into which it has been thrown.  As 
they-self, Da-sein takes care of things and spends time among others without considering its 
own being.  When we (as human Da-sein) exist in the mode of they-self, we simply behave 
like others:  
We enjoy ourselves and have fun the way they enjoy themselves.  We read, 
see, and judge literature and art the way they see and judge.  But we also 
withdraw from the “great mass” the way they withdraw, we find “shocking” 
what they find shocking.  The they, which is nothing definite and which all 
are, though not as a sum, prescribes the kind of being of everydayness.53 
 
Understandings of everything from enjoyment to shock are already given (and accepted).  By 
accepting the given understandings and ways of proceeding, one avoids the difficult work of 
recognizing and coping with the fact that one has a being of one’s own and is capable of 
taking responsibility for one’s own possibilities.  As they-self, Da-sein is disburdened of any 
need for explicit concern about its own being. 54   Everydayness, however, does not 
completely obstruct Da-sein’s capacity to return to concern about its being, which is 
grounded in its Wesen.  Da-sein can be summoned back to its Wesen via the “call of 
                                                
52 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. Joan Stambaugh (Albany: SUNY, 1996), 121. 
53 Ibid., 119, 126-127. 
54 Ibid., 120, 128. 
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conscience.”  When conscience calls, Da-sein is summoned “to its ownmost potentiality-of-
being-a-self.”55  It is called to take on the burden of its being.  Instead of allowing das Man to 
dictate its way of being, it must choose how to be.  The call of conscience operates as the 
prompt in this example.   
 In the call of conscience, Da-sein is specifically prompted to recall that it has a being 
of its own.  Because it has this being of its own, it has the opportunity to realize possibilities 
outside of those normally taken up by das Man.  Prior to the call of conscience, however, it 
had simply taken up being like the others.  The call, moreover, is bound up with Angst.  In 
Angst, a human Da-sein becomes anxious (Heidegger also calls this anxiety uncanniness), 
though without a particular object in the face of which this feeling occurs.  Though the 
anxious person might attribute her Angst to some particular aspect of her life, the true source 
of Angst is Da-sein’s individual being-in-the-world wherein it can choose its own possibilities 
(i.e. that it exists and can choose its own way of being).  Da-sein can have Angst whether or 
not it expressly knows that it has its “own potentiality-of-being.”56   Its anxious uncanniness, 
because the feeling has to do with its own being, is radically individuating.  Da-sein might not 
undergo the call of conscience when in Angst.  Angst, however, attunes Da-sein to its own 
individuality and possibility for being.  When the call of conscience takes place, Da-sein is 
summoned to itself, away from das Man, so that it can “project upon its ownmost 
potentiality-of-being.”57  Without the attunement of Angst, Da-sein would not be able to 
come “face to face with its own uncanniness.”58   
                                                
55 Ibid., 249. 
56 Ibid., 255.  “Angst reveals in Da-sein its being toward its ownmost potentiality of being, that 
is, being free for the freedom of choosing and grasping itself” (Being and Time, 176).  
57 Ibid., 256. 
58 Ibid., 272. 
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The call summons Da-sein to its own being, and Da-sein thereby recognizes that it has 
forgotten the possibility of being itself that lies outside of the dictates of das Man.  This 
usually means that it realizes that there are possibilities beyond those that das Man 
recognizes.  The human Da-sein, thereby, encounters its presupposition of the rightness of 
the ways of being of the they-self.  Encountering itself enables the human Da-sein to 
recognize its unreflective way of being (i.e. the way of being it had, as they-self, unreflectively 
fallen into and, thus, presupposed as necessary or fitting).  This encounter opens the 
possibility that Da-sein can critically question its being as they-self.  By questioning, it might 
stop being as they-self and, instead, reflectively choose itself and, maybe, also its own 
possibilities.  
 The human Da-sein in this example critiques its way of going about as they-self, 
whereas Socrates is concerned with death, Arendt with evil, and Farmer with his lifestyle.  In 
each of these instances, however, the thinker is prompted by something and tarries with a 
presupposition.  The four examples discussed here demonstrate the key aspects of critical-
reflective thinking: the prompt and the critical moment.  These aspects are formally 
structural.  Although they assume different content in each case, they operate similarly in 
each case of critical-reflective thinking.  The phenomena of prompt and critical moment 
require further explication, however, to make sense of critical-reflective thinking as a 
singular, integrated, well-defined phenomenon of which there are many instances.  The 
following subsections (“The Prompt” and “The Critical Moment”) lay out key aspects of the 
two moments of critical reflective thinking and describe the relationship of each moment to 
the other.   
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THE PROMPT 
 
Critical-reflective thinking is comprised of two elements.  As described above, the 
first of these is the prompt.   The prompt is the occurrence of an invitation to think.  
Prompts always happen to people.59  They are not, in other words, events that occur 
independently.  A prompt occurs when someone is invited to think.  When a person is 
invited to think, she must respond to the prompt.  She may accept or reject the invitation.60  
Each of these constitutes a response to the prompt.  Although the prompt occurs in 
concrete, determinate circumstances and may issue from an object, the prompt itself is an 
occurrence rather than a thing.  In the following, I will elaborate its key characteristics:  
(1) a prompt can address a person from many different sources,  
(2) its arrival is not compelled by human agency,  
(3) it is empty of content, and  
(4) it functions merely as an invitation, without a necessary causal relationship to the 
critical encounter with a presupposition.   
 
Because the prompt is something that humans cannot compel ((2) above), the conditions for 
its occurrence must also be addressed.  Conditions for prompts, though addressed only in 
passing in Chapter One, are a primary topic of discussion in Chapter Three.  At the end of 
this section, I will point our way forward by discussing possible obstructions to the prompt.  
Sources of the Address 
 
We have already seen that the prompt can issue from a variety of sources.  The 
invitation to think has presented itself in the sound of a flute, the warning of a daimon (and 
its absence), reflections upon an individual, and the call of conscience.  These examples 
provide a glimpse into the diversity of sources from which prompts can issue.  Arendt 
                                                
59 Although the question of whether animals too can be prompted might yield interesting 
work, here only humans are under consideration. 
60 A rejection of the prompt includes instances when the thinker ignores the prompt.  
Ignoring, although it is a refusal to take up critical consideration, is still a response to the 
invitation. 
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expresses the breadth of this diversity in “Thinking and Moral Considerations” when she 
writes that all “events and facts” provoke “our thinking attention” simply “by virtue of their 
existence.”61  Anything can be the source of a prompt: an experience, a feeling, an idea, a 
person, a thing.  Although anything can be the source of a prompt, something may not offer 
a prompt, or even the same kind of prompt, to different individuals.  In other words, 
different people are prompted by different things.  In this subsection, I will consider, first, 
the relation between the source and the prompt and, second, the variation of sources among 
different people.        
The relation between source and prompt is not one of identity.  Each source, 
whether an experience, feeling, idea, person, or thing is not the same as an invitation to 
think.  This relation of non-identity holds for all source-prompt pairs.  An individual, like 
Eichmann, who invited Arendt’s thought, is clearly more than just a prompt.  Moreover, the 
prompt cannot be found somewhere in that person.  No matter how much we analyze the 
source of a prompt, the prompt itself cannot be found there in any physically objective 
sense.  Imagine a geologist examining a rock.  In the course of her examination, while 
magnifying and analyzing its minerals, she might be invited into critical-reflective thinking.  
In this example, the source of the prompt is the rock.  If she notices that she has been 
prompted and begins to wonder where the prompt has come from, perhaps she will start 
looking more closely at the rock.  She might dissect it, analyze its composition, and break it 
into pieces.  But no matter how closely she looks, there is no physical aspect of the rock that 
is the prompt.  In the example of John Farmer, we might seek the prompt in the strains of 
the flute.  But the music is not identical with the invitation to think.  And even if we look 
very closely at the notes and trills, the invitation will not be found.  Although the invitation 
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and the sounds happen together, the prompt is not somewhere in the sounds.  The 
invitation is an occurrence of its own that takes place through a source, but is not inherent 
the source.  A prompt and its source must, thus, be differentiated.  The prompt is not some 
physically objective part of its source.  Rather, the prompt occurs through or in the context 
of the source. 
The non-identity of prompt and source is further supported by Elaine Scarry’s 
example of her experience of being prompted by a palm tree.  This example further 
distinguishes the source from the prompt by showing that a thing that has never prompted 
one to think before may suddenly do so.  In On Beauty and Being Just, Scarry explains that she 
had always “confidently repudiated [palm trees] as an object of beauty.”62   One day, 
however, while standing on a balcony, she saw a palm tree’s 
huge swaying leaves…at eye level, arcing, arching, waving, cresting and 
breaking in the soft air, throwing the yellow sunlight up over itself and 
catching it on the other side, running its fingers down its own piano keys, 
then running them back up again, shuffling and dealing glittering decks of 
aqua green, yellow, and white.63  
 
In this moment, Scarry was struck by the beauty of the palm tree.  This sudden 
manifestation of beauty prompted her to reflect upon her former presupposition that palm 
trees are not and cannot be beautiful.  In Scarry’s experience, a prompt took place when she 
noticed a common object through which she had never previously been invited to think.  
She had seen many palm trees before and had surely glimpsed the very palm near the 
balcony prior to her meditation on it at the particular moment when she became enthralled 
by its beauty.  Palm trees in general, and this palm tree in particular, did not consistently yield 
a prompt for her.  An invitation to think, in other words, had not previously issued from this 
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source.  Insofar as the palm trees and prompt are not inherently simultaneous, this example 
reiterates the non-identity of source and prompt.      
Conversely, moreover, things that have prompted one in the past may not 
consistently continue to do so.  A place or an object that had, at one time, remarkably 
excited one’s thought can become dull or so overworked with consideration as to no longer 
invite one to think.  Even in cases when something has always previously provided a 
prompt, it may not continue to do so.  This might occur when someone experiences 
something new for the first time.  The experience of a new food or activity might be the 
source of a prompt that, after repeated trials, ceases to occur.  For example, having been 
raised as a strict vegetarian, my first experiments in eating meat drew my attention to my 
prior understandings of nutrition.  Although I did not ultimately decide to integrate meat 
into my diet, I imagine that had I done so, its novelty would have worn off and meat would 
have become commonplace for me.  I would no longer be prompted by it to think about 
how I eat.  The disappearance of this prompt would show that a usual source is not 
necessarily a consistent source.  Prompts do not always take place through particular sources, 
so prompts are not identical with their sources.     
This does not, however, preclude the possibility that a prompt might often issue 
from a particular source for a particular thinker.  Thoreau explicates the relation between 
people and particular sources when, in a chapter from Walden entitled “Solitude,” he writes,   
What do we want to dwell most near to? […] to the perennial source of our 
life, whence in all our experiences we have found that [i.e. life] to issue, as the 
willow stands near the water and sends out its roots in that direction.  This 
will vary with different natures…64 
 
                                                
64 Thoreau, Walden, 129. 
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The fact that a source of life is perennial refers to the fact that it can be constant or 
continual for a certain person.  A person might be enlivened by a specific thing over and 
over again.  In the passage, Thoreau suggests that to be more alive, one should dwell near to 
the source in whose presence one is continually enlivened.  The willow does this naturally by 
sending its roots toward the water.  Humans too can physically nourish themselves by 
acquiring basic necessities like food, water, shelter, and clothing.  Thoreau, however, has 
something other than physical life in mind when he recommends that humans dwell near to 
the source of life.  Although it is not immediately clear from the passage at hand, living, for 
Thoreau, is partly constituted by thinking.  If one is truly alive when one thinks, then the 
passage can be interpreted as a suggestion to dwell near to the sources that perennially 
prompt thought.   
In “Where I Lived and What I Lived For,” a chapter that precedes the passage 
above, Thoreau connects life with thinking via a discussion of wakefulness.  He writes: “To 
be awake is to be alive.”65  Contrary to understanding “being awake” as a descriptor of a 
person’s physical state, wakefulness is defined by the ability to take part in deep thinking.  
For Thoreau, being awake has little to do with getting out of bed in the morning and “what 
the clocks say.”66  In the morning, when we awaken, “there is least somnolence in us; and for 
an hour, at least, some part of us awakes which slumbers the rest of the day.”67  According to 
Thoreau, the part of a person that awakens is his or her intellectual or spiritual faculty.68  
                                                
65 Ibid., 87. 
66 Ibid. 
67 Ibid.  This means, furthermore, that any time of the day when one awakens is the morning.   
68 Though the spiritual faculty is essential to a complete understanding of Thoreau and it is 
not entirely divorced from the intellect, I will concentrate, here, on the intellect. 
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When one is truly awake, one may engage this faculty in “effective intellectual exertion.”69  
Though such wakefulness is often limited to brief moments, Thoreau contends that being 
awake could persist throughout the day: “To him whose elastic and vigorous thought keeps 
pace with the sun, the day is perpetual morning.”70  Thus, Thoreau describes being awake as 
thinking.  If being awake means being alive, then thinking is also constitutive of life.  By 
utilizing Thoreau’s understanding of life as constituted by thinking when reading the passage 
from “Solitude,” the passage more clearly has bearing on critical-reflective thinking.  The 
passage says that thinking is occasioned by various sources.  In order to think, one should 
dwell near the sources where one is perennially enlivened (i.e. prompted).   
Thoreau description of enlivening sources helps explain two facts: first, that different 
individual people are prompted by different sources and, second, that it is possible for 
particular individuals to be perennially prompted by particular sources.  That these facts 
obtain is already apparent in the primary examples discussed so far.  We can see that 
different people are prompted by different things in the examples of Socrates, Farmer, the 
they-self, and Arendt in that the prompt is highly individual in each instance.  Though it is 
possible for two or more people to be prompted by the same source, most often, different 
people are affected differently by a thing.  We might imagine two people viewing the same 
artwork.  Though both might find a painting beautiful, it might be merely a pretty picture to 
one while the other launches into thought after having been prompted through its colors 
and shapes.  Furthermore, the fact that a person can be prompted again and again by the 
same source is already apparent in the example of Socrates and his daimon.  Socrates’ daimon 
continually prompted him throughout his life.   
                                                
69 Ibid.  According to Thoreau, in wakefulness, a vast minority also leads a “poetic or divine 
life” (Walden 87). 
70 Ibid. 
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For Thoreau, the claim that particular sources continually enliven particular persons 
is, however, grounded in the idea that a person’s nature is native, ever-present and, to an 
extent, individually personal.71  As he writes in the passage cited above, the variation of 
sources of life “will vary with different natures.”72  In Thoreau’s account, one’s ever-present, 
personal nature somehow accords with certain sources of life.  This accord is the basis for 
the two facts discussed above.  One is perennially prompted by a particular source because 
one’s nature (as ever-present) always accords with it; one is prompted by a source while 
another is not because it resonates with one’s nature while not with the other’s.  Grounding 
the relation between a source and prompt in personal nature is, however, problematic in the 
context of my project.  For, exploring the metaphysical claim to constant personal nature, 
which underlies a theory of the person that comes along with its own consequences, would 
require a dissertation of its own.  As I will show below, however, Thoreau’s metaphysics of 
the person is dispensable for my purposes.  Rather than by taking recourse to personal 
natures, the continual occurrence of prompts through particular source for certain people, as 
well as its variation among individuals, might be explained by the fact that different 
individuals approach things in different ways.  Sometimes, if someone has an interest in 
some specific thing or activity (or type thereof), one approaches it with open receptivity.  
Such open receptivity facilitates the constancy of prompts that occur as long as one’s 
comportment toward a specific source remains the same.   
When a person has a particular interest in something, she often attends to it 
differently than someone who is not interested in the same thing.  This particular attention 
might allow a thing to prompt her to think again and again.  An art-enthusiast, for example, 
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might often be prompted by artworks while someone who is uninterested in art might not.  
This need not be explained by an inherent, natural difference between the two people.  
Rather, it likely has to do with the fact that the enthusiast attentively engages artworks while 
the other person does not.  The difference between the two people lies in how they 
approach artworks, which depend on their interests and desires.  The enthusiast might 
excitedly approach a work, receptive to finding out what it might reveal to her, while the 
uninterested person might be bored and listlessly mill around the museum until it is time to 
go home.73  Even if the latter attempts to pay attention to the artworks, his disinterest might 
close off and limit his ability to engage them so as to make way for a prompt.  By attentively 
and openly engaging with the artworks, the art-enthusiast is more likely to be prompted by 
them.  A person who is interested in something might, thus, attend to that thing in such a 
way as to increase the possibility of a prompt.74  If one’s approach to certain things remains 
attentive and openly receptive, one might be perennially prompted by the same source.  The 
variation between and perenniality of particular sources for particular individuals can, thus, 
be explained by how they approach things.    
Orienting the likelihood of prompts around attentiveness and open receptivity can 
also help explain the possibility of new prompts as well as the variation of prompts over a 
person’s lifetime.  Though an openly receptive approach is often linked with a person’s 
particular interests, a person can also approach thing in which she is not (or had not been) 
particularly interested.  This approach makes one available to be prompted by sources that 
had not issued prompts in the past.  So, prompts can seemingly occur with respect to 
arbitrary objects, though this still requires some openness.  A person’s interests and 
                                                
73 The uninterested person might, of course, become interested during the trip to the 
museum.  But, her initial approach to the artworks is different from that of the enthusiast.  
74 Precisely what constitutes this type of attention is a topic to be explored in Chapter Three. 
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approach to things might also change over the course of her life such that she is attentive 
and openly receptive to different things at different times.  To be fair to Thoreau, however, 
it must be noted that his metaphysics of personal nature might allow concessions for 
prompt-relevant change for an individual.  For Thoreau, a person’s nature underlies the 
growth and change that take place throughout his or her lifetime.  This is apparent in 
Thoreau’s imperative to his reader to “grow wild according to thy nature.”75  When a person 
grows, his or her way of approaching things and the world changes.  Personal changes 
arguably affect the possibility of prompts.  So, even if one accepts the claim to ever-present, 
native personal nature, it is possible that the sources of prompts will, for an individual, vary 
over time.        
This discussion of the relation of person to source emphasizes the role of the person 
in the phenomenon of critical-reflective thinking.  Whether something is a source of a 
prompt for a particular person is not only a matter of its presence.  Rather, the person and 
how she goes about the world also has bearing on the likelihood that a prompt will take 
place.  In order for anything to be a source, the person must, in some way, be open and 
receptive to its invitation to think.  The importance and efficacy of open receptivity is a topic 
I will explore at the end of “The Prompt,” in An Obstacle to Hearing and Accepting the Invitation.   
Emphasizing the importance of the person for the occurrence of a prompt is not to 
downplay the necessity of specific concrete sources.  Even if the prompt is not identical to 
the source, people always exist in concrete circumstances and are always prompted by 
specific things.  Neither the person nor the source is solely responsible for the occurrence of 
prompt.  Each of the thinkers I examine agrees that a prompt arrives through concrete, 
determinate circumstances.  As we have already seen, for Arendt the prompt issues from 
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events and facts.  Though Scarry’s project is focused on the appearance of beauty, she too 
maintains that beauty becomes apparent and prompts thought through singular particulars.76  
Feelings of anxiety, the strains of the flute, and the warnings of the daimon are also 
determinate and specific.  It is worth adding that the possibility of an invitation appearing in 
the absence of specific circumstances is radically problematic.  Because humans always exist 
in definite, particular contexts, any possible prompt must also take place within these 
circumstances.77  There is no location where a human is absent from particular places, things, 
people, events, and experiences.  Any place of escape would still be just that, i.e., a place, 
and, thus, in some way determinate. 78   Any possible prompt will arrive in concrete 
circumstances, issuing in a context and from particulars.                 
Arrival and Compulsion 
 
When Scarry stood on the balcony, she was “suddenly” called, through the palm tree, 
to rethink her presupposition that palms are not beautiful.79  She did not expect, nor did she 
will, the prompt to take place.  The prompts in the other examples above are similarly 
unwilled.  Socrates did not choose to be prompted when his daimon left him alone during his 
trial.  The human Da-sein did not choose to be prompted by its Angst and the call of 
conscience.  Arendt did not choose to be prompted by the phenomenon of non-thinking.  
John Farmer did not choose to be invited to critically reflect by the music of the flute playing 
in the distance.  In each case, the prompt arrives unexpectedly and without compulsion by 
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78 Even if one does not understand one’s own context, one’s ability to experience it at all is 
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even if its way of being there is abstract or cloudy. 
79 Scarry, On Beauty and Being Just, 16. 
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the agency of the thinker.  This points to a key characteristic of the prompt, namely that it is 
not compelled by human agency.   
Heidegger describes the unplanned character of the arrival of the prompt when he 
writes that the call of conscience is something “that we ourselves have neither planned nor 
prepared for nor willfully brought about,” and, further, that “the call lies in the factor of a 
jolt, of an abrupt arousal.”80  This suddenness, common to Scarry’s example, reinforces the 
fact that humans do not compel the prompt.  Humans, furthermore, cannot force it to occur.  
Each of us has likely had the experience of sitting down with the best intentions of engaging 
in deep reflection and being unable to produce the thinking we seek.  Just because we sit 
down to think does not mean thinking will take place.  We might read, write, talk about, and 
mentally summarize our ideas hoping that one of them will catch us and draw us away.  We 
desire and attempt to bring about something that will start us thinking.  But no matter how 
hard we try to be struck by something interesting, to enter a thought process in which we 
can critically consider our deepest assumptions, the prompt simply does not occur.   
Even though it might seem that such attempts involve attentive engagement that 
makes way for the occurrence of a prompt (and sometimes they might), by trying so hard, 
one can actually close off the possibility of the invitation to think.  By attempting to compel 
a prompt, one desires and awaits something in particular.  Such expectancy concerning the 
prompt and its occurrence limits one’s openness to whatever might occur.  By looking out 
for something in particular, a person closes off other possibilities of being prompted.  This 
does not mean that an invitation to critical-reflective thinking is impossible along the way 
when we engage in reflective projects.  Just such a prompt takes place in Arendt’s critical 
reflection on evil.  For Arendt, a prompt occurred in the midst of carrying out her project of 
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observing and researching Eichmannn’s trial.  The fact that the phenomenon of Eichmann’s 
inability to think “struck” her, however, shows that it was unforeseen and abrupt. 
The fact that the prompt does not present itself when we want it to, expect it to, or 
attempt to compel it opens the possibility of inquiry into whether we can cultivate critical-
reflective thinking.  If the prompt is a constitutive part of this thinking, and if humans 
cannot force it to occur, is it possible for humans to encourage critical-reflective thinking in 
any way?  Directly compelling critical-reflective thinking may be impossible.  Yet, humans 
can open themselves to prompts by cultivating openness and receptivity.  In Chapter Three, 
I will discuss the matter of cultivation in greater detail.  For now, we can note that receptivity 
might be cultivated by achieving a type of openness that allows prompts to occur.  This 
includes not only approaching things attentively and openly, but also putting ourselves in the 
right circumstances to hear and respond to prompts.  We may need to arrange our lives so 
that there is time and space for reflection.  Such openness also requires accepting the 
possibility that some things we hold to be true may turn out to be otherwise.  Having 
described the arrival of and the human inability to compel the prompt, I turn now to a 
discussion of the way in which it lacks content. 
Emptiness 
 
In addition to arising from many various sources and not being compelled through 
human agency, prompts are empty.  A prompt is empty in two important ways:   
1. Neither (a) the prompt itself nor (b) its source is necessarily the object of reflection. 
2. The prompt does not provide a specific message that becomes the content of 
thought.   
 
Although the prompt is empty in these ways, the prompt is not utterly devoid of content.  It 
is still an occurrence that one can remember, describe, discuss, and try to explain.  Its 
content is its invitation.  Socrates, for example, describes his daimon as a “sort of voice” that 
 39 
calls him to stop what he is doing, but that never encourages or requires that he do 
something else.81  For Farmer, the content of the prompt is even less specific; the invitation 
that comes through the music does not demand that he stop, but gently draws him in.  The 
prompt’s content is simply the content of an event, which for the most part is not the 
content upon which the thinker critically reflects.  Its emptiness refers to the fact that neither 
the prompt itself nor its source is necessarily thematized or reflected upon by the thinker.  
Nor does the prompt speak a specific message that will necessarily become the content of 
the subsequent critical moment.  The prompt simply invites a person to critically reflect.  
That thinkers do not often consider the fact that something has prompted them to 
think is already apparent.  In none of the above examples does the thinker turn to consider 
the prompt when the invitation to think occurs.  Rather, having been invited to think, the 
thinker begins to explore a topic besides the prompt itself.  Although the prompt could 
become the object of reflection, this is rare.82      
In addition, the source of the prompt (as noted above in 1(b)) is not always, and so, 
not necessarily, the object upon which the thinker reflects.  This comes out clearly in the 
example of John Farmer.  His reflections about his lifestyle have no content-laden 
relationship to the sounds of the flute.  It is not the music of the flute, through which he was 
prompted, that he considers.  Instead, Farmer critically examines an entirely different topic.  
In other instances, the prompt is more closely connected with the specific content of the 
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thought.  For example, the prompting of the palm tree through its movement and colors 
starts Scarry on a path of criticizing her aesthetic judgment of palm trees.  Still, the primary 
presupposition she encounters is her judgment of the trees and not the palm tree itself (i.e. 
the source of the prompt).  So, although she considers the palm tree, her criticism is not 
strictly focused on the source of the prompt (the tree).  For both Farmer and Scarry, the 
source of the prompt is not the topic considered in their subsequent thought.  I leave open 
the possibility that the source of a prompt could also be the content considered in a critical 
moment (e.g. if the idea of a presupposition were to invite one to think and then also 
undergo questioning through critical reflection).  Farmer and Scarry demonstrate that the 
prompt and its source may, but need not, be related to the content of the thinker’s 
reflections.  Neither the prompt nor its source determines the particular content of thinking. 
Secondly, the prompt is empty in that it does not give a specific message that 
determines what is to be thought.  We can see this emptiness best in the prompt issued to 
Socrates by his daimon.  The daimon causes him to pause, it does not speak a message with any 
specific content besides its interruptive, “Stop!”  It does not “encourage” him to do anything 
or to think anything in particular, but only to stop and think.83  Socrates must interpret the 
meaning of its call.  In the Apology, the daimon’s absence leads Socrates to consider death.  
Although considering death may not be surprising given the proceedings of that day, this 
topic is not given by the prompting absence of the daimon.  In Heidegger’s description of the 
call of conscience, he makes explicit the call’s lack of content.84  He writes that its summons 
calls nothing out: “The call does not say anything, does not give any information about 
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 41 
events of the world, has nothing to tell.”85  This statement may seem odd since Heidegger 
goes on to elaborate the meaning of the call as a specific summons to oneself and back from 
the they-self.  This, however, is Heidegger’s existential interpretation of the event of the call.  
The call of conscience occurs because Da-sein has lost itself in the they.  But the call itself 
does not articulate this specific message to Da-sein.    
This sort of emptiness may seem to run contrary to the specific questions that 
present themselves to John Farmer and Arendt.  In each of these examples, a very clear 
question follows the prompt and addresses the thinker.  In John Farmer’s case, a voice 
speaks to him, asking why he leads his life the way he does.  It appears as if, in this instance, 
the prompt comes with content for thought.  Although the prompt occurs together with the 
music of the flute, note that the immediate result of the prompt is that Farmer is drawn away 
into thought.  The music of the flute does “away with the street, and the village, and the state 
in which he lived” and awakens his mental faculties.86  Only once he pauses and becomes 
alert does this question appear to him.  Although this does not prove that the question is not 
somehow inherent in the prompt, there is good reason to believe that the question may 
already have been rooted in John Farmer’s mind.  If the question was already present in his 
thoughts, perhaps incipient and unformed, the prompt merely made room for its explicit 
expression through thinking.  In this case, the question is a response to the prompt and is 
not given by the prompt itself.   
Having been drawn into thought, the question comes to light, seemingly out of 
nowhere.  But the question is not so strange as to have no relation to Farmer’s own interests.  
We cannot know his psychological state or why this question appears.  Because the question 
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is so utterly pertinent to him, however, it seems unlikely that some mysterious voice that 
existed apart from his own concerns posed it.  It is also striking that a question specifically 
relevant to Arendt’s own interests addresses her in the example above.  Her question has to 
do with thinking and evil.  Arendt had already broached topics related to thinking and ethics 
in The Human Condition, where she examines the vita contemplativa.  She published that work in 
1958, whereas Eichmann’s trial did not take place until 1961.  The question that imposed 
itself came about in the thought space in which she moved, following the prompt that 
occurred through Eichmann’s testimony.  It is remarkable that the contents of Farmer’s and 
Arendt’s questions, although these questions seem to appear out of thin air, pertain to 
matters with which each is deeply concerned.  I find it, thus, compelling that the content of 
their thought was generated by the thinkers themselves, on the basis of their own interests 
and not by the immediate prompt.  In this way, even if the thinkers did not purposively state 
the questions to themselves, the questions appear in the course of critical-reflective thinking, 
as a response to the prompt.  The prompt made room for Farmer and Arendt to think such 
content by inviting them into thought.  The next topic for consideration is the character of 
prompt as invitation. 
Invitation 
 
Prompts function as invitations both because they provide an opportunity for a 
thinker to enter the critical moment and because they require a response.  When a thinker is 
affected by a prompt, she responds to it by either accepting or rejecting its invitation.  If the 
thinker accepts the invitation, she moves into the critical moment, and if she rejects it, she 
does not.  The response can happen in one of two ways: either (1) unintentionally or (2) 
intentionally.  The unintentional acceptance or rejection of a prompt is just as much a 
response as is a purposive, intentional engagement with or turning away from thinking.    An 
 43 
unintentional response is an unconscious acceptance or rejection.  This means that a thinker 
might enter the critical moment without consciously choosing to do so.  A response to a 
prompt can, thus, also be characterized as whatever a thinker does once the prompt occurs.  
In this sub-section, I discuss both unintentional and intentional responses to prompts in 
order to also clarify the relationship between prompt and critical moment.  Since the 
prompt’s invitation can be refused, the critical moment does not always follow.    
Both Socrates and Farmer unintentionally accept the invitation of their respective 
prompts.  Their thinking attention is not merely “aroused,” but also “claimed” by the 
prompts they encounter.87  Affected in this way, neither Socrates nor Farmer has a chance to 
intentionally choose not to follow out the prompt.  Socrates’ daimon stops him completely.  
In the Symposium, Aristodemus describes how Socrates, claimed by thought, sometimes “just 
goes off… and stands motionless, wherever he happens to be.”88  The sounds of the flute 
that John Farmer hears whisk him away into thought more gently.  Though the daimon and 
the music of the flute affect Socrates and Farmer differently, in each case the prompt 
immediately instigates the critical moment.  Both Socrates and Farmer respond to the 
prompt by accepting its invitation unintentionally.  Both of them, in other words, begin 
thinking without making a purposive decision to accept the invitation of their respective 
prompts.   
It is also possible to intentionally accept or refuse the prompt’s invitation.  Ralph 
Waldo Emerson, Thoreau’s mentor and friend, mentions the neglect of the prompt in his 
famous essay, “Self-Reliance.”  He writes, “A man should learn to detect and watch that 
gleam of light which flashes across his mind from within, more than the lustre of the 
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firmament of bards and sages.  Yet he dismisses without notice his thought, because it is 
his.”89  Here Emerson comments on the way we respect the thoughts of the esteemed and 
learned (i.e. the bards and sages) while dismissing our own.  If we do not hold our own 
thoughts worthy of consideration, we will likely reject the invitation of the prompt.  
Additionally, however, his description of the prompt as a gleam of light that flashes across 
the mind reinforces the possibility that the one affected by it might reject its invitation.  In 
this Emersonian example, the prompt does not demand attention like Socrates’ daimon does, 
nor does it immediately draw one in as in the case of John Farmer.  It arrives, but is brushed 
aside.     
Choosing to take up or refuse the invitation can be a highly conscious act, especially 
if the decision requires that one actively give up another understanding or activity in favor of 
taking a questioning departure into thought.  Arendt’s example of the “respectable members 
of society” illustrates this possibility.  Arendt refers to the group of people who accepted and 
willingly went along with operations of the Nazi regime as “the most respected members of 
respectable society.”90  She calls them “respectable” because, as law-abiding citizens they 
continued to do what would be respectable under normal circumstances.91  They followed 
new rules that came into force with the new regime.  These people were not sadists, and may 
not have even held anti-Semitic sentiments, but they supported actions of the regime simply 
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because the “will of the Führer… had the force of law.”92  It might be difficult for a member 
of this “respectable society” to accept the invitation of a prompt if doing so would require 
acting against the law or considering the possibility that obeying the law is not always best.  
Even though accepting this invitation would be difficult, I do not believe it is impossible.   
Each of us likely knows moments in which we feel the tug of an idea that calls for 
more attention.  Sometimes we intentionally break ourselves away from other tasks in order 
to investigate it.  At other times, however, we are too committed to what we are doing to 
abandon our tasks in favor of thinking.  Though we are affected by the prompt, we swiftly 
push it aside in order to stay with our other tasks.  Alternatively, we might be too lazy or 
distrustful of our own thoughts (as in Emerson’s example) to accept the prompt.   
Since a prompt can be refused, the occurrence of a prompt does not necessarily lead 
to a critical moment.  There is no necessary causal connection from the prompt to the 
critical moment.  The independence of prompt and critical moment, however, does not 
mean that the prompt’s invitation and the thinker’s response cannot be phenomenologically 
inseparable.  In Farmer’s case, the transition into the critical moment is phenomenologically 
smooth, effortless, and spontaneous.  Farmer does not confront an explicit moment of 
decision about whether to accept or reject the prompt.  A rejection of the invitation can also 
happen smoothly.  When someone is in the midst of another activity (rushing to work, for 
example), ignoring the prompt might not require conscious rejection.  Instead, other 
concerns and thoughts (for example, “Did I remember my keys, my lunch?  I need to 
prepare for my meeting.  I must bring up x, y, and z there…”) supersede the invitation, and 
the thinker ignores the prompt without deciding to do so.  In such circumstances, the 
thinker might hardly notice the prompt.  Experientially, a thinker might or might not 
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consciously choose a response.  A distinct, intervening moment of choice, therefore, is not 
essential to critical-reflective thinking.        
In his discussion of the call of conscience, Heidegger writes something that seems to 
conflict with my assessment of the relationship between prompt and critical moment: 
The authentic understanding “following” the call is not an addition annexed to 
the phenomenon of conscience, a process that can either occur or else be 
lacking.  The complete experience of conscience can only be grasped from 
understanding the summons together with it […]. Viewed existentially, an 
unattached call from which “nothing ensues” is an impossible fiction.93 
 
This passage seems to imply that the prompt as call of conscience cannot be separated from 
what occurs subsequently, namely critical reflection.  In the last sentence, Heidegger avows 
the impossibility of a call that does not lead to something further.  The prompt and the 
critical moment are, in this description, inseparable.  So, how can the prompt be a mere 
invitation without a necessary connection to the critical moment?   
It is important to note that this passage is about “authentic” and “complete” 
engagement with the call of conscience as prompt.  To enter presently into a more detailed 
discussion of Heideggerian authenticity would take us far afield.  I should explain, however, 
that in an authentic engagement with the prompt one not only receives its invitation but also 
accepts it.  The call of the prompt and following it out in thought are inseparable when one 
authentically understands the prompt.  This analysis, however, also places limits on the 
necessary connection of prompt and its subsequent effects.  The necessary coupling of 
prompt and critical reflection is limited to instances in which a human Da-sein is authentically 
engaged with the call of conscience.  One might also inauthentically understand a prompt 
and, thereby, fail to follow it out.  Though Heidegger is specifically discussing the call of 
conscience, his point is applicable to other types of prompts as well.  Experiences of 
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prompting are not necessarily authentic in the way described in the passage.  Thus, the above 
passage does not imply that the prompt necessitates entry into the critical moment. 
Both a prompt and the conscious or unreflective acceptance of its invitation are 
requisite to entering the critical moment.  These prerequisites motivate questions about what 
makes prompts occur and what enables a person to respond to them affirmatively.  The first 
of these questions (i.e. “What makes prompts occur?”) is not a question I propose to answer 
from the pole of the prompt.  Insofar as people cannot compel prompts, their occurrence is 
unpredictable.  Since prompts always happen to people, we can, however, further consider the 
role of thinkers in the occurrence of prompts.  As I began to discuss in Sources of the Address 
above, I contend that a thinker’s openness and receptivity affect her ability to be addressed 
by a prompt and to accept its invitation. The suddenness of the prompt implies the 
importance of both readiness for and openness to the prompt.  The question of developing 
openness and receptivity will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter Three.  Here, I will 
provide some initial remarks upon the obstacles that can impede open receptivity to the 
prompt. 
An Obstacle to Hearing and Accepting the Invitation 
 
 The ability to be addressed by a prompt is related to the readiness to accept its 
invitation while a certain type of closed-ness can inhibit ready openness.  Hearing and 
accepting the invitation require a thinker to do something that is not part of his or her usual 
activities.  If one is closed off to critical reflection, one will not hear or, even in the case of 
hearing it, respond affirmatively to a prompt.  As Arendt writes, “All thinking demands a 
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stop-and-think.”94  Though a person’s interested attentiveness to something might provide an 
initial openness to being prompted, her ability to hear and accept the invitation to think 
through such a source is limited if she is unavailable to cease other activities in order to 
think.     
The prompt’s arrival is sudden in that it comes unexpectedly and unwilled.  In order 
to be addressed by the prompt, a person must be able to suddenly receive it, suddenly to be 
invited.  Accepting the invitation requires further openness.  When a prompt takes place, its 
subsequent acceptance can likewise be impeded if one is closed to abandoning other 
activities in favor of thinking.95  Both the occurrence of the prompt and the acceptance of its 
invitation require openness or receptivity and can be obstructed if people are unavailable or 
closed off to them.  Although I will leave the question of developing openness and 
receptivity for Chapter Three, in this section I will provide examples that illustrate how our 
everyday, quotidian ways of going about can close people off from being prompted and 
accepting the invitation to think.  Quotidian existence is the way people usually go about and 
understand the world.  Quotidian existence need not, however, completely obstruct 
prompts, as is clear from Heidegger’s example of Da-sein as they-self.  When people adhere 
too strictly to the usual and familiar, however, people can be closed to prompts and, thus, 
critical-reflective thinking. 
If one already has plans for the day and is closed to the possibility of diversion, it is 
difficult for anything—like a prompt—that lies outside the bounds of the plans, to take 
place.  The sudden invitation of the prompt might break the constancy of the everyday or 
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come as an irritation.  In either case, it disrupts the usual or expected course of things; it 
arrives as an interruption.  It stops one in the midst of something else and requires a 
response.  According to Arendt, thinking “interrupts any doing, any ordinary activities, no 
matter what they happen to be.”96  In Heidegger’s account of the call of conscience, he too 
explains that the interruption is something that breaks in.  When the they-self hears the call 
of conscience, how it usually proceeds as they-self is “broken by the call.”97  The prompt is 
characteristically disruptive.  The occurrence of the prompt, thus, depends on one’s 
availability to interruption.  
Although human activities may seem, in principle, to be open to interruption, it is 
easier for some people than for others to be interrupted and allow distractions from 
whatever tasks are at hand.  Daily activities can be so regular and fixed that getting out of 
them is difficult.  Even if some unusual accident occurs, one may notice it for a moment and 
then turn back to what one was doing.  The ways in which one understands the world also 
favor some possibilities at the expense of others.  Strict adherence to one’s usual views can 
close one off to interruption by anything (like a prompt) that is unusual.  Receptivity to 
being addressed by a prompt is limited because people are so deeply involved in and 
committed to certain ways of going about and understanding and leave little room for 
anything out of the ordinary to disturb this.  Arendt’s example of strict adherence to laws by 
the “members of respectable society” could be explained by this phenomenon. 98   The 
“respectable” people held fast to the laws, although the laws “changed overnight” when the 
Nazis came to power.99  Some Germans’ adherence to a quotidian existence that valued 
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governmental authority (authority in general) may have limited their susceptibility to the 
prompts that would have jarred them out of this way of being.  An outsider might view their 
circumstances as extraordinary and, thus, as teeming with the possibility of prompts.  Insofar 
as they were not open to the interruption of their usual ways, however, such prompts did not 
occur.  Furthermore, even if prompts had taken place, the people may have held so tightly to 
their law-abidingness that they would have declined prompts’ invitations to engage in 
critique.   
Thoreau presents two particularly pithy examples of moments ripe with the prospect 
of a prompt, but whose potential goes unfulfilled.  In Thoreau’s respective interactions with 
a farmer and a seamstress, both interlocutors find themselves in what we might have thought 
was a perfect moment for critical-reflective thinking.  Each is presented with a view contrary 
to his or her own.  Their deep-rooted involvement in their own understandings, however, 
make it impossible for these alternatives to strike them as legitimate, let alone thought-
worthy.    
A farmer learned of Thoreau’s intention to move to Walden Pond and grow his own 
food.  Thoreau planned to eat a primarily vegetarian diet in order to free up his time.  He 
reasoned that by not eating meat, which cost more than vegetables and grains, he would not 
have to work as much to earn the money he would need to buy food.  He would, thereby, 
gain free time to devote to activities he found more valuable than earning wages.  The 
farmer imparted his opinion with regard to Thoreau’s dietary plan, simultaneously driving his 
[vegetarian] oxen:  
One farmer says to me, “You cannot live on vegetable food solely, for it 
furnishes nothing to make bones with;” and so he religiously devotes a part 
of his day to supplying his system with the raw material of bones; walking all 
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the while he talks behind his oxen, which, with vegetable-made bones, jerk 
him and his lumbering plough along in spite of every obstacle.100 
 
The oxen, with whom the farmer worked the fields on a daily basis, were living proof, 
contrary to the farmer’s view, that a vegetarian diet can sustain life and help build strong 
bones.  His oxen ate nothing but “vegetable food” and, yet, continued to live and work.  The 
farmer’s adherence to his view that being a vegetarian is an unsustainable lifestyle obscured 
the fact of the oxen who stood directly before him.  If he were more receptive (if his view 
were open to interruption and question), perhaps the life and strength of his oxen would 
prompt him to critically reflect upon his view.      
 Thoreau experienced a similar lack of receptivity to notions that lay outside, in this 
case, the norms of fashion when he asked his seamstress to sew a particular garment for him.  
Their short exchange prompted Thoreau himself to consider her presupposition that the 
contemporary fashions determined what could be sewn.  The seamstress, by contrast, 
remained at a loss:      
my tailoress tells me gravely, “They do not make them so now,” not 
emphasizing the “They” at all, as if she quoted an authority as impersonal as 
the Fates, and I find it difficult to get made what I want, simply because she 
cannot believe that I mean what I say, that I am so rash.  When I hear this 
oracular sentence, I am for a moment absorbed in thought, emphasizing to 
myself each word separately that I may come at the meaning of it, that I may 
find out by what degree of consanguinity They are related to me, and what 
authority they may have in an affair which affects me so nearly.101 
 
The seamstress appeared to be stuck within the bounds of contemporary fashion, unable to 
comprehend the idea that an unusual garment could be stitched to meet Thoreau’s needs.  
That is, she could not be interrupted by something that might lead her to this new view.   
The norms of fashion held her too strongly.  Thoreau, conversely, began to thoughtfully 
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question the authority of the fashion “They” during this brief conversation.  She found his 
request to be “rash” and, perhaps, ridiculous.  For all appearances, the seamstress was not 
struck by a prompt.  But even if she was, she did not appear to be open to reconsidering her 
way of creating garments and her attachment to the “fateful” fashions.  Her deep-rootedness 
within the bounds of contemporary fashion obstructed her ability to critically and reflectively 
think. 
 In Plato’s Republic, Cephalus too seems to be in a situation rife with possible 
prompts.  Yet, he leaves his conversation with Socrates before it develops into more than a 
basic disagreement about the meaning of justice.  Cephalus is the wealthy father of 
Polemarchus and it is he who greets Socrates when Socrates stops by to visit Polemarchus’s 
house in Pireaus.  Sitting down and taking a break from making his morning sacrifice in the 
courtyard, Cephalus is very happy to see Socrates and to talk with him.  Because of his 
decreasing ability to walk the long distance to Athens as he gains in years, Cephalus does not 
often visit Socrates.  Socrates also does not often venture to the Pireaus.  Cephalus and 
Socrates begin discussing Cephalus’s attainment of the “threshold of old age” and whether 
old age is a difficult stage of life.102  This conversation leads into a nascent examination of 
justice. 
 Cephalus expresses the opinion that his wealth has made old age easier for him 
because (1) he has not been tempted to “cheat or deceive” anyone on account of being in 
need and (2) having paid all his debts, he need not worry about owing anyone money when 
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he dies.103  Socrates takes him to be talking about justice.  He attributes to Cephalus the 
position that justice is “speaking the truth and paying whatever debts one has incurred.”104  
This position is, however, easily opposed, and Socrates counters it by giving an example of 
an occasion when it would be unjust to speak the truth and/or pay debts.  When the 
indebted person is a friend who has lent you his weapons and asks to have them back, it 
appears to be just, on Cephalus’s account, to fulfill his request.  But if this friend is “out of 
his mind,” Socrates claims, it would be unjust to return the weapons.105  Likewise with regard 
to truth telling: no one should be “willing to tell the whole truth to someone who is out of 
his mind.”106  According to Socrates, justice does not require telling the truth and repaying 
debts in every circumstance.  Having given this example, Socrates believes he has refuted the 
stance attributed to Cephalus: “Then the definition of justice is not speaking the truth and 
repaying what one has borrowed.”107  Cephalus agrees with this assessment.  Though he had 
initially supported the notion that justice is speaking the truth and repaying debts, he now 
finds himself in disagreement with this stance.     
 At this point in the conversation, Polemarchus boldly jumps in to counter Socrates’ 
conclusion.  Polemarchus agrees with the initial definition of justice and attempts to defend 
it.  Cephalus willingly bequeaths the argument to Polemarchus and leaves the room, going 
back to the courtyard to look after his sacrifice.  The reader of this dialogue might think 
Cephalus is leaving at the most interesting part.  The tension between his initial view, which 
has just gained a supporter, and the discovery that he disagrees with it, though it may bring 
the reader suspense, does not prompt Cephalus to engage in an examination of justice.  His 
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discovery that his prior understanding of justice was wrong does not seem to disturb him in 
the slightest as he “laughing[ly]” gives the argument over to Polemarchus and disappears to 
tend his sacrifice.108  
 Perhaps the sacrifice demands his attention.  This task might so define the trajectory 
of his day that even an immanent tension on the topic of justice cannot prompt him to think 
further about it.  The importance of the sacrifice might also signify Cephalus’ concern for 
piety as opposed to knowledge in his old age.  As he draws nearer to death, his primary aim 
might lie in readying himself for the afterlife by making sacrifices and not reasoning about 
justice with Socrates. 109  Whatever the reason, Cephalus returns to his usual activities 
apparently unbothered by the disagreement generated in conversation with Socrates.     
 So far I have emphasized how adhering to usual ways and understandings can 
decrease one’s chances of being prompted and accepting the invitations involved.  Most 
people lead their lives without regular interruptions by prompts.  Although I would attribute 
the relative rarity of critical-reflective thinking partly to the fact that most people are deeply 
rooted in their quotidian lifestyle, it is important to note that quotidian existence does not 
completely obstruct prompts or obstruct the possibility of responding affirmatively to them.  
It is not just the quotidian itself, but our deep attachment to it that limits the possibility of 
prompts and critical-reflective thinking.  For, it is possible to be committed to familiar 
understandings and lifestyles in a way that does not close off the possibility of interruptions 
by prompts.  Heidegger’s explanation of the call of conscience illustrates how a prompt can 
still take place for Da-sein as they-self.   
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The they-self characteristically does not experience prompts.  Rather, they-selves 
continuously and, for the most part, uninterruptedly live like others.  A they-self’s 
involvement in average everydayness, however, does not completely obstruct the call of 
conscience.  The call of conscience happens precisely to a person who is involved in being 
like the they: “The call reaches Da-sein in this always-already-understanding-itself in everyday, 
average taking care of things.”110  Though deeply involved in particular understandings and 
ways of life, a human Da-sein as they-self can be summoned by the call.  In order to hear the 
call of conscience, however, Da-sein must be resolute.  Da-sein can be resolute while it is also 
involved in the they.   
Heidegger describes resoluteness as the major condition that must obtain for human 
Da-sein to authentically hear the call of conscience.  He writes, “To the call of conscience 
there corresponds a possible hearing.”111  In order to hear the call, Da-sein must be ready to 
hear it.  Normally, a Da-sein as they-self is caught up in listening to the they.  The call of 
consciences interrupts this listening and “arouses another kind of hearing.”112  This “other” 
kind of hearing, however, can only be aroused if the human Da-sein is ready for it.  The call 
“reaches him who wants to be brought back [from the they].”113  This means that the call 
cannot always reach every they-self.  Being ready for the call consists in Da-sein’s wanting to 
hear the call, or “wanting to have a conscience.”114  Only the human Da-sein who wants to 
have a conscience can heed the call: “Understanding the summons reveals itself as wanting to 
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have a conscience.”115  Heidegger calls this way of being—being ready to hear the call or 
“wanting to have a conscience”: “resoluteness.”116      
If Da-sein is resolute, it is, thus, ready for the call of conscience.  The conditions for 
hearing the call will have been met.  Although the fulfillment of the conditions does not 
necessitate the prompt’s occurrence, without resoluteness a human Da-sein would not be 
available for the prompt.  Those who go about their usual ways in quotidian life can also be 
open to the prompt and to accepting its invitation.  I will leave to Chapter Three a full 
discussion of the types of readiness that can make one more openly receptive to the prompt.  
Arendt’s respectable, law-abiding citizens, Thoreau’s seamstress and oxen-driving farmer, 
and Plato’s Cephalus were closed to the prompt because they strictly adhered to their own 
usual ways.   
Although the prompt is a mere invitation, not identical with the physical existence 
that is its source, and empty of content that the thinker must take up in thought, it is 
essential to critical-reflective thinking.  The fact that the prompt precedes the critical 
moment in all of the examples provided lends empirical evidence to this contention.  
Because the prompt, moreover, invites the thinker to critically reflect, it is preparatory.  The 
prompt prepares the thinker by inviting her to critically reflect.  The prompt opens the way 
for the critical moment by inviting the thinker to take up considerations different from his or 
her usual concerns.  The thinker who accepts the invitation enters into a space of thought 
where things usually presupposed can be examined, questioned, and criticized.  This 
questioning takes place in the second constitutive moment of critical-reflective thinking: the 
critical moment.     
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THE CRITICAL MOMENT 
 
 Many different presuppositions operate in the primary examples discussed in the first 
part of this chapter.  In the critical moment, the presuppositions become disclosed to and 
are questioned by the thinkers.  Arendt’s society presupposed that evil is solely malicious; 
John Farmer presupposed that his lifestyle was somehow necessary or fitting; Da-sein as they-
self presupposed the necessity of the ways of the they; and Socrates’ countrymen 
presupposed that death is the worst evil.  Each of these suppositions came into question in 
the respective thinkers’ critical moments.  Presuppositions were also at play in the examples 
of the “respectable” members of society, the ox-driver, the seamstress, and Cephalus.  Each 
of these latter persons or groups, however, did not reach the critical moment.  They did not 
become aware of their presuppositions so as to be able to question them because they either 
were not prompted or, though they were, did not accept the invitation.  Only through the 
acceptance of a prompt’s invitation is a presupposition disclosed to the thinker and made 
available for questioning.  Critical-reflective thinking is then carried out when a thinker 
examines the presupposition.     
Presuppositions are notions that we take to be true without first considering them.  
They are not usually apparent to us, but instead operate in the background, undergirding 
how we go about and understand the world.  Although lacking awareness of our own 
presuppositions might appear to be radically problematic, presuppositions do the positive 
work of providing each of us a context for concrete, practical life.  An existence without 
presuppositions is impossible.  Only by taking some things to be true can our physical 
surroundings be present, our choices grounded, and possibilities for our lives available.    
Wittgenstein aptly refers to the necessity of presuppositions when he discusses 
“hinge propositions” as the assumptions we must make and accept in order to go about 
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living.117  To exist, we must hold some things to be true, though there may be variance 
between the presuppositions upheld by different persons.  In On Certainty, he explains the 
necessity of always maintaining some such propositions.  Not only does this necessarily arise 
because we “just can’t investigate everything,” but also because these propositions act as 
“hinges” that allow us to pose questions, have doubts, take up scientific investigations, and 
even live:118   
343.  […] we are forced to rest content with assumption.  If I want the door 
to turn, the hinges must stay put. 
344.  My life consists in being content to accept many things.119  
 
Just as sturdy hinges make it possible for doors to swing open and closed, our 
presuppositions enable us to go about our lives.  They are basic understandings that we 
usually do not notice, although they underlie our actions and thoughts.  Our presuppositions 
can be thematically problematized.  A presupposition-less existence, however, is not 
possible.  For when one questions a presupposition, a different hinge that enables this doubt 
to be raised must be in place.  Wittgenstein writes, “Doubting and non-doubting behaviour.  
There is the first only if there is the second.”120  The presupposition that underlies doubt 
might simply be that doubting is possible or that whatever is doubted can be doubted.  
Presuppositions always operate, even during critical-reflective thinking.  A presupposition 
can only be questioned on the basis of other presuppositions on whose basis it can become 
problematic for a thinker.  There is, thus, no end to critical-reflective thinking, no stopping 
point where all presuppositions are recognized and considered and a thinker becomes utterly 
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transparent to him or herself.  Presuppositions of some sort must continually operate in 
order for humans to think and to go about their lives.   
 My purpose in the following subsections is to further describe presuppositions and 
what happens when they are disclosed in the critical moment.  I will also discuss the 
outcomes of critical-reflective thinking, whose processes Arendt describes as fundamentally 
destructive.  Destruction takes place in two ways.  First, the destruction of a thinker’s prior, 
unconsidered, relationship to her presupposition occurs when the presupposition is 
disclosed in the critical moment.  Second, destruction takes place if a thinker undermines a 
presupposition through his or her critical, reflective examination.  Lastly, I will illustrate the 
conversational nature of critical questioning.  In that questioning is dialogical, critical-
reflective thinking is not limited to solitary thinkers, but can take place amongst a group of 
thinkers conversing together.      
Presuppositions 
 
Presuppositions are notions people take to be true prior to considering them.  A full 
account of how humans take up presuppositions would be another project of its own.  For 
now, we can understand presuppositions as notions that shape one’s perspective and that 
one takes for granted.  They often seem to have been ingrained in people by virtue of their 
socio-historical context, family, community, or personal developmental experiences.  Hans-
Georg Gadamer, one of Heidegger’s students and a leading philosopher in the history of 
hermeneutics, refers to presuppositions as “prejudices.”  He explains that everyone has 
prejudices because of his or her historical and social situation within a tradition: “Long 
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before we understand ourselves through the process of self-examination, we understand 
ourselves in a self-evident way in the family, society, and state in which we live.”121   
Prior to his experience of critical-reflective thinking, for John Famer, the propriety of 
orienting life around work seems to have been self-evident.  Farmer held the notion that his 
life, consumed with work, was somehow necessary.  This presupposition was closely related 
to (and may have even stemmed from) a value that was prevalent in his society, namely, the 
importance of earning money in order to purchase what the society deemed to be the goods 
necessary for life.122  In the course of everyday life, we do not have many occasions to reflect 
upon presuppositions because they always already frame how we proceed.  A person can 
gain the critical distance necessary for considering presuppositions if she accepts the 
invitation issued by a prompt.  Accepting the invitation allows the thinker to stop what she is 
doing and to critically question a presupposition.  In critical-reflective thinking, 
presuppositions become overt and can, thereby, be scrutinized.  Before, however, 
investigating how they become apparent and what takes place in the critical moment, what 
presuppositions are must be further elaborated.  In this section, I will draw on the examples 
already given to illustrate the work presuppositions do in practical, everyday life.  Although 
humans are usually unaware of them, presuppositions continually shape daily life and 
understanding on both personal and societal levels.   
Presuppositions frame our world.  Whether held personally or by a broad 
community of people, they define a context of relevance and value within which people go 
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about and understand.  When a thinker comes to question a presupposition, it has already 
been there, giving shape to his or her everyday activities.  Heidegger describes how Da-sein, 
simply by virtue of existing, always presupposes the ways of das Man and the “customary 
interpretation” of its being:  
In its manner of existing at any given time, and accordingly also with the 
understanding of being that belongs to it, Da-sein grows into a customary 
interpretation of itself and grows up in that interpretation.  It understands 
itself in terms of this interpretation at first, and within a certain range, 
constantly.  This understanding discloses the possibilities of its being and 
regulates them.123 
 
Da-sein has always already been thrown into a world among others, wherein it exists and is 
thereby defined.  In a totalizing and inconspicuous fashion, das Man frames Da-sein’s practical 
activities and understanding.  
The they not only influences how everyday Da-sein enjoys itself, reads literature, 
withdraws from society, and is shocked.124  Das Man also prescribes possibilities for Da-sein’s 
own action, its pre-ontological interpretation of its being, and even the way it “sees.”125  By 
“articulat[ing] the referential context of significance,” the they provides the framework 
within which humans exist together.126  In such a framework, “everyday possibilities” are 
determined for Da-sein because only what is significant in the context is immediately available 
to Da-sein.  By defining what is available, the they “prescribes the kind of being of 
everydayness,” thereby prescribing “what can and may be ventured.”127  Everything is 
determined by what is normative and significant for the they.  A human Da-sein in its 
everyday fashion, as they-self, proceeds within the framework of the they and cannot help 
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but to do so.  Each individual Da-sein must presuppose the ways of the they because such 
ways are already operative in the world into which is thrown.   
A human Da-sein is always among others and exists in the same context as they are.  
The possibility of a common context inherently rests upon common presuppositions.  By 
being thrown into such a context, Da-sein takes up its existence with respect to what is 
already there: “What is decisive is only the inconspicuous domination by others [i.e. the they] 
that Da-sein as being-with has always already taken over unawares.”128  Da-sein as they-self, 
its everyday self, presupposes the truth, propriety, and necessity of the ways of the they 
because these simply are normal and apparent.  Da-sein naturally takes up the presuppositions 
that are always already set out by the they.  Although Da-sein initially takes up the ways of the 
they, these can also come into question.  Such questioning can occur when the they-self is 
summoned by the call of conscience to consider its being.  The prescriptions of the they are 
not, thus, necessary.  Thoreau’s example of John Farmer provides a concrete example of 
how the prescriptions of one’s presuppositions frame daily life.129    
Farmer’s usual everyday tasks and thoughts were oriented by his focus on working in 
the fields, almost to the extent that another life was unimaginable to him.  Although Thoreau 
did not provide an extensive account of Farmer’s life, the reader gleans that Farmer’s 
activities and thoughts usually centered on work.  Farmer’s work-consumed existence is 
apparent not only in that he inquires about living a mean, moiling life, but also in his train of 
thought before and directly following the music of the flute.  On the day when he took part 
in critical-reflective thinking, he sat down after working all day to “recreate his intellectual 
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man.”130  At first, however, his thoughts remained focused on work.  Thoughts of field labor 
and the impending frosty weather (which also would have been relevant to the welfare of his 
crops) ran through his mind.  When the notes of the flute initially sounded, “still he thought 
of his work.”131  He eventually began to drift away from his usual concerns: the notes “gently 
did away with the street, and the village, and the state in which he lived.”132  The word 
“state” refers to his usual condition, being primarily, though not self-reflectively, concerned 
with his work.  Farmer’s presupposition (i.e. the necessity of the work that composed his 
mean, moiling life) provided structure for his daily life.  Additionally, it offered the fodder 
that kept his mind busy.   
On the scale of a community, Socrates offers evidence of the practical effects of the 
presupposition that death is the worst evil.  Many of Socrates’ fellow Athenians seem to have 
understood life as the best of all things and death as the worst of all evils.  They were willing 
to do almost anything to protect themselves from death.  When Socrates noticed that people 
around him held this presupposition, he commented that his defense was undergirded by 
something higher than physical life, namely the well-being of the soul.  During his trial, 
Socrates did not come to the jury with “lamentations and tears,” nor did he confess to any of 
the crimes of which he was accused.133  According to Socrates, juries in Athens were 
“accustomed to hear” such pleas from defendants who merely wished to save their own 
lives.134  We can, thus, see two practical effects of the presupposition that death is the worst 
of evils.  First, the presupposition established what the jury expected to hear in response to 
charges punishable by death.  Second, it might undergird how those on trial defend 
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themselves.  Those who presuppose that death is the worst of all evils might engage in 
practical actions whose aim is to preserve their lives, even if it requires lying while on trial.  
The presupposition that death is the worst of all evils, thus, might underlie behavior on the 
parts of both defendants and jurors that may be antithetical to doling out fair punishments 
on the basis of true testimony. 
For Arendt, the presupposition that evil is characterized by malice also carried a 
disturbing practical implication in the judicial realm.  If courts of law are supposed to punish 
those who do evil as so defined, imputing punishable responsibility to criminals presumes 
that they have acted with malicious intent.  Arendt goes so far as to ascribe this 
presupposition to modern courts as their fundamental perspective: “the assumption current 
in all modern legal systems [is] that intent to do wrong is necessary for the commission of a 
crime.”135  Furthermore, the requirement of intent is not only a presupposition of the legal 
system, but also of many individuals: “Where this intent is absent… we feel no crime has 
been committed.”136  The requirement of intent struck Arendt as distinctly problematic for 
the judges who would determine Eichmann’s fate.   
In accord with this presupposition, the prosecution claimed that Eichmann was a 
“perverted sadist,” painting him as an obviously culpable criminal.137  In truth, however, he 
was “terribly and terrifyingly normal.”138  When taken to Jerusalem for his trial, Eichmann 
was put through rigorous psychological examinations.  The results were that “half a dozen 
psychiatrists […] certified him as ‘normal’ […and one psychiatrist] found that his whole 
psychological outlook, his attitude toward his wife and children, mother and father, brothers, 
                                                
135 Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem, 277. 
136 Ibid. 
137 Ibid., 276. 
138 Ibid. 
 65 
sisters, and friends, was ‘not only normal but most desirable.’”139  A minister who regularly 
visited Eichmann in jail even declared that Eichmann was “a man with very positive 
ideas.”140  Eichmann understood himself to be a law-abiding citizen and a follower of 
Kantian ethics.  His sense of moral idealism entailed that he had to put his feelings aside so 
as to never be diverted from his duty, which was to obey the law and carry out the 
professional tasks assigned to him.141  And, indeed, he did not allow his personal feelings (i.e. 
that he “never had anything whatever against Jews; on the contrary, he had plenty of ‘private 
reasons’ for not being a Jew hater”) to interfere with his professional duties.142  Although his 
duties were attended by disastrous consequences for the passengers he helped to transport, 
he was not, at heart, a hateful murderer.    
His normality and lack of malicious intent conflicted with the understanding of 
criminal activity as evil in the traditional sense.  On the presupposition that evil is 
characterized by malice, Eichmann’s case would be difficult to decide.  The presupposition 
poses a difficulty to making sense of Eichmann as a criminal, someone who intended to do 
harm.  Although he was, in the end, convicted and sentenced to death, Arendt recognized 
the tension between the traditional view of evil and the murderous activity in which 
Eichmann participated, though not maliciously.                       
Of course, people can be aware that they hold certain things to be true, though they 
may not recognize them as presuppositions.  In the Crito, the Platonic dialogue that 
chronologically follows the events of the Apology, Crito exemplifies someone who explicitly 
presupposes that death is the worst evil and leads his life accordingly.  Because he thematizes 
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his presupposition, he is clearly aware of it in some sense.  His awareness, however, differs 
from the critical-reflective awareness and engagement with the presupposition that could 
take place in critical-reflective thinking.         
Crito visits Socrates in prison and attempts to convince him to flee (i.e. to evade his 
sentence and save his life).  Socrates disagrees with Crito’s plan on the grounds (among 
others) that by escaping his sentence, he would be acting unjustly by intentionally harming 
the laws of Athens.  Committing the injustice and intentional harm that would save his life 
would also damage the part of him that is concerned with justice, namely, his soul.  In the 
course of conversation, Socrates and Crito agree that the soul is more valuable than the 
body:    
Socrates:  And is life worth living for us with that part of us corrupted that 
unjust action harms and just action benefits?  Or do we think that 
part of us, whatever it is, that is concerned with justice and 
injustice, is inferior to the body? 
Crito:  Not at all. 
Socrates:   Is it more valuable? 
Crito:  Much more.143 
 
Because of the harm it would inflict on his soul (and the benefit for his soul of doing what is 
just) Socrates is unwilling to follow Crito out of the jail. 
 Although it appears that Crito and Socrates agree upon the relative value of soul and 
body, Crito’s actions and arguments up to that point in the dialogue show that, prior to their 
conversation, Crito operated on a different presupposition.  By attempting to help Socrates 
escape from jail, Crito shows that he is most interested in saving Socrates’ life, even if it 
requires acting unjustly by disobeying the law.  Prior to their agreement that the soul is more 
valuable, Crito thematizes the notion that death is the worst evil.  If death is the worst evil, 
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the demise of the body would be far worse than the demise of the soul brought on by doing 
injustice.  He says, “the majority can inflict not the least but pretty well the greatest evils [i.e. 
put one to death] if one is slandered among them.”144  This implies that his intentions in 
saving Socrates are primarily oriented toward preserving Socrates’ physical life.  So, it is 
evident not only from his actions, but also from what he says that Crito had presupposed 
that death is the worst of evils.  Although he comes to agree with Socrates’ counter-
arguments in the course of their conversation, he had not previously critically reflected upon 
the presupposition that led him to propose Socrates’ escape.  Although he could articulate 
the basis of his actions, Crito had taken this presupposition to be the simple truth of the 
matter. 
 Although people can thematically articulate their presuppositions, such awareness 
does not equate to the critical awareness that takes place in critical-reflective thinking.  
Whether or not we thematically articulate our presuppositions, we go about, for the most 
part, critically unaware of them.  In order to come to critical awareness, the presuppositions 
must be disclosed as such so as to allow for questioning.  This alteration in a thinker’s 
relation to a presupposition takes place in a moment I call “disclosure” and discuss in the 
next section. 
Disclosure, Questioning, and Destruction 
 
Arendt wrote, “thinking inevitably has a destructive, undermining effect on all 
established criteria, values, measurements of good and evil, in short, on those customs and 
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rules of conduct we treat of in morals and ethics.”145  It should be noted that thinking 
reaches into all areas, not just morality and ethics.146  The things Arendt refers to as 
“established” include presuppositions.  Presuppositions are established insofar as we take 
them to be true without question. 147   Through critical-reflective thinking, established 
presuppositions are destroyed.  What does destruction mean here, and how does it take place 
in the critical moment?  Regardless of whether a presupposition has been previously 
articulated, in order to be questioned it must be thematized.  The critical moment thus 
includes disclosing the presupposition as well as questioning it.  In both disclosure and 
questioning, destruction can take place.  To destroy a presupposition, however, does not 
mean to annihilate it.  Rather, for my purposes here “destruction” denotes two ways in 
which the thinker’s relation to the presupposition can be fundamentally altered.  First, when 
disclosure takes place, a presupposition is articulated and disclosed qua presupposition.  
From that moment on, it is no longer an underlying notion taken to be true without 
consideration.  Disclosure, in other words, fundamentally changes and, in this sense, 
destroys the thinker’s previous relation to the notion presupposed.  Second, the thinker can 
destroy the presupposition in the sense of defeating it during questioning.  The defeat of a 
presupposition happens when the thinker, through critical reflection, finds it to be false or 
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unnecessary.  Through this second type of destruction, the presupposition might lose its grip 
on, or efficacy in, the thinker’s practical life and understanding; this need not, however, take 
place when instances of the first type of destruction occur. 
When a presupposition is disclosed, it is articulated as a presupposition.  By 
articulating it, disclosure makes the presupposition known to the thinker and, thus, available 
for questioning.  Whereas beforehand it was simply taken as true without being considered, 
after disclosure it is known and no longer has this quality.  Moreover, because a thinker 
cannot question something of which she is unaware, disclosure is indispensible to the critical 
moment.  Whether or not the thinker previously articulated the presupposition, she comes 
face-to-face with it in the critical moment.  Like coming to know a secret, the presupposition 
appears to the thinker, and she sees that it underlay her way of going about and 
understanding.  Disclosure thus articulates not only the presupposition’s content, but also its 
status as presupposition.  This makes the presupposition as presupposition available for 
questioning. 
Both Elaine Scarry and Crito, for example, had articulated their presuppositions 
prior to the critical moment.  The presuppositions had not, however, been previously 
disclosed as worthy of question (i.e. their status as presuppositions had not been disclosed to 
the thinkers).  Scarry tells of her life-long aversion to palm trees leading up to the moment 
on the balcony.  When she was struck by the beauty of the palm tree she viewed there, 
Scarry became poignantly aware of this presupposition as a presupposition and thus as 
something worthy of question.  She recalled the presupposition and found it wanting, given 
the beauty of the palm tree near her balcony.  Similarly, Crito told Socrates that the majority 
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could inflict the worst of evils, namely, death.148  He assumed without question that death is 
the worst of evils, but this assumption did not become available for questioning until 
Socrates directly countered it: “Would that the majority could inflict the greatest evils, for 
they would then be capable of the greatest good, and that would be fine, but now they 
cannot do either.”149  As they continued in conversation, Socrates reminded Crito of the 
importance of self-examination.  By inquiring into the relative value of body and soul, Crito 
became aware that the presupposition is dubious and eventually agreed that “the most 
important thing is not life, but the good life.”150  
In the case of John Farmer, the reader does not know whether he had previously 
thematized his presupposition.  Regardless of whether he had or had not already articulated 
it to himself, the presupposition is thematically stated in the form of a question that appears 
to him after he hears the flute’s music.  The question, recall, asks, “Why do you stay here and 
live this mean moiling life, when a glorious existence is possible for you?”151  A notable 
feature of this question is that it at once articulates and critically questions the 
presupposition.  The coincidence of the formulation of the presupposition and the 
questioning of it seems contrary to what I have described as the necessary course of events: 
the presuppositions must first be disclosed in order to then be questioned.  If we look at 
Farmer’s thought after he hears the flute and before the question forms itself, however, we 
find strong evidence that the presupposition is disclosed before the question arrives.  If the 
presupposition was disclosed to Farmer prior to the question, his experience fits into the 
structure I have described.  
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After Farmer heard the flute’s notes, he became aware of the train of his thought.  
The question did not occur immediately after the notes.  Rather, “still he thought of his 
work; but the burden of his thought was, that though this kept running in his head, and he 
found himself planning and contriving it against his will, yet it concerned him very little.”152  
It was when the flute interrupted him in the midst of “recreating his intellectual man,” that 
Farmer, thus, first began to reflect on his thoughts and to recognize what they were about.153  
His thoughts concerned work.  He was also “burdened” by the fact that that he continued to 
think about work even though he did not will himself to consider this topic.  Now aware of 
the course of his thoughts, Farmer noticed that his life was so oriented toward working that 
his work took up not only his days in the fields, but continued to consume him in his free 
time.  Furthermore, thoughts of work were of little interest or importance to him.  In his 
thoughts before the question arrived, he characterized his work as “no more than the scurf 
of his skin, which was constantly shuffled off.”154  Yet, at first, he could not simply “shuffle 
off” thoughts of his work.   
These initial reflections imply that, in the moments before the question arrived, the 
presupposition had already been disclosed.  In recognizing the burden of his work-focused 
lifestyle (which continued to burden him even during his recreational hours), he noticed that 
he was leading a mean and moiling life.  He was so fixated on his work that it kept running 
through his mind even though he did not will it.  In the midst of these musings, he was 
becoming aware of the fact that his life was centered around the presupposition that work 
was necessary and proper.  Life could, however, be otherwise, if he could just allow the 
presupposition that oriented his activities and thoughts to be “shuffled off.”  It is, thus, 
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evident that the presupposition was, indeed, disclosed in his reflections following the 
invitation of the flute.  Through its disclosure, the presupposition became available for 
questioning.       
By opening a presupposition for question, disclosure fundamentally alters a thinker’s 
relation to it.  Once articulated, Farmer saw the presupposition as something that can be 
considered and critically examined.  Similarly, Scarry, Crito, and Farmer all began to question 
notions that they had previously taken simply to be true.  Perhaps some of Socrates’ fellow 
Athenians also underwent a moment of disclosure when, at the end of his trial, he 
enumerated the idea that death is not the worst of all evils.  At the very least, the 
presupposition was disclosed to Socrates: he inquired into it and expressed it to others.  The 
traditional notion of evil likewise became apparent to and questionable by Arendt through 
her observations and research on the Eichmann trial.  Eichmann did not make sense as an 
evil-doer under the definition of evil as malicious.  By noticing this, the presupposed 
traditional notion of evil became available to Arendt for question.  Finally, in Heidegger, the 
Da-sein goes about as they-self becomes apparent to itself.  It can then consider its “existent 
potentiality-of-being” (i.e. that it could take up other possibilities).155   
The new availability for questioning that results from the disclosure of the 
presupposition constitutes the first type of destruction.  The quality of the presupposition as 
presupposition, as something held as true without consideration, is destroyed.  Even if the 
thinker abandons the critical moment before fully examining the presupposition, she sees it 
in a new way at the moment of disclosure.  It is no longer unconsidered, but there, available 
to questioning.  Its disclosure denotes the first moment of destruction.  Following this 
moment of destruction the thinker might or might not further examine the presupposition.  
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If the thinker pushes the presupposition aside and completely forgets that it was ever 
disclosed, she might return to presupposing it.  But at the moment of disclosure, the 
thinker’s unconsidered relation to it fundamentally changes.  Thus, even if the thinker 
notices the presupposition qua presupposition only for a short time, destruction takes place.  
If a thinker subsequently forgets that the presupposition is a presupposition, the disclosure 
simply has no long-lasting destructive effects.          
In the context of the they-self, Heidegger describes the destruction of disclosure as a 
“collapse.”156  When the they-self is disclosed to itself as having taken up the ways of the 
they, as having presupposed the necessity of the they, “the they collapses.”157  By “collapse,” 
however, Heidegger does not mean that das Man disappears as an operative feature of Da-
sein’s world.  Rather, when Da-sein recognizes that it has presupposed the necessity of the 
ways of the they, the necessity is neutralized and the unquestioned hold of the they negated.  
The they does not disappear, but it can influence Da-sein’s way of going about only if Da-sein 
allows this.  Similarly, other presuppositions are not necessarily rendered ineffective when 
they are disclosed.  A presupposition can, however, become ineffective if the second type of 
destruction takes place.   
The second type of destruction becomes possible after a presupposition is disclosed.  
Once the presupposition is disclosed, the thinker can critically interrogate it and potentially 
defeat it in thought.  Defeat consists in finding the presupposition unworthy of being held.  
A presupposition might be unworthy for a number of reasons.  The thinker might, for 
example, judge it false, pragmatically limiting, or unnecessary.  In the examples I have 
discussed so far, Crito, Socrates, Scarry, Farmer, and Arendt clearly defeat their 
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presuppositions.  Crito and Socrates defeat the notion that death is the worst evil; Scarry, 
that palm trees are always ugly; Farmer, that his lifestyle is necessary; Arendt, that evil is 
always and singularly malicious; and Da-sein, that going about as the they is necessary.        
The second type of destruction does not, however, always take place in the critical 
moment.  A thinker might question a presupposition but still affirm it in the end.  Even if a 
thinker concludes the critical moment by affirming the presupposition, she has nonetheless 
taken part in critical-reflective thinking.  She has been invited by a prompt, accepted its 
invitation, and critically engaged a presupposition.  In the next section, on conversation, I 
will show how Callicles, Socrates’ main conversation partner in the Gorgias, held onto his 
presupposition even after critical-reflective thinking.  Before considering this dialogue, 
however, I will discuss possible effects of defeating a presupposition in thought (i.e. found 
unworthy of being held as true or right).   
Defeating a presupposition in thought can, but need not, result in noticeable changes 
in a thinker’s practical way of going about.  Because thought does not always translate into 
action, it is possible that new thoughts will not be enacted in practical life.  This issue will, in 
part, motivate the discussion of the value of critical-reflective thinking in Chapter Two.  For 
now, it is important to note that although in many of the examples discussed here, the defeat 
of a presupposition does have practical consequences in the thinker’s life, it need not.  The 
lack of practical transformation following critical-reflective thinking might be attributed to a 
thinker’s forgetfulness, strong opposing habits, or simple failure to act on new discoveries.  
Both Farmer and Arendt defeat the presuppositions that were disclosed to them in the 
critical moment.  Yet, only in Arendt’s case does this defeat clearly have long-term effects in 
her practical life.  This is evident in her intellectual work.  This ambiguity does not, however, 
change the fact that both Arendt and Farmer took part in critical-reflective thinking.  
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Arendt decisively defeats the presupposition that evil is fundamentally malicious.  
She found this traditional notion of evil insufficient to describe the banal evil perpetrated by 
Eichmann.  Furthermore, Arendt defeated the presupposition by abandoning it as an 
adequate notion of evil and elaborating an alternative notion of banal evil that informed her 
subsequent work.  Arendt developed the latter notion by questioning the traditional notion 
of evil and observing Eichmann.  Eichmann’s testimony provided proof that evil is not 
always malicious and performed by people who desire to harm others.  Banal evil is a type of 
evil that people perpetrate in their everyday lives, in part as a result of not thinking about the 
meaning and consequences of their activities.  Sometimes banal evil is structurally present in 
the activities accepted by society or demanded by government authorities. The Nazi regime 
took advantage of long-standing German attitudes toward authority to systematically build 
evil into the workings of its society.  To perpetrate this evil, citizens did not have to actively 
hate Jews.  They merely had to obey the laws.  The Nazis brought “criminality into the 
public realm” by demanding terrible acts of its functionaries.158  This drastic change in the 
moral quality of German society seemed to take place “overnight” and to take hold of “a 
great majority of public figures in all walks of life.”159  Normal people perpetrated evil even 
though they did not desire to harm others.  Arendt remained committed to her concept of 
banal evil in essays many years after the Eichmann trial.160  Her continuing affirmation of the 
reality of banal evil attests to the long-term defeat in her life of the paradigm of traditional 
evil.  Critical-reflective thinking, not only neutralized Arendt’s relation to the presupposed 
notion of malicious evil, but the presupposition itself was destroyed.   
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The effects of Arendt’s long-term defeat are evidenced in her new formulation of 
evil (which was made possible by her examination and defeat of the traditional notion of 
evil) that maintains a presence in her work until the end of her life.  In contrast, we cannot 
say whether defeating the presupposition had a long-term effect in Farmer’s life.  After the 
presupposition had been disclosed, Farmer thought to himself: “Those same stars twinkle 
over other fields than these.”161  The “fields” spoken of here are not only the physical fields 
in which Farmer worked each day, but also the fields of possibilities for his life.  “These” 
fields delimited his familiar horizon of possibilities.  He affirmed “these” fields by continuing 
to lead the same mean, moiling life.  “These” fields, however, were not the only fields 
available to him.  There also are “other fields” under the “same stars” that defined his world.  
He was not stuck in “these” fields but could also explore “other fields.”  John Farmer saw 
that there are other ways to live, other possibilities to be had, “other fields” that he could 
occupy.162  The presupposition that his current way of life is the only way of life is untrue if 
other ways of life exist.  This metaphor thus indicates that John Farmer defeated the 
presupposition that his mean, moiling way of living was necessary.  Not only did his relation 
to the presupposition undergo destruction through his reflection upon it, but the truth of the 
presupposition was also destroyed.   
The reader of Walden does not learn of Farmer’s future.  Thoreau only briefly relates 
Farmer’s subsequent thoughts: “—But how to come out of this condition and actually 
migrate thither [i.e., to other fields]?  All he could think of was to practise some new 
austerity, to let his mind descend into his body and redeem it, and treat himself with ever 
                                                
161 Thoreau, Walden, 213.  
162 In fact, one of Thoreau’s central tenets is that “there are as many ways [to live] as there 
can be drawn radii from one centre” (Thoreau, Walden, 11). 
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increasing respect.”163  Farmer seemed to grasp the possibility of incarnating understandings 
of “other fields” into his life.  By bringing his mind, or his thoughts, into his body and the 
way he lived, he could perhaps begin to lead his life in a new way.  The reader never finds 
out, however, if Farmer abandons his presupposition and leads his life differently.  In other 
words, it is unknown whether Farmer’s destruction of the presupposition in thought had 
long-term practical effects.  Whether or not he subsequently changed his life has, however, 
no bearing on the facts that he engaged in critical-reflective thinking and that destruction 
took place in the critical moment.  He was invited by a prompt and, in the critical moment, 
tarried with the presupposition that his work-centric way of life was necessary. 
Critical-Reflective Thinking in Conversation 
 
In this chapter so far, I have focused on the phenomenon of critical-reflective 
thinking as something that takes place in individual people.  Although thinking is often a 
solitary activity, it can also take place among people.  It can be a collective activity, 
something people do together.  People, in other words, are more than just sources that 
prompt individuals’ solitary critical-reflective thinking (as Eichmann was for Arendt).  They 
can confer with one another and, in conversation, think together, as Plato’s dialogues attest.  
Conversation provides a context in which presuppositions can be effectively disclosed and 
considered collectively.  Communal critical-reflective thinking can occur among people when 
they are physically present to one another and words are directly exchanged.  People can also 
converse through writing and reading (e.g. writing a letter or engaging an author by 
questioning and seeking out responses in texts) or through conference calls and video 
chatting.  Critical-reflective thinking can take place in any of these types of conversations.  
Presently, however, I will focus on in-person dialogues.           
                                                
163 Thoreau, Walden, 213. 
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In her later writings, Arendt follows Plato in characterizing thinking as dialogue.  
Although Arendt’s writings on thinking primarily focus on the dialogical character of the 
thinking that happens when an individual converses with herself, the thinking that takes 
place among people is also dialogical.  Readers of her later works will recall that she defines 
thinking as “the two-in-one of the soundless dialogue” and describes this dialogue as taking 
place between “me and myself.”164  Socrates prefigures this definition of thinking when, in 
the Theaetetus, he suggests that thinking is “a talk which the soul has with itself about the 
objects under its consideration.”165  Both Plato and Arendt agree, however, that people can 
think together in dialogue or conversation.  In conversations with other people, “if, as 
sometimes happens, we begin to talk in the form of dialogue about the very same things 
either one of us has been concerned about in solitude, then it is as if I now address another 
self.”166  Arendt’s definition of thinking as solitary conversation is, likewise, extended to 
include people conversing with one another.  These historical and textual references to 
thinking as dialogue motivate the task of examining how critical-reflective thinking might 
collectively take place.   
In collective critical-reflective thinking, the same prompt-critical moment structure 
occurs as in solitary instances of the same phenomenon.  The difference is that the various 
individuals involved in the conversation might be prompted at different moments and by 
different things.  The interlocutors, however, critically question a single presupposition 
together.  In Plato’s dialogues, Socrates often seems to discover what his interlocutors 
                                                
164 Arendt, Thinking, 193, 122. 
165 Plato, Theaetetus, 189e.  This definition also comes under consideration in the Sophist in 
connection with speech, perception, and belief. 
166 Arendt, “Some Questions,” 98.  There is a clear connection between Arendt’s description 
of interpersonal conversation and Aristotle’s notion of friendship, wherein the friend is a 
second self. 
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presuppose before the interlocutors do.  By asking the interlocutor about the matter, he 
assists in the disclosure of the presupposition and the process of critical questioning.167  If 
we believe Socrates when he pleads ignorance to true knowledge of the topics he examines 
with his conversation partners, the conversations might also be an occasion when he himself 
examines presuppositions (including presuppositions he might not personally hold).  In 
other dialogues, however, interlocutors discover and question shared presuppositions 
together.  In what follows, I will examine the occurrence of critical-reflective thinking in 
three philosophical conversations: two Platonic dialogues, Crito and Gorgias, and Heidegger’s 
triadic Country Path Conversation.    
In contrast to Socrates’ monological, though public, examination of death in the 
Apology, critical-reflective thinking takes place among people in many Platonic dialogues.  
One example of dialogical critical-reflective thinking is in the Crito.  Beyond valuing Socrates’ 
bodily life, one of Crito’s more selfish reasons for wanting to save Socrates is to preserve his 
own reputation.  Though Socrates’ death would deprive him of a friend, “the like of whom 
[he would] never find again,” it would also sully his reputation as a friend, something Crito 
wishes to avoid.168  Crito’s reputation would be a discredited because, as he says to Socrates,  
many people […] will think that I could have saved you if I were willing to 
spend the money, but that I did not care to do so.  Surely there can be no 
worse reputation than to be thought to value money more highly than one’s 
friends, for the majority will not believe that you yourself were not willing to 
leave prison while we were eager for you to do so.169 
 
                                                
167 When Socrates functions in this way, he practices the “midwifery” of which he speaks in 
the Theaetetus.  As a midwife, Socrates assists his interlocutors in the birthing of ideas as well 
as the testing of them to “distinguish the true from the false offspring” (Plato, Theaetetus, 
150b). 
168 Plato, Crito, 44b. 
169 Ibid., 44c. 
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To save his reputation as someone who does not value money more than his friends, Crito 
offers to bribe those who would make Socrates’ escape from jail impossible.  He also offers 
to hide Socrates in Thessaly among friends.  Their dialogue provides Crito an opportunity to 
consider not only his presuppositions about the value of life, but also his reputation.  
Together, Socrates and Crito consider the power of the majority and its relation to Crito’s 
reputation.  Insofar as “the many are able to put us to death,” the many have immense 
power.170  Socrates, however, disputes the idea that the many can rightly appraise the value of 
Crito’s friendship.  If they cannot, Socrates argues, their opinion should not be heeded.  
Crito’s presupposition that his reputation, as judged by the majority, really matters is 
thereby disclosed and open to question.  Socrates seems to recognize Crito’s presuppostion 
before Crito does, and he poses a question that discloses it to Crito.  He asks: “Consider 
then, do you not think it a sound statement that one must not value all the opinions of men, 
but some and not others, nor the opinions of all men, but those of some and not others?”171  
By asking this question, Socrates asks whether all people’s opinions are worthy of attention.  
He articulates (and, thereby, discloses) an idea that Crito had taken to be true and opens it to 
doubt.  Crito and Socrates then begin to examine together in conversation the notion that 
reputation as judged by the many really matters.  This phenomenon of one person 
recognizing another person’s presupposition is not particularly rare.  In conversations with 
others, we have all likely experienced occasions when our conversation partner discerned a 
presupposition that underlaid our views or activities.  Sometimes we are not aware of our 
own presuppositions until someone else voices them to us.  Although Thoreau does not 
begin a critical-reflective conversation with his tailoress, he espies her presupposition about 
                                                
170 Ibid., 48a. 
171 Ibid., 47a. 
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the dictates of the fashionable they.  Regardless of whose presupposition it is, in collective 
critical-reflective thinking as in solitary thinking a presupposition is disclosed and examined.       
After Socrates poses the above question, he and Crito agree that, by analogy to the 
trustworthiness of trainers who give advice in matters of physical training, only those who 
have knowledge in a certain area can properly judge it.172  This applies to “actions just and 
unjust, shameful and beautiful, good and bad,” for example, the goodness of a friendship.173  
The majority of people do not have knowledge of what is just and unjust, shameful and 
beautiful, or good and bad.  Thus, although a majority might judge Crito to be a poor friend 
when Socrates dies, its opinion should not be valued.  Socrates and Crito claim only that 
“one who has knowledge of these things and before whom we feel fear and shame more 
than before all the others” should be trusted in such matters.174  By heeding what these 
individuals would say, Crito comes to recognize that he had misguidedly prized both bodily 
life and his reputation.  The defeat of these presuppositions has practical outcomes for Crito.  
When he abandons the presuppositions, he stops trying to convince Socrates to escape from 
jail and to flee his sentence.  When he affirms that his own reputation, as well as Socrates’ 
bodily life, is not as important as he previously thought, he also gives up his goal of rescuing 
Socrates from death, this being the goal that had followed from the presupposition.  
In the Gorgias, Socrates’ interlocutor, Callicles, has a different experience.  Although 
Callicles is able to critically reflect on a presupposition that he and Socrates examine 
together, in the end, he is unable to give it up.  He does not effect the second type of 
destruction during the course of the conversation.  In the midst of a discussion between 
Polus and Socrates about the value of rhetoric, a bystander, the politician Callicles, breaks in.  
                                                
172 Ibid., 47a-b. 
173 Ibid., 47c-d. 
174 Ibid., 27d. 
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Together with Polus, Socrates has just determined that rhetoric is a skill that is useful for 
escaping punishment when one has done something unjust.  A person practices rhetoric 
when he makes speeches in court to support a claim to innocence, even though he is not 
really innocent.  By contrast, rhetoric will not be needed if one has committed no injustice.  
Although Polus finds Socrates’ contention strange, he agrees with Socrates.  Callicles, 
however, finds their conclusion utterly wrongheaded.  He believes that it is more shameful 
to suffer injustice than to do injustice.  In his opinion, consequently, it is more important to 
be able to defend oneself in court than always to do what is just.175  From Callicles’ 
perspective, it is most repugnant not to be able to “save either himself or anyone else from 
the greatest dangers” of having his life or property threatened in court.176  In Callicles’ 
opinion, therefore, rhetoric is the most valuable skill. 
The major presupposition that is disclosed and questioned in the Gorgias is that it is 
worse to suffer than to do injustice.  Although this is not a presupposition Socrates holds, it 
was widely held among his fellow Athenians at the time—it was a collective 
presupposition.177  Once this presupposition comes out into the open, Socrates and his 
conversation partners tarry with it.  The presupposition is disclosed early in the dialogue, 
when Socrates and Polus are still the main interlocutors: 
Polus:  Surely the one who is put to death unjustly, at any rate, is pitiable 
and wretched, I suppose. 
Socrates:  Less than he who kills, Polus, and less than he who is justly put to 
death. 
                                                
175 Plato, Gorgias, trans. Donald J. Zeyl, in Plato: Complete Works, ed. John M. Cooper 
(Indianapolis: Hackett, 1997), 482d-e. 
176 Ibid., 486c. 
177 Those present during the historical occasion of the conversation might have begun to 
think, though they do not speak up in the dialogue.  This conversation speaks not only to the 
people who might have been physically present during conversation, but also to readers 
many years removed.  In this way, people who are not main characters of the dialogue can 
also take up the conversation and enter critical-reflective thinking themselves. 
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Polus:  How is this, Socrates? 
Socrates:  In this way, that doing injustice happens to be the greatest of evils. 
Polus:  Can it be that this is the greatest?  Isn’t suffering injustice 
greater?178 
 
This disagreement between Polus and Socrates articulates a presupposition (that suffering 
injustice is worse than doing injustice), into which they begin to inquire.  In the midst of 
their discussion, Callicles becomes agitated and is prompted to speak up.  He turns to 
another bystander, Chaerephon, and asks, “is Socrates in earnest about this or is he 
joking?”179  Callicles finds Socrates’ conclusion, that doing injustice is the greatest of evils, so 
strange that he asks Socrates,  
For if you are in earnest, and these things you’re saying are really true, won’t 
this human life of ours be turned upside down and won’t everything we do 
evidently be the opposite of what we should do?180 
 
The idea that doing injustice is worse than suffering injustice is completely contrary to the 
normal attitudes and practices of the Athenians.  Socrates’ claim, if true, would turn their 
world upside down.  By championing the common collective presupposition, Callicles’ view 
is representative of what most normal Athenians of the time might have taken to be true.   
 In the lengthy conversation that ensues, Socrates supports the idea that doing 
injustice is far worse than having justice done to oneself because doing injustice harms one’s 
own soul, whereas suffering injustice harms only the body.  If one is unjustly convicted in 
court and sentenced to a fine or even death, the body is punished. 181   Such unjust 
punishment, however, does not affect the convicted’s soul.  For Socrates, the health of the 
soul is radically more important than that of the body.  Rhetoric, like all other life-saving 
                                                
178 Plato, Gorgias, 469b. 
179 Ibid., 481b. 
180 Ibid., 481c. 
181 The health of the body includes not only one’s physical body, but also one’s material 
property. 
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techniques (e.g. piloting a boat, swimming, medicine), can save only the body.182  It cannot 
help one be just and pursue the good, which are the conditions for happiness.183  Such 
pursuits cannot occur without a prior understanding of the good itself, which, according to 
Socrates, can be found only by doing philosophy. 
Through his exchange with Callicles, Socrates is convinced that he has defeated the 
presupposition that having injustice done to one is worse than doing injustice.  Callicles, on 
the other hand, is not swayed by Socrates’ argument.  Some of Callicles’s statements even 
cast doubt on whether he actually thinks through the issue with Socrates.  Although he 
enthusiastically begins the conversation, Callicles soon becomes frustrated.  Because Socrates 
continually questions Callicles’ statements and shows them to be self-contradictory, Callicles 
complains that Socrates is “talking nonsense,” “being ironic,” and shamefully “catch[ing] 
[his, Callicles’] words” in order to make “hay out of  [his] tripping on a phrase.”184  Callicles 
takes Socrates to be so intent on merely winning their argument that Socrates will attempt to 
set ablaze any small turn of phrase to show that Callicles is mistaken.  Eventually, Callicles 
appears to give up the attempt to say what he honestly believes so as to avoid being shown 
up as inconsistent.185  He says, for example, “I won’t dissent.  I’m going along with you, both 
to expedite your argument and to gratify Gorgias here,” who has urged Callicles to continue 
the conversation for the sake of the common elucidation of the spectators.186  Moreover, 
                                                
182 Plato, Gorgias, 511-512. 
183 Ibid., 508b. Socrates’ view that happiness [eudiamonia] is conditioned only by the pursuit of 
justice and the good has been challenged (for example, Julia Annas—see Julia Annas, Platonic 
Ethics Old and New, (New York: Cornell University Press, 1999)).  Along an Aristotelian line 
of thought (see Aristotle’s Nichomachean Ethics I.9) conventional goods, like family, friends, 
and material necessities, and good fortune also condition one’s happiness.  
184 Plato, Gorgias, 489b-c. 
185 Ibid., 495a. 
186 Ibid., 501c. 
 85 
Callicles admits to Socrates that he “couldn’t care less about anything” Socrates says.187  If 
Callicles does not take part in the conversation as an earnest interlocutor who listens to and 
engages his conversation partner, is he really critically and reflectively thinking together with 
Socrates?  The evidence of Callicles ambivalence and disdain for the conversation shows that 
for much of the conversation he may not have been in critical-reflective thinking.   
Yet, there is one moment in the middle of the conversation when Callicles indicates 
that Socrates has successfully brought the presupposition into question.  At 511c, Socrates 
makes a long speech in support of his claim that because doing injustice is harmful to the 
soul, it is far worse than having injustice done to oneself.  At the end of the speech, Callicles’ 
response shows that Socrates succeeded in articulating the presupposition and opening it to 
question.  He says, “I don’t know, Socrates—in a way you seem to me to be right, but the 
thing that happens to most people has happened to me: I’m not really persuaded by you.”188  
Given the continual skirmishes between Callicles and Socrates up to this point and the fact 
that Callicles has all but abandoned the conversation, this statement is surprising.  Callicles 
was apparently able to transcend their differences and follow Socrates’ train of thought.  He 
was able to see the presupposition in a critical light and to understand that it might not hold 
true.  It is only by considering the presupposition critically, if only for a moment, that is he 
able to say that Socrates seems to be right.   
Although Callicles does not give up the presupposition, he entertains the possibility 
that it might not be true.  Like many others who conversed with Socrates, Callicles’ position 
does not shift; he ultimately remains unpersuaded of Socrates’ position.  The fact that he 
does not abandon the presupposition, however, does not mean that he did not critically and 
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reflectively think despite himself.  Callicles was prompted to essay thought by Socrates’ and 
Polus’ initial conversation.  In the subsequent conversation, he was able to consider that his 
presupposition might not be true, if only for a moment.  When Callicles says that Socrates, 
in a way, seems to be right, he demonstrates that he has encountered the collective 
presupposition as something open to scrutiny.  His relationship to it changed, at least breifly.  
Others present for the conversation (both historical persons or readers) who think along 
with it might also find that their relation to the presupposition has changed. 
There are many possible reasons that Callicles’ engagement with the presupposition 
does not result in defeat.  Callicles might be loath to be bested in argument or to agree with 
Socrates, whose talk he calls “nonsense.”  Perhaps his lack of sincere involvement in the 
conversation prevents him from agreeing with Socrates and requires that he further examine 
the presupposition on his own if he is to reject it.  Socrates, however, attributes Callicles’ 
defense to his love of the people: “It’s your love for the people, Callicles, existing in your 
soul, that stands against me.”189  As a budding politician, Callicles loves the people of Athens 
and desires to be respected and loved by them.  Callicles cannot “contradict [his] beloved.”190  
Instead, he must say “what [the people] wants to hear.”191  Socrates’ thesis on the baseness 
of doing evil, however, opposes what people usually do and think.  In fact, Callicles 
contends, normal life would be turned upside down if Socrates is right.  So, Callicles must 
defend the position of the many, namely, that it is worse to be harmed than to do injustice.  
He continues, accordingly, to uphold the presupposition although it has been brought into 
question.  This example from the Gorgias shows that an examined presupposition need not 
be abandoned.  Thinkers might have various reasons for retaining a presupposition even 
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after having examined it in critical-reflective thinking.  Even so, disclosure of the 
presupposition effects the first type of destruction, which consists in questioning a 
presupposition that had been previously taken to be true without consideration.  As I will 
discuss in Chapter Two, even the first type of destruction has consequences for a thinker’s 
understanding.  Simply by becoming aware of her presupposition, a thinker gains perspective 
and nuance that was not previously present.      
To look at critical-reflective thinking in conversation from one further perspective, I 
turn to one of Heidegger’s Country Path Conversations, “'Aγχιβασíη: A Triadic Conversation on 
a Country Path between a Scientist, A Scholar, and a Guide.”  The topic of this dialogue, 
written between 1944 and 1945, is thinking.  Along the way, the interlocutors encounter a 
presupposition that they collectively hold.  The presupposition concerns the nature of 
conversations: the interlocutors presuppose the necessity of staying on track and not 
allowing diversions.  For the Scientist and the Scholar, this means investigating thinking, the 
main topic of their conversation, to the exclusion of all other topics.  They believe that only 
by sticking to the topic will they gain new, essential knowledge of thinking.  This 
presupposition first appears as a presupposition to the Guide, who puts it into words for the 
others.  It subsequently comes under critical questioning.  The interlocutors eventually defeat 
the presupposition in that, instead of continuing to avoid digressions, they allow themselves 
to explore ideas that do not appear to be relevant to the main topic.   
The conversation takes place on a country path along which the interlocutors walk as 
they talk.  Early in the dialogue, the Scientist and the Scholar adamantly attempt to stick to 
the topic that had been selected at the outset.  They believe that, by choosing the topic in 
advance and sticking to it, they will best be able to uncover the nature of thinking.  The 
Scientist, unsurprisingly, wishes to examine the matter from the perspective of the natural 
 88 
sciences; at the beginning, consequently, he attempts to focus on cognition.  He also 
proposes that the best way to find out about thinking is through the methods of modern 
physics.  The Scholar, by contrast, treats the topic of thinking historically.  When the 
interlocutors begin discussing Kant’s notions of thinking, cognition, and intuition, the 
Scholar refers to Leibniz in order to connect historical viewpoints.  Both the Scientist and 
the Scholar attempt to keep the conversation centered on the topic of thinking by using their 
favored methods of investigation.  The Guide is less attached to sticking to the topic of 
thinking, though he too is not aware of the presupposition at the beginning of the dialogue.  
He primarily makes enigmatic comments that push the Scientist and Scholar to consider the 
topic in new ways and, eventually, to question the presupposition.     
Though each of the interlocutors is prompted at different points in the conversation, 
it is clear that each interlocutor undergoes an interruption.  The fact that an interruption 
takes place implies that they have been prompted.  Within the context of conversation, each 
interlocutor departs from his usual affairs and way of being.  The Scientist says, “In our 
conversations it always seems to me as if [one’s] standing and name—indeed, even one’s 
own accustomed daily being [tägliche Wesen]—were to vanish.”192  The Scholar and the Guide 
agree with the Scientist’s assessment by questioning why this occurs in their conversations.193  
Apparently, the interlocutors have undergone interruptions where they depart from their 
daily ways of being during their conversations before; this is a perennial phenomenon.  This 
departure occurs in that their “standings,” “names,” and “ways of daily being” seem to 
                                                
192 Martin Heidegger, “'Aγχιβασíη: A Triadic Conversation on a Country Path between a 
Scientist, a Scholar, and a Guide,” in Country Path Conversations, trans. Bret Davis 
(Bloomington: Indiana, 2010), 54. 
193 The interlocutors agree that it has something to do with how new horizons open up in 
their conversations.  This conclusion leads into a discussion about the nature of horizons 
and the relation between horizons and willing. 
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vanish.  These aspects of their lives are representative of their usual, likely unreflective, ways 
of going about.  By experiencing an interruption of their usual activities, the interlocutors are 
able to enter the critical moment wherein their shared presupposition is disclosed and 
questioned.  The interlocutors begin to think together.  Their collective presupposition (that 
they must discuss solely the topic under consideration if they are to succeed in discovering 
something new and essential about it) comes to be disclosed when it obstructs the 
discussion’s progress. 
 The presupposition becomes problematic very early in the dialogue when the 
conversation veers away from the topic of thinking.  When the Scientist proposes that 
modern physics provides the best method for discerning the nature of thinking, the Guide 
poses the hermeneutical question of what such a method presumes.  The Guide believes that 
modern physics is bound up with technology.  By approaching the topic of thinking from 
the perspective of physics, any results would, thus, inevitably be colored by technology.  The 
Scholar, meanwhile, notes that if they use the methods of science to find out about thinking, 
they must examine the essence of theoretical physics.  The Scholar is anxious, however, 
about such an inquiry.  He fears that it would lead to mere speculation and that the 
interlocutors “will fall into vacuity with it.”194  The Guide responds to this comment by 
posing a general question about the relationship between anxiety and speculation.  The 
orientation of the conversation toward its goal of finding out about thinking weakens 
through the twists and turns of these exchanges.  The Scientist admits that he is beginning to 
feel lost, and the Guide issues one of his enigmatic remarks, “The human only ever loses 
that which he does not yet properly have.”195   
                                                
194 Heidegger, “A Triadic Conversation,” 5. 
195 Ibid., 6. 
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This remark frustrates the attempts of the Scientist and the Scholar to stay on topic.  
They consider it completely unrelated to the matter at hand.  Indeed, the reader of this 
dialogue might have sympathy with the Scholar, who attempts to bring the conversation 
back on track.  A short exchange directly following the Guide’s enigmatic remark is the 
initial moment when the narrow topical focus of the conversation comes into view:  
Scholar:  Now I too must confess that everything escapes me when I try to 
think what you just said.  So I think it would be beneficial for me to 
bring our conversation back again to its path. 
Guide:    I am happy to entrust myself to your guidance, so long as you take 
into account that my interspersed remarks will sometimes slow 
down the course of the conversation. 
Scientist: Such delays don’t harm anything, as long as they don’t cause us to 
get off track.196   
 
The Scholar and the Scientist presuppose that the success of their discussion rests on their 
ability to stay on track and not to digress into topics that are not clearly related to thinking.  
The Guide, though more prone to “getting off track,” does not initially dispute this idea.  
Not only is it ironic that he submits to the guidance of his conversation partners, who are 
not, strictly, guides.197  His statement also shows that he understands the effects of his 
remarks in a different way than the Scientist and Scholar.  Rather than turning the discussion 
away from its course, he sees his contributions as merely slowing its progress.  For him, 
discussing topics that might not be clearly relevant constitutes another way of finding out 
about thinking.  Other topics that come up in a conversation about thinking are bound to be 
related to it in some way.  Although the presupposed importance of keeping the 
conversation on track is thematized and becomes problematic at this point in the dialogue, it 
is not yet disclosed as a presupposition.  Consequently, it does not yet come under question.  
                                                
196 Ibid. 
197 In German, the Guide is called the “Weiser.”  Bret Davis, in his translation of the Country 
Path Conversations, has rendered this German word as “Guide,” though it has the double 
meaning of “sage” and “one that shows the way.”  
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Instead, further departures from the topic of thinking occur again and again throughout the 
dialogue.198  The Scientist and Scholar continually respond by trying to bring the discussion 
explicitly back to the topic of thinking.  Eventually, however, it becomes apparent that their 
attempts are in vain.  Not only do they fail to keep the conversation on track but, through 
these attempts, they fail to gain essential knowledge of thinking. 
 At one point, one of the Guide’s remarks shifts the topic of the discussion from 
thinking to willing.  This shift provides the occasion for the disclosure and critical 
questioning of the presupposition.  This moment occurs when, the Scientist and the Scholar, 
having been continually thwarted and puzzled by the Guide’s remarks, ask the Guide to say 
exactly what he wants to gain—or “wills”—in the conversation.  At this point, the Guide 
again gives an enigmatic remark.  This remark, however, serves to shift the topic of the 
conversation.  The Guide says, “Since you so directly put me on the spot to say something, I 
must also directly, and therefore insufficiently, reply.  What I really will [will] in our 
meditation on thinking is non-willing [Nicht-Wollen].”199  The meaning of this reply is not 
immediately clear to the interlocutors, not even to the Guide himself.200  And despite their 
previous attempts to stay on topic, the appearance of the related topic (i.e. willing) grabs the 
Scholar’s and Scientist’s attention, and they begin to inquire into it.201  In this, they appear to 
unreflectively abandon their presupposition.  At this point, however, the Guide discloses the 
presupposition and instigates the critical moment.    
                                                
198 See also Heidegger, “A Triadic Conversation,” 16, 21, 30, 32. 
199 Heidegger, “A Triadic Conversation,” 33.  The German words, “will” and “Wollen” might 
have also been rendered as “want” and “wanting,” respectively. 
200 The Guide thinks this comment has been elicited from him.  He cannot immediately say 
what it means, and the interlocutors proceed to examine the meaning of his statement 
together. 
201 Heidegger, “A Triadic Conversation,” 33. 
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The Guide notes the risk of digressions and the fact that his conversation partners 
have, up to this point, blocked them.  In beginning to investigate willing, he says to the 
Scientist and the Scholar, “You are thereby running the risk of shifting our conversation on 
thinking to the topic of willing, while it is you who are continually and at times violently 
struggling to keep the conversation on its topic.  The topic, however, is thinking and not 
willing.”202  This statement discloses the underlying and unquestioned method that the 
Scientist and Scholar have pursued throughout the conversation.  They have presupposed 
the importance of discussing thinking to the exclusion of all else.   
Although willing is not the same as thinking, all three interlocutors agree that 
investigating it might lead them to new findings about thinking.  The Scientist and the 
Scholar now leave the path of the conversation they had set out before.  This fact, coupled 
with the Guide’s comment about non-willing, brings up the question of whether a 
conversation can reach essential knowledge of its object if it willfully limits itself to 
discussing this object alone.  The Guide states the central issue: “Yet perhaps one could 
doubt whether a conversation is still a conversation at all if it wills something.”203  Instead of 
willing something (i.e. willing the conversation to stay on track), the interlocutors discuss 
that if something essential is to come to light through their discussion, an event that they 
cannot plan in advance must occur, namely, the event of something coming to language (“in 
a proper conversation an event takes place wherein something comes to language”).204  The 
Scientist accepts this notion, and it moves him to explicitly reject his prior commitment to 
staying on track.  He says, “Then in fact my question, what we will in the conversation, would 
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be contrary to the essence of the conversation, since at best it wills something with us.”205  
He sees that by forcing the conversation along a narrow path confined to the topic at hand, 
the conversation is not allowed to move on its own.  The interlocutors do not think that the 
conversation actually has agency of its own.  Rather, this statement expresses a shift in their 
understanding of how conversations work.  As a result, they abandon their attempt to focus 
on the narrow, pre-defined topic chosen in advance, and reorient themselves to allow the 
investigation of other topics that come up along the way. 206   This shift signals an 
abandonment of their presupposition.  By allowing the discussion of topics that do not 
immediately appear relevant to finding out about thinking, they leave behind the premise 
that had guided the direction of their conversation up until then and enact the implications 
of defeating it.    
 The dialogues presented here illustrate how conversation can provide a prime site for 
critical-reflective thinking.  Not only can each person involved in a dialogue be the source of 
a prompt for the others.  Conversation partners can also, together, disclose communal 
presuppositions and question them.  The critical-reflective thinking in these conversations 
did not always result in defeat of a presupposition.  Callicles did not abandon his 
presupposition in the course of his conversation with Socrates, although Crito and the three 
interlocutors in the Country Path Conversation did abandon theirs.  Each of the interlocutors, 
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206 In his 1955 “Memorial Address,” Heidegger reinforces the idea that it is important to 
consider ideas that do not initially seem to be related to topics of interest.  When discussing 
meditative thinking, a type of thinking that is uncommon in the contemporary world, he 
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Address,” in Discourse on Thinking, trans. John M. Anderson and E. Hans Freund (New York: 
Harper, 1966), 53). 
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however, partook of critical-reflective thinking in being prompted, encountering a 
presupposition, and critically questioning it.    
CONCLUSIONS 
 
Arendt discusses one final sense in which thinking is destructive.  In critical-
reflective thinking, thinkers recognize and question presuppositions.  Because people hold a 
multitude of presuppositions many of which they will never discover, thinking can always 
take place anew.  Even if a thinker believes that she has reached a conclusion and has new, 
true knowledge, this too can be questioned.  Arendt refers to Kant when discussing the 
possibility of never-ending thinking.  She writes that, 
In the privacy of his posthumously published notes, Kant wrote: “I do not 
approve of the rule that if the use of pure reason has proved something, the 
result should no longer be subject to doubt, as though it were a solid axiom”; 
and “I do not share the opinion… that one should not doubt once one has 
convinced oneself of something […]” From which it follows that the 
business of thinking is like Penelope’s web; it undoes every morning what it 
has finished the night before.207 
 
Thinking is “self-destructive.”208  Whatever has been thought is susceptible to further 
examination and possible destruction.  Critical-reflective thinking can happen again and 
again ad infinitum.  And no matter how often it takes place or how transformative it is, 
humans continue to hold things as true, presuppositions continue to be maintained.  The 
work of thinking is never finished and can never be completed. 
This sort of infinitude is one of the two main issues about the value of critical-
reflective thinking that is raised in this chapter.  The second issue is that critical-reflective 
thinking need not be accompanied by practical change in a thinker’s life.  Although 
something fundamental changes for the thinker when a presupposition is disclosed and 
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defeated, these changes do not always translate into action and may even be forgotten or 
thwarted by other, opposing habits.  Consequently, it is difficult to justify the value of 
critical-reflective thinking on the basis of its results.  Arendt, too, motivates this concern too 
when she asks, “How can anything relevant for the world we live in arise out of so resultless 
an enterprise [as thinking]?” 209   Though critical-reflective thinking is not completely 
resultless, Arendt’s question points out that thinking is sometimes quite remote from 
practical life and action.   
 The incompleteness and “resultlessness” of critical-reflective thinking should not 
dissuade us from taking it up when we are invited to do so.  Even if it never ends and does 
not necessarily result in practical change, critical-reflective thinking is valuable.  By 
recognizing presuppositions, people recognize themselves and can, thereby, become more 
aware of how they lead their lives.  Critical-reflective thinking, in other words, encourages 
deeper, richer understanding and opens new possibilities for life.  The value of critical-
reflective thinking is the central topic of the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER TWO: 
THE VALUE OF CRITICAL-REFLECTIVE THINKING 
 
 
[W]hen one realizes that understanding is an 
adventure, one realizes that it affords unique 
opportunities as well.  It is capable of 
contributing in a special way to the 
broadening of our human experiences, our 
self-knowledge, and our horizon, for 
everything that understanding mediates is 
mediated through ourselves.210  
- Hans-Georg Gadamer 
 
This passage from Hans-Georg Gadamer’s “Hermeneutics as Practical Philosophy” 
points toward reasons why an activity like critical-reflective thinking is valuable.  Like 
critical-reflective thinking, Gadamerian hermeneutical experience (and the generation of new 
understanding therein) is a task that requires the examination of notions one has 
unreflectively taken to be true.  It is also a task that, though completed in each instance, is 
never, as a whole, finished.  Because they are never completely finished, both hermeneutical 
understanding and critical-reflective thinking offer the possibility of a life-long “adventure” 
wherein participants progress in such a way as to deepen experience, gain self-knowledge, 
and expand their horizons.  These contributions to their understanding help to mediate the 
world in new ways by allowing people see in new ways.  In this chapter, I further clarify the 
destructive results of critical-reflective thinking to show how critically tarrying with 
presuppositions positively generates new understandings that contribute to how people see 
and go about the world.  Critical-reflective thinking is valuable in that it facilitates the growth 
and development of understanding and, thereby, liberates thinkers to new possibilities.   
                                                
210 Hans-Georg Gadamer, “Hermeneutics as Practical Philosophy,” in The Gadamer Reader, 
trans. and ed. Richard E. Palmer (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2007), 244. 
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Although Gadamer has not been a main figure in this dissertation so far, as a student 
of Heidegger and peer of Arendt his thought, like theirs, engages phenomenology and 
discusses some of the same topics.  His writings have two distinct advantages for an analysis 
of value over those of the other primary authors who have contributed to the discussion so 
far.  First, Gadamer thematically considers and evaluates an activity akin to critical-reflective 
thinking, whereas Heidegger, Thoreau, and Plato simply provide anecdotes and examples 
that, though poignant, describe it only indirectly.  Though Arendt thematically considers 
thinking, I find one of her primary reasons for valuing it to be highly problematic.  Arendt 
poses the question of whether thinking hinders evil-doing and ventures an affirmative 
answer.211  Even in her final work, The Life of the Mind, however, tension between thought 
and action remains.  She writes, “The decision the will arrives at can never be derived from 
the mechanics of desire or the deliberations of the intellect that may precede it.”212  Thinking 
does not determine action.  As a result, even if one understands the wrongfulness of some 
action, one still may perform it and continue to live with oneself.213  Second, Gadamer treats 
thinking as valuable in a more straightforward manner than Heidegger, Thoreau, and Plato.  
In Being and Time, Heidegger, for example, explicitly denies that his project is involved with 
ethics and questions concerning value.  He takes himself instead to be engaged in a project 
(i.e. awakening the question of Being) that he sees as a prerequisite to understanding “the 
fundamental structures of Da-sein.”214  The way that Plato, moreover, takes up the value of 
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212 Arendt, Thinking, 213. 
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thinking in the Socratic dialogues requires more metaphysical underpinnings than I can do 
justice to here.  The statement that thinking is good for the soul, for example, would require 
an in depth examination of the soul, the good, and their relation to each other.  Thoreau, 
finally, might come closest to describing the value of reflection with commonsensical and 
practical clarity.  Through his anecdotes in Walden, he shows the fulfillment people can 
achieve by gaining reflective understanding of themselves, Nature (i.e. their environment as 
well as the workings of the world around them), and what they can get out of life by 
following their own directives (rather than those set forth by the status quo).  Yet, 
Gadamer’s confrontation with an activity that has specific similarities to critical-reflective 
thinking makes his discussion of value more directly relevant than Thoreau’s.  Gadamer 
offers a general account of the value of hermeneutic experience and understanding.  As in 
the passage with which this chapter begins, he states that gaining understanding (through 
hermeneutic experience) broadens not only one’s horizon of understanding, but also 
deepens one’s experience and self-knowledge.   
Here I will follow out, in the context of critical-reflective thinking, Gadamer’s central 
claim that the adventure of understanding provides transformative horizonal expansion.  
The destruction of presuppositions, though it is valuable on its own in that it can disabuse 
people of notions that are false or problematic, is only one aspect of what takes place in 
critical-reflective thinking.  In this activity, new understanding is also generated, and this new 
understanding reshapes a person’s perspective.  As described in Chapter One, 
presuppositions undergird how people see and go about life.  In Gadamerian language: 
prejudices (his term for presuppositions) partly constitute a person’s underlying 
understanding, and this underlying understanding mediates and frames how people see and 
go about.  This mediating understanding also partly constitutes a person’s horizon.  By 
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recognizing a presupposition, i.e. a constitutive aspect of her underlying understanding (or 
horizon), a person gains reflective understanding of it, and this understanding automatically 
alters the shape of her horizon.  Both the content and practical efficacy of the person’s 
horizon change, and this new horizon mediates her world differently than before.   
Because there are relevant similarities between hermeneutic experience and critical-
reflective thinking, Gadamer’s reasons in support of the value of hermeneutic experience (i.e. 
the generation of new understanding that induces horizonal expansion and gains in 
perspective) also hold for critical-reflective thinking.  Applying Gadamer’s account to 
critical-reflective thinking helps show how critical-reflective thinking can make a difference 
in a person’s perspective, allowing her to more deeply relate to herself and others, the world, 
and experiences.  By approaching critical-reflective thinking in this way, I aim to show that it 
is transformative and that this transformation is often valuable.  Because, however, people’s 
experiences of thinking vary insofar as they consider different presuppositions and their 
considerations have meaning specific to them, the particular consequences of transformation 
will be distinct in each case.  This means that critical-reflective thinking could have negative 
effects in some cases, and the negative effects may even devalue it in those cases.  These 
possibilities will be considered below.  Two positive transformative consequences, however, 
are implied by the structure of the activity itself and, thus, usually obtain.  First, thinkers 
grow in understanding and, second, they become liberated to new possibilities for life and 
thought.  These new possibilities not only reiterate that thinkers have reached a greater depth 
of understanding, but also enable thinkers to act more freely and intentionally, on the basis 
of reflective considerations. 
 By conceptualizing the effects of critical-reflective thinking through a discussion of 
horizons, we can discover more precisely how destroying presuppositions helps thinkers 
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grow and become liberated to new possibilities.  This will build the foundation for a clearer 
assessment of the value of this thinking.  Along the way, I will also bring up possible 
objections to the value of critical-reflective thinking by considering risks involved in it as 
well as issues related to its infinitude.  In particular, the specific significance of destruction 
will, as mentioned, vary by thinker, so while for some it may feel empowering, for others it 
might result in perceived limitations.  The infinitude of critical-reflective thinking, its 
essential incompleteness, might also cause doubts about both what progress in it means and 
whether thinkers can achieve comfort in the face of understanding that is never final or 
complete. 
GADAMER, EMERSON, HORIZONS, & CRITICAL-REFLECTIVE THINKING 
 
The concept of horizon is central in elaborating Gadamer’s view.  In order to make 
sense of changes in thinkers’ perspectives, I refer to the conglomeration of assorted 
understanding that every person has.  Understanding is composed of presuppositions, 
beliefs, knowledge, and experiences that, though not always in the foreground of one’s mind, 
undergird one’s thoughts and actions.  In this way, a person’s understanding defines her 
“horizon” (Gadamer calls it the “horizon of understanding”).  Though horizons are 
described in greater depth throughout this chapter, it is important, from the beginning, to 
clarify the relationship between understanding, horizons, and presuppositions.  Insofar as 
presuppositions partly constitute understanding, and understanding delimits horizon, one’s 
presuppositions, serve to delimit one’s horizon.  So, when a thinker considers 
presuppositions that operate in her understanding, her horizon undergoes change. 
Clarifying the meaning of “horizon,” Seyla Benhabib writes,  
The term horizon in phenomenology suggests the ever-present but never quite 
fully transparent presuppositions, contexts, and referential networks that we 
must always take for granted when we are in the world […]; at any point in 
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time, it is only some aspect of it, some part on which we focus our attention, 
and this then becomes present to us and reveals itself to us.215  
  
This statement thematically connects presuppositions to horizons.  Since presuppositions 
partly delimit horizons, a discussion of horizons is essential to considering the effects of 
critical-reflective thinking.  According to Benhabib, “One of Arendt’s fundamental 
contributions […] is the thesis that the human space of appearances is constituted by” just 
such a horizon, a “web” of “invisible, gossamerlike ties, networks, and contexts of human 
relationships.” 216   Insofar as every person “must always take [some presuppositions, 
contexts, and referential networks for granted] when… in the world,” Arendt treats the 
horizon as a universal human phenomenon; every person has a horizon.  By virtue of 
people’s common humanity, moreover, their horizons might have fundamental similarities.  
However, their particular horizons are not likely to be identical since horizons are partly 
constituted by presuppositions and individuals can hold different presuppositions. 
Arendt’s discussion of horizons in The Human Condition is, however, brief, whereas 
Gadamer considers the topic more fully.  Curiously, another figure related to this dissertation 
by his association with Thoreau, Ralph Waldo Emerson, too, describes a dynamic of 
horizonal alteration in his essay, “Circles” that is similar to Gadamer’s account.  For 
Gadamer and Emerson, every person has a horizon that demarcates her “realm of vision” 
(or perspective), defines how she sees, and places different things within her view in relation 
to each other.  Both authors use the metaphor of vision to describe how understanding 
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mediates experience and possibility.  Encounters with and dissolutions of constitutive 
aspects of one’s horizon (such as presuppositions) redefine one’s perspective.  In turn, a 
changed perspective allows a person to gain access to new ways of seeing and going about.  
Passages in Emerson’s “Circles” and Gadamer’s Truth and Method show how the destruction 
of presuppositions effects a broader or more developed perspective, how this development 
can shape a person’s views, and how these changes liberate thinkers to new possibilities.   
Before illustrating the dynamic of horizonal expansion and its effects, the relevance 
of Gadamer and Emerson for a discussion of the destruction of presuppositions must be 
more fully established.  In the following sections, I will consider each author in turn in order 
to show the similarities between their views and mine.  By exploring how our views 
converge, I also illustrate the contributions that a horizonal model makes to valuing critical-
reflective thinking.  After discussing the contributions of each author to the project of 
evaluating critical-reflective thinking, I also consider an important objection, namely that 
horizonal expansion is not possible.   
Heidegger and Gadamer 
 
Heidegger deeply influenced Gadamer, who was one of his doctoral students.  In 
fact, Gadamer’s magnum opus, Truth and Method, could be interpreted as a Hegelian 
extrapolation of Heidegger’s thoughts in §31 and §32 of Being and Time.  Gadamer’s 
description of “prejudices”—his word for “presuppositions,” which he also describes as 
“pre-judgments,” “fore-meanings,” and “fore-understanding”217—is rooted in Heidegger’s 
notion of “fore-having.”  In Being and Time, Heidegger offers a description of understanding 
that sheds light on how presuppositions are effective for Da-sein.  For Heidegger, 
understanding discloses the world and the beings in it through an always already given 
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totality of relevance: “The totality of relevance reveals itself as the categorical whole of a 
possibility of the connection of things at hand.”218  The fact that all beings in the world are 
possibly connected to each other via the totality of relevance does not yet provide the 
specific details about how they are connected.  Though the totality of relevance may provide 
a set of possible ways in which things can be connected, it does not, in other words, dictate 
the specific ways in which Da-sein will interpret them.  Human Da-sein interprets the beings 
and their connectedness to each other through its understanding.  Humans always already 
have ways of understanding, perspectives, and conceptual frameworks that allow them to 
project meaning onto the totality of relevance.219  This understanding reveals things as such 
and such and in specific relations to one another.  Each person, for the most part, operates 
on the basis of her understanding’s interpretation which gives things as there in such and 
such a way.   
If the given understanding allows a person to interpret what and how things are, 
interpretation is “never a presuppositionless grasping.”220  Rather, as Heidegger puts it, 
“When the particular concretion of the interpretation […] likes to appeal to what “is there,” 
what is initially “there” is nothing else than the self-evident, undisputed prejudice of the 
interpreter.”221  By way of interpretation, humans initially comprehend things in the world 
based the framework provided by their understanding.222  Human Da-sein always interacts 
with things based on an understanding that illuminates things in particular ways and gives 
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them meanings and significance.  Since interpretative understanding is always already at work 
before one encounters something in the world, Heidegger writes that it is grounded in “fore-
having, fore-sight, and fore-conception.”223  In each case, before a human Da-sein encounters 
another being, it has a way of interpretively understanding it.  Fore-having is the background 
framework, or totality, of possible intelligibility that people bring along with them in their 
encounters and experiences.  The ability to access the world and interact with others is only 
possible by virtue of fore-having.  Indeed, without a pre-reflective way of understanding, 
things, people, and one’s environment could not be meaningful or, perhaps, even 
comprehensible.  
Fore-having and presupposing have striking similarities.  Fore-having, as the 
understanding a person always brings along and by way of which she interprets things, is 
broader and more fundamental than any particular presupposition.  Nonetheless, fore-having 
can be described as an encompassing type of presupposing since people largely take its 
interpretation of the world as truth without consideration.  Insofar as fore-having determines 
how a person initially encounters other beings, the function of fore-having is similar to that 
of presuppositions.  Both fore-having and presupposing provide initial ways of seeing and 
interpreting things.224  In addition, both fore-having and presuppositions can be challenged, 
questioned, and changed.  
For Heidegger, people can question fore-having through practicing phenomenology, 
whose central tenet is to attend to things themselves.  For, attending to things themselves 
can enable one to critically encounter and possibly neutralize the givenness of fore-having.  
Heidegger writes that “the last task is not to let fore-having, fore-sight, and fore-conception 
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be given to it [i.e. to an interpretation] by chance ideas and popular conceptions, but to 
guarantee the scientific theme by developing these in terms of the things themselves.”225  
This shows that things can appear in ways not pre-defined by fore-conception.  This 
happens when something appears different from how one might have expected.  When this 
takes place, one can force the thing to conform to one’s fore-conception or, by attending to 
the thing itself, grasp it in how it shows itself.  Doing the latter helps develop fore-having by 
bringing fore-having into accord with things instead of with one’s own fore-having, which 
may have been based on “popular conceptions.”  Heidegger does not describe specific forms 
or effects of alterations in fore-having, for example, how alterations would affect 
understanding or whether the totality of relevance would be affected.  According to 
Gadamer, however, “Heidegger describes […] that every revision of the fore-projection is 
capable of projecting before itself a new projection of meaning.”226  Rather than continuing 
to project what and how things are on the basis of prior fore-having, revisions of fore-
having can yield new projections of meaning and significance.  Gadamer’s interpretation of 
Heidegger suggests that encountering things themselves and paying attention to what they 
are can provide the opportunity for altering fore-having and fore-projection. 
Heidegger’s “fore-having,” as a type of pre-reflective understanding that is embodied 
in a totality of relevance, constitutes peoples’ horizons.  He and Gadamer, however, differ in 
their descriptions of how shifts in horizons take place.  For Heidegger, shared horizonal 
factors are and must be effective in people’s lives for two reasons.  First, certain, 
fundamental horizons (e.g. time and care) universally shape human lives.  Throughout the 
corpus of his work, Heidegger holds that these cannot change.  Second, as emphasized in 
                                                
225 Ibid., 143, my addition. 
226 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 280. 
 106 
Heidegger’s later work, humans share horizons (e.g. the essence of technology) by virtue of 
existing in epochs of being.  In a given epoch of being, humans share certain basic 
understandings of things based on prevailing ways in which things are revealed.  This differs 
from the horizon of time, which conditions the possibility of phenomena at the most basic 
level; epochs of being come with prevalent ways of revealing phenomena, but in every epoch 
the world and life in it are temporal.  If a new epoch of being occurs, which is a rare event, 
elements of people’s shared horizons do, however, change and they change totally.  To more 
concretely demonstrate Heidegger’s description of horizonal alteration I will briefly discuss 
the universal, fundamental horizons of time and care as well as the essence of technology as 
a horizon shared among people in a particular epoch of being. 
In Being and Time, Heidegger describes Da-sein as situated within a horizon that 
delimits Da-sein’s ontological possibilities (i.e. what can be and how it can relate to other 
beings).  By virtue of being there (as Da-sein), all individual humans share a world that is 
constituted by fundamental horizons such as care (Sorge) and time.  The structure of care 
makes Da-sein essentially concerned with being and the meaningfulness of things in its world 
as what they are used for.227  Care is:  
a complex but fundamental existential-ontological phenomenon, more basic 
than any theory or practice, any willing or wishing, any drive or urge.  In 
other words it is “a priori,” what is presupposed [by the kind of being that 
Da-sein is] in the most primordial sense.228  
 
Insofar as care is an essential “a priori,” an encompassing way in which Da-sein is, it shapes 
the way humans interact with things and go about the world.  In Being and Time, however, 
Heidegger contends that time is the most fundamental horizon.  Time, he claims, not only 
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conditions the possibility of space, but space—and all practical existential being and 
experience—is a form of temporality.  Among other things, time determines Da-sein’s being 
toward death and its abilities to await occurrences and to engage in discourse.  The horizon 
of time defines every human Da-sein’s way of being.  It cannot be surpassed, however, so 
long as Da-sein remains Da-sein because it fundamentally specifies the meaning of Da-sein’s 
being.229  It is impossible for humans to gain a perspective that is not delimited by the 
horizon of time.  Hence, care and time are horizons that all people share and that constitute 
their world. 
In his later thought, Heidegger describes a history of epochs of being, in each of 
which everyone understands things in certain, shared basic ways.  As a result, shared 
horizonal elements are unavoidable among people.  At the same time, the fact that epochs of 
being follow one another shows that aspects of communal horizons can change because they 
are effective only in certain epochs of being.  The essence of technology, for example, 
permeates the contemporary world and reveals beings as standing-reserve, or resources, that 
are at the disposal of humans.  By revealing things as resources, the essence of technology 
fundamentally influences how people see and go about the world.  The essence of 
technology could, however, fall away and be replaced by some other destining of revealing if 
and when a new way of revealing is granted, i.e., when the event of a new epoch of being 
occurs.  
In contrast to Heidegger’s rare and total horizonal alterations, for Gadamer horizons 
are under continuous development.  Gadamer’s discussion of horizonal alteration focuses on 
individual persons rather than on epochs of being, though Gadamer agrees that all people 
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who are situated in a certain historical time and place share communal horizons.  The closest 
Gadamerian analogue to the horizons Heidegger describes is what Gadamer calls, 
“historically effected consciousness.”  This term refers to the fact that all people exist in 
history, shaped by traditions and interpretations that have been handed down through the 
course of history.  When and where a person exists determines the framework from within 
which she will understand things: her individual-historical consciousness is a product of a 
wider historical horizon.  The lives of all individuals are imbued by historical consciousness 
(similar to how, for Heidegger, all human lives are situated in a horizon of temporality), and 
all individuals who are part of a specific historical time and place share a historical horizon. 
Similar to time, people cannot escape or undo history; it will, without fail, continue to shape 
shared horizons.  It can, however, undergo development so as to continually change aspects 
of shared horizons that affect how people understand things.  Alterations in this shared 
horizon are not, however, differentiated as epochs that rarely occur and effect total change.  
Instead, these horizons are shaped by the past and change continuously as history advances 
and people live forward into the future.   
Furthermore, Gadamer and Heidegger differ with respect to what drives horizonal 
alterations.  Whereas for Heidegger, spontaneous changes in how being occurs constitute 
new epochs of being, Gadamer suggests that human activities may institute change. 
Gadamer explains that horizons continue to grow and develop through movements in 
history in which humans are involved:  
Everything contained in historical consciousness is in fact embraced by a 
single historical horizon.  Our own past and that other past toward which 
our historical consciousness is directed help to shape this moving horizon 
out of which human life always lives and which determines it as heritage and 
tradition.230 
                                                
230 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 315. 
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People inherit historical consciousness by virtue of being enveloped in particular historical 
horizons.  Their activities take place in the context of traditions.  Yet, the horizon of 
tradition is always developing because human activities (which, as they occur, become part of 
the past) continually reshape traditions and generate a new historical situation within which 
people subsequently go about.  
Human situatedness in shared historical horizons might lead us to wonder how, if at 
all, people are individuated.  The facticity of hermeneutic experience provides a key to 
understanding difference.  When one individual human (as opposed to others) undergoes a 
hermeneutic experience, her personal understanding changes without others’ also therewith 
changing.  Hermeneutic experience is something individuals undergo when, for example, 
they read historical texts or encounter other people.  In experiencing a text that is grounded 
upon different historical presuppositions than one’s own, a tension between past and present 
arises.231  This tension “projects a historical horizon that is different from the horizon of the 
present.”232  By distinguishing a horizon of the past from a horizons of the present, the 
person undergoing the hermeneutic experience posits a plurality of horizons within the “one 
great horizon.”233  When a person undergoes a hermeneutic experience, her own horizon 
accommodates more than it had before and in this her individual horizon changes.  Insofar 
as an individual’s horizons can undergo such alteration through experiences that are specific 
to her, each person’s horizon differs from each other’s.      
                                                
231 Hermeneutic experience no only occurs when one reads historical texts.  It can also occur 
in any circumstance where a person encounters horizonal otherness, for example, in talking 
people from other cultures or traditions or in discussing ideas that presuppose substantially 
different assumptions. 
232 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 317. 
233 Ibid., 315. 
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Gadamer, thus, provides an initial step in understanding the relation between 
individuals and their tradition’s horizon.  If different people have different experiences, it is 
impossible that every person inhabits a traditional horizon in precisely the same way as 
everyone else.  Though they live from out of a shared horizon, individuals’ experiences alter 
the way they go about within it.  The hermeneutic experience that a person undergoes 
modifies her own horizonal understanding by enlarging the horizon of her present to include 
a projected horizon of the past.  The two horizons then fuse with one another, thus resulting 
in a changed horizon.  This fusion does not mean that a person’s individual horizonal 
perspective becomes identical to whatever horizon of the past she encounters.  Instead, it 
becomes a part of her historical understanding.  In addition, according to Gadamer, the 
more one has hermeneutic experiences, the more encompassing one’s particular horizon 
becomes.234  Thus, people situated within the same traditional horizons do not all share an 
identical personal horizon or view because of this.  Since individual hermeneutic experiences 
differ from person to person, individual horizonal perspectives develop in distinct ways.  Of 
course, these horizons may not vary radically since they share a starting point and cannot 
simply erase the ways in which their involvement in a tradition has shaped them.  Still, 
variation between persons’ experiences individuates their horizons.    
In another passage in Truth and Method, Gadamer defines “horizon” in a way that 
helps make sense of individual horizonality.  Here he describes the relationship between 
horizon and perspective, emphasizing its particularity by noting its relationship to specific 
perspectives: 
                                                
234 Gadamer refers to this phenomenon as the “fusion of horizons” because one’s horizon 
fuses, though never perfectly, with another previously unknown perspective (Gadamer, Truth 
and Method, 317). 
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We define the concept of “situation” by saying that it represents a standpoint 
that limits the possibility of vision.  Hence essential to the concept of 
situation is the concept of “horizon”.  The horizon is the range of vision that 
includes everything that can be seen from a particular vantage point.  Applying 
this to the thinking mind, we speak of narrowness of horizon, of the possible 
expansion of horizon, of the opening up of new horizons, and so forth.  
Since Nietzsche and Husserl, the word has been used in philosophy to 
characterize the way in which thought is tied to its finite determinacy and the 
way one’s range of vision is gradually expanded.235 
 
Similar to Heidegger’s totality of relevance, Gadamer explains that a person’s horizon 
defines what is significant and meaningful in her world.  It shapes what and how one sees 
things by demarcating a boundary within which everything is related to everything else while 
also necessarily referring to and excluding whatever might lie outside.  Because a horizon is 
“particular” and defines “one’s range of vision,” it is highly individual.  People with different 
ranges of vision perceive things in ways that are not completely consistent with the ways 
others view them; in spite of commonalities between their horizons, things may have 
differing significance and meanings for each person.  The things within a horizon compose a 
world order defined by their relations to each other and by each thing’s significance.  
Gadamer writes that, “A person who has an horizon knows the relative significance of 
everything within this horizon, whether it is near or far, great or small.”236  His notion of 
“horizon” thus describes the region in which a person is situated.237  One can perceive only 
what appears as significant, and see significant things in relation to other such things, as 
defined by one’s horizon.  Hence, the horizon defines one’s “range of vision.” 
                                                
235 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 313. Emphases added. 
236 Ibid. 
237 Gadamer’s “horizon” is closer to Heidegger’s notion of the “clearing” which appears 
throughout his corpus, including in Being and Time, The Anaximander Fragment, Four Seminars, 
“Building, Dwelling, Thinking,” Wegmarken, and Country Path Conversations.  The clearing is 
the region where one is situated and where entities appear by coming into the light out of the 
darkness.  
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A person’s horizon, and the meanings built into the interconnection of things within 
it, is not fixed and permanent. 238   One’s horizon can expand (through hermeneutic 
experience, for example) and thereby constitute a changed perspective where different things 
become significant and/or the relations among things within the horizon change.  An 
expanded horizon may allow new things to become visible as well and illuminate what was 
already present in different ways.  Although people may not be able to surpass the singular 
communal horizons that they, as humans, necessarily inhabit, their personal horizons, based 
on their understanding and definitive of their perspectives, can undergo change.  What’s 
more, by acting upon alterations to their own horizons (or otherwise publicly sharing new 
ways of seeing), individuals can also instigate changes in the horizon of their tradition, which 
they share with others.  Because I am interested in individuals’ experiences of thinking, from 
here on, unless otherwise noted, I will use “horizon” to refer to individual horizons and not 
the “one great horizon” of history.  As described above, personal horizonal expansion can 
occur through an aspect of hermeneutic experience that Gadamer describes at length: the 
recognition and consideration of one’s unconsidered understanding, or “prejudices.”  
According to Gadamer, a prejudice is “a judgment that is rendered before all the 
elements that determine a situation have finally been examined.”239  Although the word 
“prejudice” has gained negative connotations (whose source Gadamer locates in the 
Enlightenment), Gadamer says that he does not mean it in a negative sense.240  Though 
Gadamer recognizes that prejudices might be utterly mistaken (and, it can be added, 
potentially harmful), for him, many are not.  Every person has prejudices and exercises 
prejudgment in the form of her prejudices as a result of her membership in a tradition that 
                                                
238 See Gadamer, Truth and Method, 313. 
239 Ibid., 283. 
240 Ibid. 
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imbues the world with particular meanings.  Prejudices can be interpreted as operating in a 
way similar to Heidegger’s “fore-having” in that prejudices and fore-having provide 
meaningful access to the world.  Furthermore, prejudices, like fore-having, can be 
encountered and developed.  When a person’s prejudices change, her perspective shifts.  In 
other words, because prejudices shape the horizon, considering a prejudice might lead to a 
reshaped horizon: “…the horizon of the present is continually in the process of being 
formed because we are continually having to test all of our prejudices.”241   
Similar to how prejudices, as constitutive of a person’s horizon, demarcate a person’s 
perspective (providing significance and meaning), presuppositions undergird one’s way of 
seeing and going about.242  In this, prejudices are strikingly similar to presuppositions.  Like 
presuppositions, they are taken as true without reflective consideration, shape how people go 
about and see the world, and operate primarily without a person’s being conscious of 
them.243  Moreover, prejudices, like presuppositions, come up for consideration through an 
event (i.e. hermeneutic experience or the acceptance of a prompt’s invitation) in which they 
become available for questioning.  There are, thus, foundational similarities between 
Gadamer’s view and mine.  Due to these parallels between prejudices and presuppositions 
and, therewith, hermeneutic experience and critical-reflective thinking, Gadamer’s theory can 
assist in clarifying the meaning of destroying presuppositions. 
The key point I wish to appropriate from Gadamer’s philosophy is that people see 
and go about the world on the basis of the perspectives of their understanding and these 
perspectives define their horizons.  Given that prejudices shape a person’s perspective, 
alterations in a person’s consciousness of a prejudice and changes in how prejudices operate 
                                                
241 Ibid., 317. 
242 Ibid., 316. 
243 Ibid., 278-281. A prejudice is a type of prejudgment of which a person largely unaware.  
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imply horizonal change.  Becoming conscious of, and altering the functioning of, a particular 
prejudice resembles the destruction of presuppositions described in Chapter One.  
Destroying presuppositions generates changed understandings that similarly amount to shifts 
in a person’s horizon and perspective.  Emerson illustrates this transformation in his account 
of horizon as circle. 
Emerson and Visualizing Horizonal Expansion 
 
Emerson gives a dynamic and imagistic account of how a person’s horizon expands 
in his essay, “Circles.”  There, he describes human lives as ever-expanding circles: “The life 
of man is a self-evolving circle, which, from a ring imperceptibly small, rushes on all sides 
outwards to new and larger circles, and that without end.” 244   A person’s circle 
topographically represents her horizon.  The person stands within her circle and, as for 
Gadamer, the horizon demarcates the boundary of her vision.  That Emerson too describes 
horizons in terms of sight is clear from the first sentence of “Circles:” “The eye is the first 
circle; the horizon which it forms is the second […]”245  A person’s horizon is “formed by” 
her eye in that the extent of the eye’s vision marks the boundary of sight.  When a person 
learns something new and gains understanding, “another [circle] can be drawn” outside the 
circumference of her previous horizon.246  A person can, thus, transcend her previously 
delimited perspective.  This, of course, does not mean she has transcended all limits.  For, 
although a person’s circle expands, its expanded form is still a delimited space (the boundary 
of which is represented by the newly drawn circle).  New understanding draws a new circle 
that is a new horizon in which one sees things from a new perspective.   
                                                
244 Ralph Waldo Emerson, “Circles,” in The Essential Writings of Ralph Waldo Emerson, ed. 
Brooks Atkinson (New York: Modern Library, 2000), 253. 
245 Ibid., 252. 
246 Ibid. 
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Although Emerson’s language of “expansion” might seem to denote a 
thoroughgoing positive movement, a negative moment (like the destruction of 
presuppositions in critical-reflective thinking) is included in the expansion of horizons.  
Whereas for Gadamer, the fusion of horizons requires that a person challenge her prejudices 
(i.e., for example, the prejudice that the horizon of the past that she encounters through 
hermeneutic experience did not exist), for Emerson, horizonal expansion requires that one’s 
creeds and/or the seeming facts about one’s world come under scrutiny.  New 
understanding can go so far as to instigate an upheaval of a person’s foundational 
understandings: “In the thought of to-morrow there is a power to upheave all thy creed, all 
the creeds, all the literatures, of the nations […]”247  Notions one took to be fundamentally 
true or important in previous circles can be disrupted:  
The facts which loomed so large in the fogs of yesterday,—property, climate, 
breeding, personal beauty, and the like, have strangely changed their 
proportions.  All that we reckoned settled shakes and rattles; and literatures, 
cities, climates, religions, leave their foundations, and dance before our 
eyes.248   
 
Emerson’s usage of “creeds,” “literatures,” and “facts,” shows that horizonal expansion 
occurs in concert with the destruction of things that people pre-reflectively took to be true.  
Because presuppositions are notions people take to be true without first considering them, 
they might likewise have the status (for people) of simple factuality.  In this, Emerson too 
describes something similar to the destruction of presuppositions.  In critical-reflective 
thinking, presuppositions, like Emersonion “facts,” “shake and rattle,” lose their 
foundational stability, and “dance” before thinkers’ eyes.  
                                                
247 Ibid., 254. 
248 Ibid., 257. 
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 One further similarity between Emerson and Gadamer, is that, for Gadamer, the 
composition of one’s horizon determines what is important: 
the state of the world [is] at any one time directly dependent upon the 
intellectual classification then existing in the minds of men.  The things 
which are dear to men at this hour are so on account of the ideas which have 
emerged on their mental horizon, and which cause the present order of 
things as a tree bears its apples.249 
 
Dearness depends upon the ideas that take shape given a certain horizon.  A different 
horizon would be a different kind of tree that bears a different kind of apple and, thus, 
determines what is dear differently.  Emerson’s mention of what is dear resonates with 
Gadamer’s idea that whatever appears within one’s horizon appears greater or smaller and 
nearer or further away on the basis of the horizon itself.  
 The similarities between the use Gadamer and Emerson make of the ideas of 
prejudices, creeds and facts, and presuppositions are unmistakable.  Each of these ideas 
denotes something one takes to be true without first considering it.  Moreover, each of these 
can be encountered and critically challenged in thought.  Insofar as presuppositions 
undergird how people see and go about, presuppositions bear a further similarity to horizons 
since horizons mediate what and how people see, what is important to them, and what is 
comprehensible.  Presuppositions, like prejudices, creeds, and facts, can therefore be 
interpreted as partly definitive of people’s horizons.  The primary effect of encountering and 
questioning prejudices or facts and creeds is horizonal expansion.  Horizonal expansion not 
only represents a growth of understanding, but also signifies an alteration of perspective.  
                                                
249 Ibid., 256. Though this comment might appear to require metaphysical idealism, this 
stance is not strictly necessary to the horizonal model.  One might agree that human 
understanding deeply affects metaphysical possibilities, but at the same time affirm the idea 
that there are some things that are given otherwise.  I do not intend to defend either view 
here, but rather simply to note that the horizonal model under consideration does not 
necessarily imply idealism. 
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These changes result in a person seeing in a new way and the things in her world being 
reordered.  A new way of seeing may also permit a thinker access to new possibilities for her 
life.   
Before clarifying why the growth of understanding and the concomitant opening to 
new possibilities are valuable, it is necessary to consider a central presupposition of a 
horizonal expansion model.  The model of horizonal expansion presupposes that such 
expansion is possible.  This presupposition has come into question in connection to 
Gadamer in the philosophy of the social sciences.  If horizons cannot actually expand, 
consequences associated with their supposed outward growth can neither occur in the way I 
intend to claim nor justify the value of critical-reflective thinking. 
A Challenge to the Horizonal Model 
 
Charles Taylor and David Hoy defend the claim that horizons can undergo 
expansion.  Both authors are readers of Gadamer and approach the question of expansion 
by discussing how it occurs through encounters with otherness.  They explore this issue as it 
appears in the social sciences and, in particular, anthropology.  The central thesis that 
opposes horizonal expansion, and against which they argue, is that humans cannot 
understand anything that does not already fit within their horizons and the perspectives 
thereby available to them.  Since people are always already situated within horizons that form 
their understandings of things, anything a person encounters will be interpreted on the basis 
of the horizon and cannot be interpreted on any other basis.  So, human horizons can never 
be challenged and reshaped.  In the context of anthropology, this view holds that humans 
are always ethnocentric—they always understand on the basis of their own rootedness in 
particular cultures and traditions.  Such closed self-referentiality precludes fundamentally 
new understanding.  If this argument against horizonal expansion were correct, it would 
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imply that anthropologists could never understand other cultures in ways that did not 
automatically assimilate these cultures to ways their own cultures understand things.  
Anthropological interpretations would be doomed to enthnocentricity.  Furthermore, 
interpreting other cultures in this way would not generate new perspectives or wider realms 
of vision for anthropologists.  More generally, this argument in effect denies that people can 
encounter otherness and that this encounter can instigate horizonal shifts.   
In his essay, “Understanding and Ethnocentricity,” Taylor explores the view that 
ethnocentricity will always taint anthropologists’ perspectives on other cultures.   He 
describes anthropologists as situated within their own cultures and discipline.  Their 
situatedness defines their horizons, and these in turn mediate their experiences.  
Anthropologists, like all people (all of whom have horizons), inevitably have some 
ethnocentric biases (similar to Gadamerian “prejudices”).  The question is whether biases 
necessarily preclude anthropologists from grasping other cultures in ways that would involve 
bracketing biases and expanding anthropologists’ horizons.  If ethnocentricity were 
inviolable, anthropology would suffer deleterious consequences.  The impossibility of really 
experiencing and understanding another culture leads to what Taylor calls “malaise.” 250  
With regard to anthropological studies, this impossibility would make us uneasy or 
discontent about anthropology’s claims to learn about and describe other cultures in ways 
that are not inherently distorted by ethnocentric biases.  In addition, it raises a challenge 
regarding the worth of anthropology as a field of study. 
These concerns can be applied to other academic disciplines as well as to critical-
reflective thinking.  Researchers in other fields and critical-reflective thinkers could be seen 
                                                
250 Charles Taylor, “Understanding and Ethnocentricity,” in Philosophy and The Human Sciences 
(Cambridge: Cambridge, 1985), 130. 
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as “ethnocentric” if encountering something in a way that does not already fit in one’s 
horizon is impossible.  Everyone might be doomed to a certain personal “ethnocentricity” 
whereby everything one encounters is automatically assimilated into one’s current 
understanding.  Nothing could ever appear other or foreign in such a way as to challenge 
one’s understanding.  If researchers in other fields were doomed to interpret everything they 
encounter in the terms of their already existing horizons, any claim to understand things as 
they really are (or really should be understood) would be problematic.  Thinkers could be 
seen as similarly trapped in their horizons and without recourse to growth and change if they 
were unable to destroy presuppositions and reshape their horizons.  If gaining understanding 
(that causes horizonal change) through critical-reflective thinking is bound up with 
destroying presuppositions, no such gains could be made.  Thus, claims to a growth of 
understanding, an expansion of horizons, or a new perspectival access to the world via the 
experience of otherness would be illusory.  
This opposition to horizonal shifts presumes that people can never have experiences 
that lead them beyond their initial horizonal perspectives.  If this were true, people would be 
stuck in the same ways of understanding and could never understand things in new ways.  It 
is certainly true that people initially approach things on the basis of the interpretations set 
forth by their horizons.  Hoy and Taylor, however, point to experiences of otherness as 
prime moments for self-reflection and for the accompanying generation of new 
understanding.  Even if a person does not fully grasp a perspective that is not her own, 
recognizing its foreignness can cause her to challenge her own way of understanding.  Such 
questioning could motivate horizonal expansion.   
Taylor and Hoy address the argument that humans are hopelessly stuck in their 
ethnocentric views without the possibility of horzional expansion by positing that horizons 
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are permeable.  Hoy points out that concerns about the thoroughgoingness of 
ethnocentricity are rooted in a specific way of conceptualizing horizons of understanding.  
The impossibility of encountering and understanding otherness is rooted in what Hoy calls a 
“windowless semantic monad picture of cultures,” or “the closed horizon model of 
understanding.”251  If a culture or person is a windowless Leibnizian monad, it cannot grasp 
ideas that are not already somehow inherent in it.  Everything “new” that a monad 
encounters and comes to understand is thus automatically assimilated to possibilities within 
its permanent and impermeable bounds.252  Its horizon could, thus, never be reshaped by 
encountering otherness. 
According to Hoy, the closed horizon model contravenes the fact that humans 
actually experience otherness, especially in the postmodern world.  Referring to Clifford 
Geertz, Hoy says that the contemporary world is characterized by the fact that people 
encounter otherness on a regular basis.  Furthermore, people do not encounter otherness 
from within integrated and whole cultures of their own:  
In the postmodern picture [as Geertz describes it] we live in a crowded world 
where difference is not exotic and far away, bur right next door […].  The 
postmodern culture is not a self-contained whole, an autonomous integral 
“we” that confronts other such cultures as “theys.”253 
 
                                                
251 David Hoy, “Significant Others: Objectivity and Ethnocentrism,” in Objectivity and its 
Other, ed. Wolfgang Natter, Theodore R. Schatzki, and John Paul Jones III (New York: 
Guilford, 1995), 121. 
252 For Leibniz, new understanding might be driven by the monad’s “entelechy,” or internal 
principle of change. 
253 Hoy, “Significant Others,” 120.  Gadamer says something similar in Truth and Method, 
when he writes, “Just as the individual is never simply an individual because he is always in 
understanding with others, so too the closed horizon that is supposed to enclose a culture is 
an abstraction.  The historical movement of human life consists in the fact that it is never 
absolutely bound to any one standpoint, and hence can never have a truly closed horizon.” 
(Gadamer, Truth and Method, 315). 
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Members of a culture are not contained within an impermeable membrane, nor is their 
culture whole and homogenous.  They are likely to come into contact with otherness both 
outside and within their own cultures.  Especially in the postmodern world, cultures are not 
“self-contained wholes;” people move in and out of cultures, and intercultural 
communication is common and necessary.  For Hoy, therefore, experiences of otherness 
result from increased interaction among and proximity between different people and cultures 
in the contemporary world.  By contrast, Gadamer focuses more closely on experiences of 
historical otherness.  For both Hoy and Gadamer, however, experiencing otherness is a 
simple fact of human life.  As Gadamer notes, hermeneutical “experience as a whole is not 
something anyone can be spared.”254     
Regardless of whether Gadamer’s or Hoy’s view is more accurate, experiences with 
otherness can instigate the tension that instigates hermeneutic experience.  For Hoy, 
hermeneutic experience is only possible because human horizons are not closed.  In 
opposition to conceptualizing understanding on the closed horizon model, Hoy proposes a 
“hermeneutic model for understanding” (and “open horizonal model”) as developed by 
Gadamer.255  According to Gadamer, although every person is within a horizon constituted 
                                                
254 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 364. Hoy, “Significant Others,” 120. 
255 Though Hoy’s stance is attractive in that it is an intuitively more accurate picture of 
human life and sociality, it would be unfair to Leibniz to leave him without a defense.  A 
monadological view, though it might not be as intuitively attractive, could account for new 
understanding and experiences of otherness.  Hoy defines the closed horizon model without 
considering this possibility.  Strictly speaking, monads do not have horizons because they are 
windowless and self-contained.  For this reason, they cannot go beyond themselves.  Even if 
monads are windowless, their internal principle of change (entelechy) could make it appear 
to a monad itself as though it had experienced something other, that exists outside of itself.  
So, a monad could have the experience of questioning basic aspects of its understanding and, 
thereby, altering its general perspective, though its perspective would only be reoriented 
within the bounds of its windowless existence.  Its entelechy would not change and it would 
not actually grow beyond itself.  The disagreement between this Leibnizian view and Hoy’s 
account has to do with where the otherness is located and whether a person or culture has 
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by her understanding, horizons are both permeable by otherness and expandable to 
incorporate new perspectives.  Gadamer writes that, 
it is important to avoid the error of thinking that the horizon of the present 
consists of a fixed set of opinions and valuations, and that the otherness of 
the past can be foregrounded from it as from a fixed ground.  
 
In fact the horizon of the present is continually in the process of being 
formed because we are continually having to test all our prejudices.  An 
important part of this testing occurs in encountering the past and in 
understanding the tradition from which we come.256  
 
People consistently encounter the otherness of the past in their day-to-day activities, for 
example, when they read books written by authors in earlier historical eras.  Encountering 
otherness provokes a person to try to make sense of and to understand something that does 
not fit with how she initially interprets it.  Whatever does not already fit within her horizon is 
something she cannot account for on the basis of her current prejudices.  To refer once 
again to the example of historical texts, tensions can appear when one reads a text whose 
horizons differ from one’s present historical perspective.  When one encounters such 
otherness in a text, the author’s horizon comes into tension with one’s own.  The reader 
might find the text somewhat unintelligible and have to learn about the historical situation of 
its author to makes sense of it.  In the process of working out the meaning, the reader 
contrasts the understanding based on the foreign horizon of the text to her initial inability to 
understand.  This contrast throws one’s views into relief such that one becomes aware of 
one’s own view as such.  This experience then allows one to question the basis of one’s 
                                                                                                                                            
access to it.  A Leibnizian argument could be made that even if people or cultures, like 
monads, are windowless (i.e. even if there is no access to external otherness), horizon-
altering growth and change can happen throughout their lives by virtue of internal principles 
that have not yet realized their work.  Though such change would not affect the internal 
principle, the monad’s perspective could undergo alteration.  The perspective would remain 
internally regulated, but it could be reshaped through experiences thereby occurring.   
256 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 316-317. 
 123 
views.  Self-reflection is, thus, implied when inter-horizonal tensions arise through 
encounters with otherness and this experience results in the consideration of differences.  
Reflecting on one’s horizon can also instigate self-critique, whereby one finds out that 
particular presuppositions underlying one’s initial interpretation of the text were mistaken.  
 Taylor supports the connection between understanding and critical self-reflection 
when he says that, “understanding is inseparable from criticism, but this in turn is 
inseparable from self-criticism.” 257   This means that though people bring their own 
understanding into experiences of otherness and critique otherness on the basis of their 
views, the act of understanding something other also instigates self-reflection and self-
criticism.  Understanding something that resists one’s initial understanding requires 
considering one’s understanding of it.  This involves both determining the merits of the 
other’s view and, conversely, allowing the other to pose challenges to oneself.  Encountering 
otherness can thereby motivate one to take a critical view toward the conceptions in place 
that have formed one’s own horizon.  In an open horizon model, even though people are 
situated within horizons and initially interpret things on the basis of their understandings, 
they can still encounter otherness and work to understand it.  In understanding otherness, 
people are also brought to criticize their own viewpoints.  For anthropologists, this means 
that even if they have ethnocentric biases, these biases can be challenged as a result of 
experiencing otherness.  Such experiences can make anthropologists aware of their biases 
(ethnocentric and otherwise) and also cause them to challenge their views in order to 
develop new and deeper understanding of other cultures.  
When people encounter otherness that instigates self-critique in critical-reflective 
thinking, their presuppositions are disclosed.  A thinker faces the fact that, all along, she has 
                                                
257 Taylor, “Understanding and Ethnocentricity,” 131. 
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operated on the basis of something she took to be true without consideration.  The simple 
recognition of this fact might illuminate her past and present in a new way.  The 
presupposition also becomes open to question in the moment when it is disclosed.  The 
person thinking is thus faced with the possibility that her understanding of things could be 
otherwise.  If she then in fact defeats the presupposition in thought, her thought will actually 
produce a new understanding.  Thinking, in effect, opens the possibility of another 
perspective (i.e. a changed way of seeing, based on different understandings) that can 
fundamentally alter the way a person sees and goes about.    
If, as Hoy, Taylor, and Gadamer suggest, people do not operate within utterly closed 
horizons, people can have experiences that allows them to gain new perspectives.  Though 
thinkers have horizons and prior understandings, they are not completely trapped in self-
referentiality and consigned to interpreting everything only on the basis of their current 
presuppositions (as constitutive of irreplaceable horizons).  Critical engagement with 
ethnocentricity, prejudice, and/or presuppositions can generate new understandings that 
alter persons’ horizons.  The next section is a more precise and systematic description of 
how the destruction of presuppositions generates new understanding that affects thinkers’ 
horizons.  
DESTRUCTION AND NEW UNDERSTANDING 
 
To make sense of the value of critical-reflective thinking on the horizonal model, it is 
important to see that the destruction of presuppositions is accompanied by the generation of 
new understanding.  The destruction that occurs in critical-reflective thinking is not merely a 
negative step that leaves a void where a presupposition previously existed.  Even if a thinker 
completely defeats a presupposition, new understanding is ipso facto generated in concert with 
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the destruction.  By briefly revisiting the two types of destruction that take place in critical-
reflective thinking, we will find that three types of understanding are generated:    
(1) The awareness of a presupposition’s content and the recognition that one has 
taken it as true without consideration, 
(2) The discovery that the presupposition is false or unworthy, and 
(3) Horizonal shifts implied by (1) and (2).   
 
The first two types of new understanding correspond to the destruction that takes place in 
the disclosure and defeat of presuppositions, respectively.  The third type captures the fact 
that (1) and (2), by virtue of taking place for a person with a horizon that is in part shaped by 
presuppositions, have further effects on that horizon.  When (1) and (2) occur, the 
underlying understanding through which the thinker’s commerce with the world is mediated 
undergoes change.  I will attempt to show that (3) necessarily follows from the destruction 
that takes place in critical-reflective thinking.    
Recall the two types of destruction discussed in Chapter One.  First, when a 
presupposition is disclosed, a thinker becomes aware of it and the fact that she has taken it 
as truth without consideration; her previous relation to the presupposition is thereby 
destroyed.  This event makes the presupposition available for questioning.  The destruction 
of her previous relation to the presupposition minimally generates the awareness of the 
presupposition qua presupposition.  This awareness provides a thinker a grasp on the 
presupposition’s content and of the fact that the presupposition has been in operation.  
Second, if a thinker tarries with and defeats a presupposition in the critical moment, she also 
finds it untrue or unworthy.  This also amounts to a new understanding, an understanding 
wherein the presupposition does not sotto voce automatically mediate the world.  I have 
characterized these types of new understanding as (1) and (2) in the list above.  (1) and (2), in 
turn, represent expansions in thinkers’ horizons, and this expansion facilitates openness to 
and the embrace of possibilities not previously viable.  The experiences of the thinkers 
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examined in Chapter One follow this model and thereby demonstrate the connection 
between the negative moment of destruction and the positive new understanding generated.  
I will briefly summarize the four primary examples from Chapter One to highlight the new 
understanding gained by the thinkers. 
 John Farmer, Socrates, Da-sein as the they-self, and Hannah Arendt became aware of 
presuppositions and defeated them in thought.  They came to understand that the 
presuppositions they examined were operative, taken as true without consideration (type (1)), 
but, in the end, unworthy of being held (type (2)).  Each of the thinkers thereby gained 
understandings that allowed them to go about and/or see the world in different ways (type 
(3)).  Farmer, for example, became aware of and questioned the presupposition that work is 
of the greatest importance and should order his life.  He also defeated this presupposition 
during his critical moment.  These understandings allowed him to posit that there are other 
fields in which he could labor, that is, other ways in which he could lead his life.  In finding 
that death is not the worst evil, Socrates came to understand his sentence as something that 
might be good.  Similarly, Da-sein as they-self comes to understand that the possibilities 
projected by the they are not its only ways to be.  Consequently, it also saw that it could take 
up its own possibilities.  Finally, Arendt not only defeated the traditional notion of evil (i.e., 
the understanding that the traditional notion of malice is definitive of evil (2)).  Achieving 
this also enabled her to conceptualize evil as a banal phenomenon.  In these examples, the 
result of critical-reflective thinking is not only negative but also generative.  The thinkers do 
more than just deny their presuppositions: they also gain understanding of them and access 
to new possibilities.  The new possibilities would not have been accessible without their 
changed understanding.  I contend that (1) and (2) necessarily result in (3): a thinker’s newly 
delimited horizon opens her to a new perspective and new practical possibilities. 
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 The reference to “horizon” in type (3) indicates that presuppositions help form the 
encompassing understandings that mediate people’s world and experiences.  Even the basic 
shift from unconsciously holding a presupposition to gaining awareness of it alters how the 
presupposition operates258 and, thus, if only minutely, the shape of the horizon.  By gaining 
awareness of a presupposition, a thinker also understands more than he had previously.  The 
destruction of presuppositions is accompanied by the gain of new understanding that 
reshapes the more encompassing kind of understanding constitutive of one’s horizon.  In 
other words, though (1) and (2) constitute new understanding of their own, they also imply 
(3).   
I have chosen to list both the awareness of a presupposition and the recognition that 
one has taken it for granted in (1).  When one becomes aware of a presupposition as such, 
one becomes cognizant of both its content and that one has taken it as true.  Because both 
become explicit in the moment of disclosure, I have organized these aspects into the 
generation of (1).  Since (1) takes place in every instance of critical-reflective thinking, both 
aspects are inseparable from the phenomenon of critical-reflective thinking.  (2), on the 
other hand, since it corresponds to the defeat that may or may not occur in the critical 
moment, does not necessarily take place in every instance.  Thinkers can find their 
presuppositions to be worthy and continue to maintain them in good faith after critical-
reflective thinking.  A thinker (like Callicles, for example) might become aware of a 
presupposition and recognize its questionability without defeating it in thought and, thus, 
not achieve (2).  A thinker might go even further than Callicles and, having defeated a 
presupposition in thought, still subsequently uphold it.  Such thinkers, who maintain a 
                                                
258 That is, it no longer operates without a thinker’s awareness of it.  This changes what its 
operation means to a thinker and the possibility that it can, in the future, operate quite as 
automatically as it had before. 
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presupposition after critically-reflectively thinking, achieve (2) but also allow their 
presupposition to remain operative.  
Regardless of whether a thinker achieves both (1) and (2) or only (1), she still 
necessarily achieves (3).  The structure of the horizon as partly composed by presuppositions 
illustrates this point.  Achieving (1) is the same as gaining awareness of a constitutive aspect 
of one’s horizon.  By becoming aware of a presupposition, one sees that it has operated as a 
presupposition one sees that one has been unaware of it and, yet, taken it as true without 
consideration.  From that point forward, the presupposition no longer operates as an 
unconsidered mediating aspect of one’s understanding.  The awareness generated in (1) 
constitutes understanding that subsequently mediates the thinker’s perspective and 
experiences, though she might not continue to be conscious of it in the future.  The 
presupposition’s function as a presupposition has changed and, as a result, the shape of the 
thinker’s horizon has shifted (even if only slightly).  So, the achievement of (1) implies a 
horizonal shift; a thinker necessarily achieves (3).    
(2), as the explicit defeat of a presupposition, alters the content of a thinker’s 
horizon.  The understanding gained in (2), that one’s presupposition is false or unworthy, 
hinders the presupposition’s ability to continue to shape one’s view.  By gaining (2), a thinker 
becomes more or less averse to the presupposition’s operation.  This usually—though not 
necessarily—neutralizes the presupposition’s function as a constitutive aspect that shapes the 
way a thinker sees and goes about the world.  As a result, the structure of understanding of 
which it is a part (that mediated her perspective) is no longer the same.  As I will argue in the 
next section, defeating a presupposition in thought enables a person to choose among 
alternative possibilities that were not available on the basis of her prior understanding.  This 
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also implies that her horizon has gained a new component.  The thinker’s horizon has 
changed.  Therefore, (3) follows from (2).  
It might be argued that it is possible for a thinker to avoid (3) even if he has achieved 
(1) or (2).  For instance, an objector could argue that a thinker can avoid (3) by engaging in 
Pyrrhonian skepticism—wherein the thinker suspends judgment about the presupposition, 
so the new understanding carries no implications for the structure of his horizon: the 
thinker’s horizon would provisionally maintain its previous shape pending further conclusive 
evidence or a decision about how to judge the presupposition.  The need to suspend 
judgment, however, shows that the thinker’s understanding has already shifted.  Prior to 
critical-reflective thinking, no such suspension occurred because it was not yet possible to 
suspend judgment.  The very possibility of suspending judgment becomes available only 
when an alternative appears.  If an alternative (like the possibility that a presupposition is 
false or unworthy) becomes available, a thinker’s encompassing understanding has still 
gained a new dimension.  In the choice to suspend judgment about the alternative, the 
thinker performatively shows that the presupposition no longer operates as it had previously.  
His understanding has changed so as to require a previously unnecessary suspension of 
judgment.   
Another possible objection to the necessity of structural perspectival change is that a 
person might be able so to bracket the understandings in (1) and (2) as to block their 
affecting how she views the world or goes about it.  People who engage, for example, in 
radical compartmentalization, self-deception, or forgetting regarding what they have 
considered in thought might be able so to hold (1) and (2) at bay as to leave their horizons 
unchanged.  Compartmentalizers, self-deceivers, and forgetters, having experienced (1) and 
(2), would effectively neutralize (1) and (2) and not undergo horizonal shifts.  Contrary to 
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this possibility, I tend to subscribe to the idea that every experience a person has leaves some 
trace, no matter how minute.  Even the smallest trace could structurally alter a person’s 
horizon and, thus, achieve (3).  If compartmentalizers, self-deceivers, and forgetters could 
consistently distance themselves from (1) and (2), they would be impervious to horizonal 
shifts.  If they must work to compartmentalize, deceive, or forget, however, they would be 
similar to the Pyrrhonian skeptic.  Actively blocking (1) and (2) in these ways, like 
suspending judgment, entails that something has been understood.  If (1) and (2) necessitate 
(3), then any such attempts at blocking these will not completely achieve what they set out to 
do.  (3) is thus also unavoidable for compartmentalizers, self-deceivers, and forgetters.   
Horizonal shifts motivated by (1) and (2) have different specific consequences for 
different thinkers.  The shifts that take place are, after all, consequent on the destruction of 
specific presuppositions that have meaning for specific persons.  In addition, the extent to 
which a horizonal alteration affects a thinker’s life will vary.  Regardless, though, of the 
particular quality and extent of its effect on a person’s horizon, recognition of a 
presupposition always provides a person more self-reflective awareness.  In the next section, 
I describe the value of understanding generated in (1) and (2) as lying in a thinker’s personal 
growth and liberation to new possibilities.  Here, however, we can already begin to make 
sense of how in (1) and (2), a thinker grows and can become open to new possibilities.  
The growth a thinker achieves in (1) is, most simply stated, an increase in 
understanding.  If the presupposition that came to light was her own, she grows in self-
understanding; if it belonged to another (as might occur in anthropological studies (as 
described by Taylor and Hoy), reading texts (Gadamer), or through a conversation (see 
Chapter One above)), then she grows in other-understanding.  In either case, (1) also opens 
new possibilities for a thinker’s life.  First, having become newly aware of a personal 
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presupposition, she is faced with the possibility of having to consciously choose to maintain 
it.  Though this might happen more smoothly and automatically for thinkers who continue 
to believe in the merits of their presuppositions, for others, it might take conscious effort.  
Second, a person’s awareness of having operated on its basis enables her to ground her 
actions or thoughts upon it more intentionally or self-consciously in the future.  She may, in 
the future, more consciously affirm her course of action on the basis of the presupposition 
that she continues to maintain.  Her affirmation would be different from someone who 
achieves (2) by finding out that a presupposition is appropriate in some situations but not in 
others.  A person, for example, who has presumed that lying is always wrong and attempts 
never to lie could experience terrible consequences in always telling the truth.  Like Kant’s 
harborer of fugitives, who does not lie to the police that seek to capture them, the harborer 
might suffer the pain of (partial) responsibility for their capture when he confesses that they 
are hidden in his house.  As a result, he might subsequently choose not to tell the truth in 
every circumstance and, thus, partially abandon the presupposition.  If the presupposition 
belonged to someone else, this also provides the thinker an opportunity to respond to the 
person, in thoughtful discourse or in action, with this new awareness.  She gains the 
possibility of acting with greater understanding of others.  
The opening of possibilities operates somewhat differently for those who also 
achieve (2).  Like Farmer, Socrates, Arendt, and Da-sein, people who achieve (1) and (2) 
through critical-reflective thinking alter the content and structure of their horizons.  A 
presupposition that had previously mediated their world has been defeated.  Their horizons 
have thus been reshaped, making new and different possibilities available.  Though the 
specific possibilities generated will vary by thinker, every thinker who achieves (2) renders a 
presupposition ineffective.  Such thinkers must subsequently go about in ways that do not 
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rely upon the presupposition.  This opens the possibility of choosing other ways of going 
about or of conceptualizing the world that were previously unavailable.        
Having to go about without a presupposition could be burdensome for some 
thinkers.  They might try to push new understandings aside or hold them at a distance.  
Other thinkers might, however, excitedly take them up and achieve new insights that they 
afford.  Regardless of a thinker’s individual response to the destruction of presuppositions, 
destruction ipso facto generates understandings that implicate horizonal shifts.  These changes 
come to bear on a thinker’s practical life by altering the way she sees the world and the 
possible actions that are available to her.  The growth and liberation that take place in 
critical-reflective thinking give it great value. 
VALUING GROWTH AND LIBERATION 
 
 Destroying presuppositions, insofar as it generates new understanding that expands a 
person’s horizon, is valuable for two general reasons: it constitutes growth and liberates people 
to choosing their lives more consciously.  Horizonal expansion, especially as captured in 
Emerson’s image of the circle, captures these aspects of personal progression.  A thinker’s 
horizon, or circle, expands beyond its previous form (i.e. she grows in understanding).  This 
expansion liberates a thinker from her previous way of seeing.  This liberation from one way of 
seeing also implies liberation to a new perspective.  A new perspective illuminates different 
possibilities than those that were previously available, one of which is the possibility of 
choosing on the basis of her new awareness.  The growth and liberation that take place 
occur in most instances of critical-reflective thinking because it necessarily expands the 
thinker’s horizon (though, as I will show in the following sections, some risks of critical-
reflective thinking can cause harm that outweighs these benefits).  Growth and liberation 
must, however, be distinguished from the specific consequences a particular thinker might 
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experience by considering personally relevant presuppositions and responding in her own 
way.  Here, I will first discuss growth and liberation in turn, before considering the objection 
that growth and liberation can entail great risks.  The value of critical-reflective thinking may, 
indeed, be diminished, or even negated, in instances when a thinker undergoes harm as a 
result of it.  My reply to this objection will be that, although such risks exist, the actual harm 
that can come to thinkers is uncommon and somewhat unlikely.  The risks, thus, only 
devalue it in few and particular cases, whereas growth and liberation are consistent results.  
Growth 
 
 Through critical-reflective thinking, a thinker grows and develops.  This type of 
growth, though it may take different forms for different thinkers, demonstrates personal 
progression.259  Nicholas Davey, a Gadamer scholar, describes it as “becoming more.”  In 
Unquiet Understanding, Davey writes that understanding “‘become[s] more’ […] by being 
prompted to disclose more of its overlooked presuppositions” and, in this, “understanding 
grasps more of itself.” 260   Thinkers recognize presuppositions that are part of their 
underlying understanding, which undergirds their ways of seeing and going about.  Thinkers’ 
understanding “becomes more” in that they gain awareness of their presuppositions and 
their horizons therewith expand.  One might deem the simple fact of personal growth 
valuable.  It can, however, also add depth, nuance, profundity, or subtlety to thinkers’ views.  
This added nuance to thinkers’ views contributes to a their self- and other-understanding 
and enriches their experiences.261    
                                                
259 Though “progression” is a word often associated with teleological undertakings, here, it 
reflects progression with respect to one’s own prior understanding and horizon (and not 
with respect to a final endpoint).  This point receives further treatment in the next section of 
this chapter.  
260 Nicholas Davey, Unquiet Understanding (Albany: SUNY, 2006), 14. 
261 Gadamer alludes to these benefits in the passage that begins this chapter. 
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When thinkers consider their own presuppositions, they become self-aware in ways 
that can provide personal insight into, among other things, their past, their attitudes, and/or 
their usual comportment.  Since critical-reflective thinking need not always focus on one’s 
own presuppositions, a thinker could also gain a greater understanding of others or of the 
world.  In conversation, for example, recognizing one of an interlocutor’s presuppositions 
can provide insight into why he goes about or sees in his particular way.  By learning how 
one or someone else has understood things one can approach oneself, others, life, and/or 
the world differently.  A thinker might, for example, view one of his regular experiences 
differently after critical-reflective thinking.  This might have happened to John Farmer when 
he became aware of the work-centricity of the thoughts that flooded his mind.  After 
recognizing that his life and thoughts were largely about work, he might have approached his 
recreation time (i.e. when he would sit on his porch) differently.  He may have come to 
understand that his past experiences, even during recreation, were based on his destroyed 
presupposition, and found this kind of mental engagement less valuable in comparison to 
other activities he could be doing or other topics he could be considering.  Realizations such 
as this make way for people to consciously change their conduct.   
Though the new possibilities will vary by thinker and by specific circumstances, at 
the very least the possibility of not acting in a way dictated by the presupposition becomes a 
live option.  Although it might be easier or more difficult for individuals to see alternative 
ways of acting that do not rest on the defeated presupposition and to subsequently take 
them up, awareness of a presupposition opens them to doing so.262  Before a person 
                                                
262 A person might have reasons unrelated to her critical defeat of a presupposition for 
continuing to act in a way her presupposition had dictated.  For example, if ceasing to 
perform a certain action were life-threatening or would cause social exclusion, it could be 
more attractive to continue enacting it. 
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becomes aware that a presupposition is part of his horizon, it is automatically effective in 
mediating his perspective and experiences.  By becoming aware of its operation, a person, 
perhaps for the first time, is able to neutralize it and to consciously see, act, or decide in ways 
that do not rely upon it.  Growth in self-awareness, in other words, makes acting differently 
a possibility even if the alternatives are yet unclear to a thinker.  The possibility of conscious 
change refers to the other primary reason that critical-reflective thinking is valuable: 
liberation.  Liberation takes place in critical-reflective thinking when a thinker, free to act 
otherwise, becomes aware of new possibilities.  
Liberation and Possibilities 
 
The simple existence of alternatives is often obscured by unconsidered 
presuppositions.  As Thoreau writes, we “reverence our life, and deny the possibility of 
change.  This is the only way, we say; but there are as many ways as there can be drawn radii 
from one centre.”263  Thoreau’s statement might be more obviously applied to someone who 
consciously reverences her life.  People can also, however, unwittingly do so.  People do this 
whenever they unreflectively uphold presuppositions that guide how they see and go about.  
Because of this reverence, alternative possibilities remain hidden.  Thoreau for example, 
admonishes his fellow citizens of Concord for reverencing goods that are not the true 
“necessaries and means of life.”264  He sees his fellow citizens as valuing the possession and 
maintenance of fine houses, material goods, and food so highly that these take on the quality 
of necessity.  These citizens unconsciously value these things highly, simply because they 
presuppose the rectitude of their normative value in their society.  Like the tailoress and the 
ox-driver who have always done things one way, they presume that this way is right and 
                                                
263 Thoreau, Walden, 11. 
264 Ibid., 7. 
 136 
necessary.  In reverencing their usual ways of life, however, citizens ignore other ways of 
living that might free them from spending the majority of their time and energy working.  
Critical-reflective thinking instigates an examination of the underlying presuppositions that 
define what one values, how one acts, and/or how one sees.  By reflecting on what 
undergirds these matters, a thinker becomes aware that there are other possibilities.  Such 
awareness liberates thinkers to more intentionally choosing how to go about life. 
The growth of understanding that takes place in critical-reflective thinking can be 
interpreted as liberating in two senses.  A thinker is liberated from one set of possibilities to 
another.  Because any presupposition that comes under consideration helps to shape a 
person’s horizon, it also effectively helps delimit available possibilities.  So, alterations in 
how presuppositions operate also delimit available possibilities anew.  Though the new 
possibilities may indeed be better that those that were previously available, they might not.  
The specific new possibilities of which a thinker will become aware cannot be predicted.  
For this reason, liberation is not valuable simply because it provides new possibilities.  
Rather, it is valuable because the awareness of previous constraints (as defined by a 
presupposition) and the opening of new possibilities enables a thinker to choose her life and 
actions more consciously.  When presented with new possibilities that had obscured a 
presupposition, a thinker need no longer unwittingly reverence her life.  Instead, she can 
reflectively choose among old and new possibilities.  She can go about her life and make 
choices more self-consciously as opposed to automatically on the basis of a presupposition.  
Critical-reflective thinking is, in this way requisite to more consciously choosing how to go 
about. 
 Thomas Carr brings up the idea of requisiteness in his article, “Gadamerian Ethics 
and the Task of Theology.”  Carr suggests that hermeneutic transformation (i.e. the 
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transformation of one’s understanding) is required for real change.265  When applied to 
critical-reflective thinking, Carr’s idea helps describe liberation.  We can describe how 
liberation happens by using the terminology of new understanding employed above.  The 
reflective awareness that comes with the new understanding of type (1) is requisite to the 
possibilities of consciously maintaining a presupposition, intentionally affirming it through 
actions, and considering alternatives.  That is, a thinker, since she has become aware of a 
presupposition, gains freedom from automatically subscribing to it.  
By finding a presupposition false or unworthy (and, thus, achieving (2)), the way that 
a presupposition had previously determined what a person could see and do is neutralized.  
By abandoning a presupposition, the way a person sees and spontaneously interprets 
whatever it had previously concerned changes.  In some cases, this shift happens smoothly, 
without conscious choice about what notions will henceforth mediate one’s approach to it.  
A person might not choose the new shape of her horizon and the possibilities available 
therein.  Still, however, she is enabled to choose what to do or how to value with more 
awareness of the notion she held previously.  This means she can choose her subsequent 
actions more consciously than before, with more attention to her understanding.  In other 
cases, however, a thinker might choose the notions that are to shape her life.  A thinker may 
find herself in the situation of letting go of one presupposition and choosing another way to 
look at the world or comport herself toward things.  In addition to the freedom from 
automatically acting on the presupposition, new understandings of type (2) can enable 
exploring and taking up alternative ways of seeing and going about.  Thinkers may even gain 
                                                
265 Thomas Carr, “Gadamerian Ethics and the Task of Theology,” Revista Portuguesa de 
Filosofia 56, Fasc. 3/4 (2000): 481. 
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access to possibilities that are better than those supported by their previous presuppositions, 
though the absence of better possibilities does not deny the fact of new found freedom.  
 Chapter One presented many examples of how the destruction of presuppositions 
leads to insights and possibilities that could be better (e.g. more fulfilling or productive) for 
the thinkers involved.  John Farmer became aware of additional ways of life.  Had he 
adopted any of them up, perhaps they would have been more fulfilling for him than was 
endlessly focusing on work.  Socrates stayed imprisoned even when given the opportunity to 
escape, in part because he acted with the understanding that death is not the worst evil.266  
This understanding enabled his attempt to care for his soul.  Arendt, meanwhile, spent much 
of her career considering questions related to evil.  This line of thought remained productive 
even in her final work, The Life of the Mind.  When Da-Sein, finally, discovered that it had 
presumed the propriety of acting like the they, it was able to seize its own possibilities 
instead of continuing to go about as before.  In each of these examples, the thinker became 
free to see or go about differently than before.  These examples exemplify positive 
consequences that can accompany critical-reflective thinking.   
It is unlikely, however, that newly available possibilities will always be better or make 
thinkers happier.  In fact, a thinker could feel as though his possibilities were vastly narrower 
than they had been before and/or that the new possibilities are not as attractive as those that 
were previously available.  Imagine a person living in a society where those who do not 
uphold the understandings that are the backbone of community life are ostracized.267  This 
                                                
266 Plato, Phaedo, trans. G.M.A. Grube, in Plato: Complete Works, ed. John M. Cooper 
(Indianapolis: Hackett, 1997), 68b, 83c. Misanthropy (and not death) is the greatest evil 
(Ibid., 89d) and death as blessing for philosophers (Ibid., 63e-64b). 
267 There are many different reasons for which a person would potentially be ostracized, 
depending on the society (e.g., in the contemporary era, especially reasons concerning 
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person thinks critically-reflectively about some undergirding presupposition of the society.  
If he achieves (2), he could open the possibility of no longer acting in accord with the 
presupposition.  Not upholding the presupposition, however, would also result in his 
ostracism.  If he acts in a way that does not accord with the presupposition, he might lose 
membership in the society of his friends and family.  If the society supported his livelihood, 
he might also lose his financial ability to support himself.  This thinker might feel that acting 
in accord with what he has discovered in thought would be worse than continuing as before.  
He might also continue as before, though he would do so with recognition of his own bad 
faith.  He would at least, however, choose rather than blindly uphold the communal 
presupposition. 
Because every thinker has her own response to newly available possibilities, the value 
of liberation cannot be grounded on its thinker-specific outcomes.  The opening of new 
possibilities, including the possibility of continuing as before, is a necessary structural 
outcome of critical-reflective thinking.  In general, awareness of new possibilities provides 
thinkers the freedom to more consciously choose their courses.  Thinkers are offered the 
possibility of a different life and the opportunity to choose their courses more freely (with 
less determination by an unreflective presupposition), even if the life that results is not better 
in every instance.  Rather than going about unreflectively on the basis of their 
presuppositions, thinkers become open to other ways of proceeding. 
Since people always operate on the basis of some presuppositions or other, critical-
reflective thinking cannot make them completely and utterly free to choose from infinite 
possibilities.  Whenever a thinker gains understanding of one presupposition, others remain 
                                                                                                                                            
sexuality, violence, and race).  Every real society likely operates on the basis of some weighty 
shared understandings.  Those who defy them face social exclusion. 
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at work; if Emerson is correct, a newly drawn circle, though its bounds encompass a 
previous circle, is still a circle.  Furthermore, a person might be hard-pressed to acquire 
possibilities that are gainsaid by presuppositions that are true.  For example, giving up the 
presupposition that gravity naturally occurs on Earth would not enable a person to have the 
possibility of a zero gravity existence.268  Therefore, thinkers do not gain complete freedom, 
where anything is possible.  This strong form of freedom is impossible also because there are 
some aspects of human experience that cannot be denied.  Denying that human life is, for 
example, essentially temporal 269  would be a formidable task.  The opening of new 
possibilities only comes with a weak form of freedom.  This need not, however, diminish its 
value.  Even if thinkers remain entrenched in some presuppositions while escaping others, 
the reflective aspect of this expansion still constitutes a movement in the direction of greater 
conscious choice.  By becoming conscious of what previously delimited their horizons, 
thinkers are able to choose more self-consciously and from new possibilities.  
Hence, critical-reflective thinking is valuable because it facilitates the growth of 
understanding and liberates people to new possibilities even if these are still limited.  These 
changes are highly valuable for a person’s self-development and for her ability to lead a 
reflectively conscious and intentional life.  It would be mistaken, however, to claim that there 
are no risks incurred in thinking.  Thinkers can suffer harm, both psychological and physical, 
consequent on exercising critical-reflective thinking.  In the following section, I describe 
these risks and ask whether the danger they pose outweighs the value of critical-reflective 
thinking.   
                                                
268 Those who have access to zero gravity chambers might have the opportunity to 
experience life without gravity.  They would not, however, have to deny the presupposition 
that gravity naturally occurs on Earth in order to have this experience. 
269 This can be interpreted as a presupposition, albeit a very deep one, insofar as it is 
something we take as true and that informs the way we value things and go about. 
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Risks of Critical-Reflective Thinking 
 
 There are two types of risks related to critical-reflective thinking: those of immediate 
harm and those of dangers that are temporally at a distance from the activity itself.  
Immediate physical harm, though somewhat unlikely, could befall a thinker when, for 
example, critical-reflective thinking directs her attention away from another high-risk activity 
in which she is involved.  Immediate psychological harm could also take place when a 
thinker destroys a presupposition that is basic to her identity.  Risks of subsequent harm, by 
contrast, concern dangers that can arise after critical-reflective thinking, partially as a result 
of the destruction of a presupposition and the new understanding thereby generated.  These 
risks include dangerous acts taken up by a thinker subsequent to and on the basis of 
possibilities that became available through thinking.  Here, I will provide examples that show 
how critical-reflective thinking holds these risks of harm.  These risks diminish the value of 
critical-reflective thinking in the cases where they obtain and/or where the damage they do 
outweighs any growth and liberation a thinker gains.  Because these cases do not frequently 
occur, however, they do not refute the value of thinking generally.  Furthermore, as Arendt 
argues, the risks of non-thinking are great.  
 Critical-reflective thinking can pose immediate risks to a thinker’s well-being at the 
very moment when she takes part in this activity.  It would be dangerous, for example, to 
engage in critical-reflective thinking while skydiving or even, perhaps, when performing 
more mundane (but still dangerous) activities like driving a car.  In both these situations, one 
is responsible for ensuring one’s own safety (and perhaps that of others as well) by following 
specific procedures.  The skydiver must activate her parachute at a particular moment to 
avoid injury or death.  The driver of a car must so operate the vehicle as to avoid colliding 
with dangerous obstacles, other people, animals, buildings, statues, fences, etc.  If a thinker 
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exercises critical-reflective thinking during high-risk activities like these, her attention could 
be diverted from the activity at hand.  A thinker might, thus, forget to take the necessary 
precautions.  In some cases this might result from the fact that maintaining focus on other 
activities while in the throes of critical examination can be a challenge.  However, it is more 
likely that a person involved in a dangerous activity would reject any prompts to think that 
might interrupt her ability to attend to pressing or potentially dangerous tasks at hand.  So 
although it should be acknowledged that thinking can be risky when coupled with dangerous 
circumstances, it is rather unlikely that a person will succumb to the distraction of thinking 
in the midst of tasks that demand concentration for the sake of his physical survival or well-
being.  
 In addition to the minor risk of physical harm, there is a risk of psychological harm.  
Elena Cuffari, in a piece on Simone de Beauvoir’s ideas about personal transformation, 
writes, “Work in cognitive psychology supports Beauvoir’s view of habit’s hold increasing 
with time as well as her portrayal of the ontological risk to self that comes whenever such 
strong sedimentation is disrupted.”270  If a thinker has held a certain presupposition over the 
course of his life, it might be so “strongly sedimented” in his self-understanding that it forms 
an essential part of his identity.  If this presupposition then comes under question in critical-
reflective thinking, the process could damage his psychological well-being or even cause a 
psychological breakdown.  It is also possible that a person in such danger would, like the 
attentive skydiver, block critical-reflective thinking.  Still, this domain of life is dynamic and 
the risk of psychological harm real.  It is important to note, however, that psychological 
harm does not always result when deeply-held presuppositions are considered (whether or 
not the presuppositions undergo defeat).  For some, questioning a deeply held and 
                                                
270 Elena Cuffari, “Habits of Transformation,” Hypatia 26, no. 3 (2011): 543. 
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sedimented presupposition can, to the contrary, be an empowering experience of 
transformation.  
These examples of physical and psychological risk show that critical-reflective 
thinking can directly cause harm.  Had the skydiver not been attending to her thoughts she 
probably would have opened the parachute at the proper time; had the thinker not been 
questioning strongly sedimented presuppositions, he would probably not have undergone a 
psychological break.  Though these deleterious outcomes are not inherent in critical-
reflective thinking, the risks are.  The existence of these risks, however, does not outweigh 
the valuable outcomes of critical-reflective thinking (growth and liberation) since the 
dangerous outcomes are neither necessary nor common.  Critical-reflective thinking might in 
itself be highly dangerous to certain individuals in certain situations.  But few thinkers suffer 
physical or psychological harm because they are more likely to stop thinking when it poses a 
danger.  Rather than undergoing harm, thinkers usually gain the benefits of a broader 
horizon and new perspective.     
Risks that result in harm subsequent to critical-reflective thinking are also possible.  
These risks can cause thinkers to suffer harm after and on the basis of their engagement in 
critical-reflective thinking.  A thinker might, for instance, act in such a way as to harm 
himself or others based on his considerations.  The thinker’s acts may be motivated by 
critical-reflective thinking in the sense that the destruction of presuppositions and generation 
of understanding in it opened up particularly dangerous possibilities or allowed the thinker 
to see in such a way as to make dangerous or malevolent acts attractive. Yet, it must be 
noted, in such cases critical-reflective thinking can only open the possibility of harm, not 
directly cause it.  Other factors must be involved in bringing about harm that takes place 
subsequent to the activity itself, including the person’s dispositions, attitudes, choices, and 
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other people’s reactions.  A deeper analysis of action in its relation to thinking than is 
possible here would have to be undertaken to uncover and describe specific conditions that 
make dangerous action on the part of thinkers more or less likely.  Instead, I will discuss two 
examples that help clarify whether and how risks removed from the activity affect the value 
of critical-reflective thinking: first, Arendt’s discussion in “Thinking and Moral 
Considerations” of Critias and Alcibiades who, after thinking with Socrates, took up moral 
nihilism and harmed their city and countrymen; second, Martin Luther King, Jr.’s 
descriptions of peaceful demonstrations during the Civil Rights Movement where the 
demonstrators can be interpreted as having thought critically and reflectively and, yet, 
violence ensued. 
In Arendt’s example of Critias and Alcibiades, it is the thinkers themselves who do 
harm to their polis.  Both Critias and Alcibiades often talked with Socrates and thought 
together with him in conversation.271  According to Arendt, after thinking with Socrates 
Critias and Alcibiades took up the nihilistic moral stance that anything goes.  Although 
Arendt does not mention particular injustices committed by the two, she presumably has in 
mind Critias’ leadership of the Thirty Tyrants and Alcibiades’ shifting political loyalties 
during the Peloponnesian War.272  Critias’s and Alcibiades’s actions were brought up as 
evidence against Socrates during his trial.  Socrates’ accusers  
cited Critias and Alcibiades as the foremost examples of [... the fact that 
Socrates had] corrupted [the] youth and said that “none wrought so many 
evils to the state.”  Critias as the leading figure in the dictatorship of the 
Thirty “bore the palm for greed and violence,” while Alcibiades under the 
democracy “exceeded all in licentiousness and insolence.”273 
                                                
271 Critias appears as an interlocutor in a number of Socratic dialogues including in the 
Charmides, Protagoras, Timaeus, Eryxias, and, of course, Critias.  Alcibiades as well appears 
throughout the dialogues, in the Symposium, Alcibiades, Second Alcibiades, and Protagoras.  
272 Because of his changing allegiance, Alcibiades can be seen as a traitor. 
273 Isidor Feinstein Stone, The Trial of Socrates (New York: Anchor Books, 1989), 29. 
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Critias and Alcibiades “turned out to be a very real threat to the polis” subsequent to 
thoughtfully conversing with Socrates.274  Arendt explains that they reached aporiae in their 
conversations and that the aporiae generated the understanding that absolute truth is not to 
be found.  Arendt describes their response to this new understanding as follows: “if we 
cannot define what piety is, let us be impious.”275  This statement is an interpretive move on 
Arendt’s part since none of the published dialogues wherein Critias and Alcibiades talk with 
Socrates primarily concern the virtue of piety.  Her interpretation is, however, corroborated 
by the description given by Socrates’ accusers.  They claimed that thinking with Socrates can 
make a person less devoted, reverential, or respectful of those things deserving of respect 
(e.g., one’s city, one’s fellow citizens, the gods, rules about common decency, or one’s 
parents).      
Assuming, for the sake of argument, that both Alcibiades and Critias took part in 
critical-reflective thinking with Socrates, their experience can be characterized thus: Having 
broken down previous presuppositions about what was to be revered, the two thinkers came 
to understand that they could not define piety.  Both also came to believe that their inability 
to define piety entailed its insignificance.  This second step made it possible for them to take 
up the opinion that it is not wrong to act in ways that are considered impious by most (since 
there is no absolute definition or criterion by which actions can be judged impious).  So, they 
concluded, “anything goes.”  Critical-reflective thinking thereby made dangerous possibilities 
available and, perhaps, more attractive.  Reaching morally dubious conclusions through 
critical-reflective thinking is, thus, a risk inherent in the activity.  If the damaging 
                                                
274 Arendt, “Truth and Moral Considerations,” 176. 
275 Ibid., 177. 
 146 
consequences of a thinker’s subsequent acts are sufficiently harmful, we might judge the 
value of growth and liberation in his particular case to be outweighed by the harm.  
Although thinking loses value in cases where harm outweighs benefits, Arendt 
cautions us about attributing responsibility for subsequent harm to thinking.  In her first 
argument in support of this stance, Arendt claims that nihilism is not an outcome of 
thinking.  This might appear contrary to her admission that “all critical examinations must go 
through a stage of at least hypothetically negating accepted opinions and “values” […] and in 
this sense nihilism may be seen as an ever-present danger of thinking.”276  For Arendt, taking 
up the nihilistic stance, at least hypothetically, is part of the activity of thinking.  Yet, nihilism 
is not the final result of thinking.  Rather, thinkers adopt nihilism out of “the desire to find 
results which would make further thinking unnecessary.”277  Critias and Alcibiades did not 
prove the rightness or certainty of nihilism when they discovered that they could not define 
piety.  Instead of continuing to tarry with their ideas about piety and to develop their 
understanding and action based on further growth and liberation, they prematurely opted to 
take up moral nihilism out of a desire for finality.  Nihilism makes further thinking 
unnecessary because it denies to thinking (and to many other things) true value.  According 
to Arendt, taking up nihilism is not the end of thinking, but a way out of it.  If one continues 
to think, however, one performatively contradicts the nihilistic claim that nothing has value, 
both by taking up thinking rather than some other activity and by engaging in an activity that 
might change one’s mind about nihilism itself.  The person who keeps thinking in the face of 
nihilism shows that thinking and the possibility of change remain valuable (or at least choice-
worthy) for her.  
                                                
276 Ibid. 
277 Ibid., 177-178. 
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Though Arendt’s claim is specifically leveled at nihilism, the idea that thinkers, 
because of their desires (to stop thinking or otherwise), sometimes take up stances and leave 
off thinking illustrates the idea that a person’s attitudes, dispositions, and tendencies play a 
key role in what she subsequently does.  Acting impiously, in other words, is not dependent 
only upon a thinker’s awareness of or attraction to impious possibilities.  It does not follow 
directly from the awareness of the idea and the conclusion that anything goes that Critias 
and Alcibiades acted in this way.  Even if a thinker begins to see the world in a way that 
makes harmful actions imaginable or attractive, she need not perform them.  Awareness and 
attraction do not imply choice.   
People are aware of many more possibilities, even attractive possibilities, than they 
take up.  They might be attracted to the possibilities of eating more healthfully, getting more 
exercise, stealing things when they would not likely get caught, or supporting sustainability 
by bringing their own coffee mug to the café.  These are real possibilities for many people 
(that may even have become live options for them through thinking) even though they often 
do not follow through and carry them out.  Their other attitudes, tendencies, and needs or 
even the fear that their family or friends would disapprove of (or be confused by) such 
actions affects what possibilities people take up.  Alcibiades’s and Callicles’s moral attitudes, 
for example, may have informed their choices and subsequent actions.  A rational conclusion 
that anything goes does not automatically make a person carry out dangerous and harmful 
acts.  Critias and Alcibiades, however, chose to perform actions that caused harm and that 
could be justified by moral nihilism.  Their choice was not purely a result of becoming aware 
of an available option by thinking about it.  Additional factors are at play when a thinker 
chooses and carries out an action (whether it has harmful results or not).  So, though the 
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availability of such actions may have been opened through thinking, they are not solely 
attributable to the activity itself.  
In a second, counterfactual argument about the relation between thinking and harm, 
Arendt compares the outcomes of thinking with those of non-thinking:  
nonthinking, which seems so recommendable a state for political and moral 
affairs, also has its dangers.  By shielding people against the dangers of 
examination, it teaches them to hold fast to whatever the prescribed rules of 
conduct may be at a given time in a given society.278 
 
Arendt, of course, holds that the banal evil and accompanying violence of the Nazizeit was a 
consequence of the failure to think.  Non-thinking too may, thus, be accompanied by terrible 
results.  The results of non-thinking may be just as bad and, as Arendt illustrates in 
describing Eichmann as the man who was unable to think, even worse than the results of 
thinking.  Moreover, for Arendt, thinking generates conscientious and intentional action.  
Thinkers are able to act on the basis of awareness, whereas non-thinkers simply follow 
“prescribed rules of conduct” that may not be morally sound.      
In contrast to the example of Critias and Alcibiades, where thinking opened 
dangerous possibilities for those who thought, the actions of thinkers might also provoke 
dangerous responses from other people around them.  A noteworthy example that 
implicates thinking in the occurrence of violence can be found in Martin Luther King, Jr.’s 
book, Why We Can’t Wait.  There, he describes the thinking that took place in his community 
and that motivated demonstrations.  The demonstrators were met with violence.  Although 
the violence done to them may not have occurred had they not demonstrated after 
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thinking,279 note that the violence in this example comes at an even greater remove from 
thinking.  For the peaceful demonstrators did not carry out the violence—other members of 
their community, who reacted violently to their demonstrations, did so.   
According to King, the centennial anniversary of the Emancipation Proclamation, 
“gave the Negros a reason to act.”280  The year was 1963 and in addition to marking the 
centennial, it had been nine years since the anti-discrimination decision in Brown v. Board of 
Education.  King and other African Americans had not, however, seen sufficient change in 
their situation and were disappointed.  King notes a number of reasons for this. (1) They had 
waited nine years to see adequate progress in the desegregation of schools, and witnessed the 
Pupil Placement Law that undermined it; (2) they were disillusioned by the fact that the 
housing order did not stop “discrimination in financing by banks and other institutions;” (3) 
they were told that racial problems would be solved by “registering more voters,” when 
those who had political power, no matter how much they proposed civil rights for all, did 
not seem to understand or could not effect the necessary change; (4) they had observed the 
USA’s defense of liberty abroad during the Cold War while liberty was not a reality for many 
in their own country; and (5) they had continued to live in poverty with little hope of 
economic advancement.  Yet, African-Americans still were not free and “still lived a form of 
slavery disguised by certain niceties.”281   
King wrote that in 1963 they “awoke from a stupor of inaction.”282  Although this 
awakening likely took place in many different forms for different individuals, it is possible 
                                                
279 Although the harm that befell them may not have occurred if they had not demonstrated, 
those affected by racism will still have suffered other forms of violence—perhaps even more 
so or longer than—if no demonstrations had taken place. 
280 Martin Luther King, Jr., Why We Can’t Wait (New York: Penguin, 2000), 18. 
281 Ibid., viii-x. 
282 Ibid., 17. 
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that it took place for some through critical-reflective thinking.  Recognizing any of the 
disappointments listed above may have prompted people to ask themselves why, in spite of 
legal policies and mandates, they were not actually receiving equal rights and treatment.  
Perhaps they discovered, as King did, that they had presupposed that promises and policies 
made by the government would effect real change.  Destroying this notion made it clear that 
they would have to put pressure on the government or take a stand in some other way to 
demand their due rights and equal treatment. 
The members of King’s SCLC acted together to organize and take part in 
demonstrations, sit-ins, and boycotts in a peaceful push for change.  Although the SCLC 
demanded rights through peaceful means, they were met with beatings by the police, 
dismissals from jobs, arrests, more beatings while in prison, the “uncertain justice” of the 
legal system, and targeted bombings by persons and groups opposed to their mission, not to 
mention many other instantiations of banal bigotry.283  If the demonstrations carried out by 
members of the SCLC subsequent to critical-reflective thinking resulted in violent harm, it 
might be claimed that thinking was indeed a catalyst for this harm.  Insofar as this violence 
may not have ensued had the demonstrators refrained from actions that they conclude were 
necessary in their considerations, critical-reflective thinking carried the risk of violent 
responses.  If this view were, however, to place blame for the violence that ensued on the 
demonstrators, it would miss the point that violence was done to the demonstrators.  In 
effect, it would blame the victim where responsibility for harm done rests with those who 
perpetrated it.  Even if the violence would not have occurred if the demonstrators had not 
thought and acted, their acts did not necessitate violent outcomes.  These outcomes may 
have been provoked by their demonstrations, but critical-reflective thinking did not 
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necessitate the violence that ensued.  Additional factors like the racial prejudice of others in 
their community played a key role in the harm that came to the demonstrators.  The critical-
reflective thinking of the demonstrators did not, in other words, cause the actions of those 
who responded violently. 
 Though the risks involved in critical-reflective thinking, both immediate and 
removed from the activity, contradicts its value in certain cases, harmful results are 
somewhat uncommon and highly inconsistent.  Thinkers can avoid harm by rejecting the 
invitation to think while in dangerous circumstance or by choosing subsequent actions that 
are not harmful or likely to incur harm.  Thinkers’ attitudes, dispositions, tendencies, and 
needs also influence the outcomes of thinking.  Though it comes with risks that may make 
certain dangers greater, realizing such possibilities is not intrinsic to the activity.  A deeper 
analysis of action could help clarify the conditions that enable or encourage a thinker to carry 
out possibilities opened through thought. 
INFINITUDE, INSTABILITY, AND VALUE 
 
Having clarified the outcomes of critical-reflective thinking and described their value, 
it is necessary to consider one final matter, namely, the infinitude of critical-reflective 
thinking.  The movement of expansion that takes place in critical-reflective thinking can 
happen again and again.  As a result, critical-reflective thinking is an activity that is never 
finished.  Because of its infinitude, it offers thinkers the opportunity to continually gain 
perspective, grow and develop in understanding, and become aware of new possibilities.  By 
engaging in an “ever completing but never completed”284 activity, we are, as Gadamer writes, 
afforded the continuous possibility of “broadening […] our human experiences, our self-
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knowledge, and our horizon.”285  The possibility of such an endless “adventure,” however, 
poses both existential and theoretical concerns that must be addressed.   
Thinkers who reflect on the meaning of the infinitude of critical-reflective thinking 
might be troubled by the lack of finality.  If anything that someone comes to understand 
through thinking can itself be, as Arendt and Kant say, questioned in the future, 
understanding will never be stable (unless thinking ceases).  Thinkers, accordingly, are forced 
to live without stable certainty of what they take to be true.  What’s more, the absence of 
finality indicates that critical-reflective thinking lacks an endpoint and final objective 
understanding toward which it is oriented.  It lacks an objective and final conclusion.  Any 
progress a thinker makes by engaging in critical-reflective thinking is relative to the thinker’s 
own previous understanding.  Even if the growth and liberation that take place through 
thinking are valuable, these, too, are goals that can never be conclusively achieved.  They do 
not point toward some ultimate horizonal shape that every person approaches through 
critical-reflective thinking.  In this section, I describe critical-reflective thinking’s infinitude in 
more detail and then consider self-referential growth and the instability of understanding in 
turn.  
Critical-reflective thinking is infinite for two reasons.  First, as noted above, Kant 
and Arendt say that thinking can be self-destructive because whatever a thinker discovers in 
thought (i.e. new understanding) can later come into question.  People can always reconsider 
what they think they understand.  Second, critical-reflective thinking is infinite in that there 
will always be presuppositions that have not yet been discovered by a thinker.  Since 
presuppositions enable people to go about the world meaningfully and to interpret things 
around them, people always proceed on the basis of some presuppositions or other.  So, no 
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matter how often a person takes part in thinking, unconsidered notions will always linger in 
the background.  Thinkers can never become completely transparent to themselves: only the 
length of their lives limits their (potential) consideration of presuppositions.  
The infinitude of critical-reflective thinking may be distressing for some people and 
make it impossible for them to appreciate its benefits.  If thinkers cannot reach or even 
progress toward a final endpoint, critics might wonder, what is the ultimate point of 
practicing it?  This complaint can be interpreted as a teleological relativistic issue or as an 
existential issue.  The teleological complaint might be that, if there is no endpoint, any sense of 
progress or forward movement is illusory or nonsensical.  This complaint does not deny the 
fact that there is growth, or change.  Rather, it finds the growth to be mere change that has 
no value since it does not advance or progress toward an objective goal.  Even if thinkers do 
objectively grow in understanding, the fact that this growth cannot be appraised with respect 
to a final endpoint could be taken to mean that growth is futile.  It does not bring one closer 
to absolute truth, the possession of complete knowledge, or a stage of final maturation.  This 
complaint treats the gain of understanding in critical-reflective thinking as an achievement 
that is merely relative to each thinker concerning both what thinkers come to understand and 
the directions in which their understanding grows.  As I will show, however, the complaint 
ignores the value of personal expansion, which I have described above.  As an existential 
concern, meanwhile, the infinitude of critical-reflective thinking could be construed as 
undermining its value because of the discomfort thinkers might feel in the absence of stable 
understanding.  The lack of a possible final and stable understanding could leave thinkers 
disturbingly uncertain.  As I will discuss, however, this outcome is not necessary and likely 
only obtains in isolated cases.  It can be understood as a risk that is possible, but unlikely.  I 
will now discuss the teleological and existential concerns in more detail.   
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The claim that progress made by thinkers in critical-reflective thinking is relative286 is 
indeed true.  Thinkers progress with respect to their former understanding; thinkers’ 
horizons broaden from their previous shapes.  The critic who propounds the teleological 
concern is dissatisfied with admitting the existence of growth without an external and 
objective telos toward which thinkers can grow (even if they can never reach it).  In addition 
to denying the value of personal progression in relation to oneself, this complaint ignores the 
possibility that continual growth and liberation could be interpreted as worthy teloi, although, 
not teloi that can be attained once and for all.  They serve as teloi without positing specific 
tasks to complete or specific conditions to attain.  Indeed, people can look back on their 
lives and reflect upon how their understanding has changed, often picking out certain events 
that have altered their perspectives.  Growth in their horizons will always have happened 
with respect to previous conditions, yet, it is still objective growth. 
A critic might still be disturbed by the absence of an aim that can be definitively 
attained once and for all, such as gaining absolute knowledge or participating in Hegelian 
absolute knowing.  Besides the fact that any evidence in human history used to show that 
people can or do move in the direction of such ends is disputable, there is good reason to be 
wary of positing an end that has specific content.  Any endpoint a person posits is part of 
her understanding.  It is, thus, open to possible revision.  Moreover, after having achieved 
further growth, one may see it from a new perspective and situate it among other things that 
an expanded view has opened up.  It is also likely undergirded by personal, social, and 
historical presuppositions that she may never have occasion to reflect upon.  And even if she 
were to reflect on presuppositions that undergird the endpoint she posits, further 
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presuppositions operate on a subterranean level of her consciousness.  Any teloi one 
postulates are grounded upon yet undisclosed presuppositions.  This means that any such 
teloi are merely provisional.  This is not to say, however, that positing a telos is bad or 
unhelpful.  Avoiding dogmatism, however, may require leaving open the possibility of 
revising it.   
Construing the aim of critical-reflective thinking as continual growth and liberation 
escapes the problem of dogmatism because it makes the activity (and what inherently takes 
place in it) an end in itself.  By proposing that these are the teleological aims of critical-
reflective thinking, one need not look beyond the activity itself.  In addition, it is important 
to note that these may not be its only or final teloi.  Perhaps on further considering critical-
reflective thinking, other aspects of its occurrence or outcomes will become apparent.  These 
could lead one to posit further teloi or revise those I have described here.  If a critic, 
however, demands a stable endpoint that has more content than these to justify the value of 
critical-reflective thinking, we reach a standoff.    
The continual possibility of change also brings up an existential issue related to 
feelings of uncertainty.  Most people do not likely suffer discomfort from the fact that they 
can always reexamine whatever they have found in critical-reflective thinking.  Their new 
understandings delimit their horizons anew and, without concern, they then see and go 
about their business on the basis of their new perspectives.  They are not haunted by 
reflective uncertainty, the awareness that their understandings are not stable and can change 
again through further critical-reflective thinking.  The fact that critical-reflective thinking is 
infinite, however, will be daunting to others.  For some people, for example those whose 
psychological or physical survival fundamentally relies upon existential certainty (even if 
unfounded) of their way of thinking, taking part in critical-reflective thinking and discovering 
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through repetition that it does not provide irrefutably certain understanding could cause 
harm.  Defeating a presupposition that is fundamental to one’s sense of self or the world 
could lead one to believe that even the things of which one feels most certain are in fact 
uncertain.  For those who depend on certainty (whether reflective or not) for peace of mind 
and/or survival, its absence would likely outweigh the valuable aspects of critical-reflective 
thinking.  Practicing it could lead to existential difficulties such as general anguish or 
indecision.  As Arendt writes, thinking “may have a paralyzing effect when you come out of 
it, no longer sure of what had seemed to you beyond doubt while you were unthinkingly 
engaged in whatever you were doing.”287  Of course, these people might avoid critical-
reflective thinking in the first place.  Sometimes, these risks are, however, likely 
unpredictable since a person cannot always anticipate its specific consequences prior to 
taking part in thinking itself.   
Others, who are neither dependent upon stabile certainty for survival nor perturbed 
by horizonal alteration, may nonetheless be bothered by uncertainty if they recognize the 
instability of thought and understanding, the fact that their understanding can always change 
again after coming to some conclusion in thought.  If those disturbed by such instability 
reject the value of critical-reflective thinking, their reasons do not arise from a fear of 
psychological breaks, but from elsewhere.  I interpret their aversion to critical-reflective 
thinking’s infinitude to be rooted in the notion that life is easier or more bearable if their 
understanding is stable, even if this stability is unreflective.  Such individuals prefer not to 
exercise critical-reflective thinking and to remain unreflectively certain rather than to disturb 
what they take as true. 
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Taken to an extreme, the instability of understanding could lead to practical paralysis.  
Imagine a thinker who, through critical-reflective thinking, recognizes that a fundamental 
presupposition that she held true is not true.  This discovery establishes a new perspective 
based on the destruction of a presupposition and the new understanding thereby generated.  
She might also see that her new perspective is unstable and could be reshaped through 
further critical engagement.  Since her perspective undergirds how she sees and goes about 
things, her decisions and actions will to some extent rest on it.  If her perspective is 
grounded upon presuppositions of which she believes she cannot be certain, she might not 
find that she has an adequate basis for deciding and acting.  Anything that might seem like a 
worthy or proper action at one moment, she might fear, could later, through a perspectival 
shift, appear unworthy or improper.  If afflicted by this uncertainty to an extreme, she might 
become paralyzed, unable to carry out actions or make decisions.  For choosing an action 
requires commitment, if only momentary, to one perspective rather than another.  If a 
thinker sees every belief, conviction, and presupposition as subject to change, choosing, even 
on the basis of what seems true at the moment, might become difficult.  For, if whatever 
seems true is subject to change and cannot once and for all be proved, there is nothing to 
rely on.  It cannot be counted on again in the future, for example, when she seeks 
justification for her past actions.  It is important to note that this paralysis cannot be total.  
One cannot but act; even if one decides not to perform one action, a person necessarily does 
something else.  Even if a person “does nothing” and dies rather than take care to keep 
living and making choices, this is something she does.  Complete practical paralysis is, thus, 
impossible; so long as one is consciously alive, actions must be performed, although 
uncertainty can make choosing more difficult or all but impossible (even to the extent that it 
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makes life unbearable).  This refutation of absolute practical paralysis does not deny, 
however, that partial paralysis based on uncertainty can be distressing.   
The risk of this distress is best understood as a risk temporally removed from 
thinking.  It is not something that takes place and causes harm to a thinker in the very 
moment of critical-reflective thinking, but instead something a thinker suffers afterward.  
Whether a thinker ends up in a state of existential uncertainty depends on her response to 
thought.  Those in whom thinking leads to paralyzing uncertainty are brought to this not 
only by critical-reflective thinking, but also by other factors such as their attitudes, 
psychological needs, and conclusions drawn beyond the activity itself.  In fact, the instability 
inherent in the infinitude of critical-reflective thinking may only detrimentally affect those 
who, subsequently to critical-reflective thinking, both notice the instability it implies about 
their other presuppositions and need complete certainty.  Many likely remain unaware of the 
instability of their presuppositions.  This is, for them, a moot issue.  But those who do 
become aware of it are not likely to all have the same reaction.  Someone who has a 
tendency to be easily and deeply frustrated might throw her hands up and fall into deep 
doubts about what she takes as true.  These doubts might make acting and deciding difficult 
for her.  Conversely, many other thinkers might take the infinitude of critical-reflective 
thinking as an opportunity for continual growth.  For example, a person with an optimistic 
attitude might hold that the absence of stability is for the best since it affords the possibility 
of continual growth.  Instead of becoming deeply disconcerted by the fundamental instability 
of understanding, optimists might also accept and act in whatever they understand at a given 
moment while also allowing the possibility of future change.  They are as certain as they 
need to be (i.e., their needs also determine their reactions to the awareness of instability).  
Unbothered by recognition that their understanding might change in the future, they forge 
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ahead in their practical lives.  Like other risks temporally removed from the activity of 
thinking, consequently, practical paralysis cannot be solely attributed to critical-reflective 
thinking.  Disturbing and potentially paralyzing uncertainty is—unavoidably—a possible 
outcome of the activity, and paralysis might greatly devalue critical-reflective thinking at least 
for those to whom this occurs.  Paralysis, however, is a rare and unlikely outcome.  
Consequently, its possibility does not refute the value of critical-reflective thinking generally. 
One might evade paralysis by avoiding thinking (e.g., by refusing the invitations of 
prompts).  This may allow one to go about with greater, though unreflective, certainty.288  
But if thinking is unavoidable, even people who usually have existential certainty may 
encounter the instability of their understanding.  Gadamer supports this idea as it pertains to 
hermeneutic experience when he writes, “Although in bringing up children, for example, 
parents may try to spare them certain experiences, experience as a whole is not something 
anyone can be spared.”289  Though some people might be more open to examination and 
change than others are, no one is utterly closed to its possibility.290  If he is right, even 
unreflective certainty tout court is not invincible.  It might come into question through a 
hermeneutic experience.  So, even those who do not usually think may not always be able to 
avoid facing uncertainty.  
If people have essentially open horizons and their thinking attention may be solicited 
by prompts that befall them, critical-reflective thinking is an ever-present possibility even if 
people attempt to avoid it (and pretty well succeed).  This possibility can open a continual 
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adventure of growth and liberation, though it comes with risks.  Since harm only obtains in 
some cases, however, harm does not lie in wait for all thinkers.  Its possibility, therefore, 
cannot overshadow the value more broadly.  The two arguments against the value of critical-
reflective thinking presented here are made possible by the infinite activity of critical-
reflective thinking.  It is never finished in the senses that it has no objective endpoint and 
that it does not provide invulnerable certainty.  Even if it is endless, the claim that critical-
reflective thinking is, therefore, without value does not hold.  
CONCLUSIONS AND ONE MORE RESULT 
 
 Though thinkers face risks in exercising critical-reflective thinking, such thinking is 
valuable because it helps thinkers grow and develop in understanding.  A horizonal model 
describes this growth as the expansion of one’s horizon—or, in Emerson’s words, as the 
drawing of a new circle.  Destroying presuppositions generates new understanding that is an 
expansion of a thinker’s horizons.  Horizonal growth provides a thinker a new, wider 
perspective, thus enabling her to see herself, others, or the world differently.  This new 
perspective also opens new ways of going about life.  Liberation from one horizonal 
perspective to others opens new possibilities for living.   
 Gadamer suggests one final result of critical-reflective thinking.  In his discussion of 
the hermeneutic experience, he writes that,  
the perfection we call “being experienced,” does not consist in the fact that 
someone already knows everything and knows better than anyone else.  
Rather, the experienced person proves to be, on the contrary, someone who 
is radically undogmatic; who, because of the many experiences he has had 
and the knowledge he has drawn from them, is particularly well equipped to 
have new experiences and to learn from them.291   
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Having undergone hermeneutic experiences, which I have likened to critical-reflective 
thinking, can remind a person to be “undogmatic” and to seek new understanding.  It can 
open the way for further experience (or thought).  Thinkers, in discovering that they had 
held questionable presuppositions, become open to further self-critique and examination in 
the future.  In hermeneutics, “experience” means having one’s expectations disappointed 
and becoming steadfastly open to the possibility that what one understands might prove 
wrong (or at least questionable).  Translating this idea into critical-reflective thinking, it 
means that the destruction of presuppositions makes one more receptive to the possibility 
that other presuppositions could turn out to be false.  In this way, critical-reflective thinking 
can encourage further instances of the same.   
Critical-reflective thinking perpetuates itself by cultivating openness in thinkers.  
Such openness encourages thinkers to exercise critical-reflective thinking again and again.  If 
critical-reflective thinking proves valuable, we may desire to practice it more often.  Since, 
however, critical-reflective thinking is instigated by the unpredictable interruption of a 
prompt, though we may become more receptive to it, actually engaging in it is, to some 
extent, out of our hands.  This leaves us with a provocative question: how can people 
cultivate critical-reflective thinking?  Are there strategies for fostering and encouraging its 
occurrence?  These are the questions to which I turn in the next chapter.  
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CHAPTER THREE: 
CULTIVATING CRITICAL-REFLECTIVE THINKING 
 
 
 Growth in understanding and liberation to new possibilities make critical-reflective 
thinking a valuable activity.  If one desires these benefits in spite of its risks, one may wish to 
practice critical-reflective thinking more often.  Humans, however, cannot compel the 
occurrence of prompts, which instigate the occurrence of this thinking.  Directly inducing a 
prompt is not, therefore, an effective way to bring about critical-reflective thinking.  The 
best humans can do is facilitate its occurrence by developing themselves in ways or creating 
circumstances that are conducive to critical-reflective thinking.  In this chapter, I will argue 
that people can develop the openness and receptivity that make the acceptance of prompts 
and deep engagement with presuppositions more likely.  Heidegger, Arendt, Thoreau, and 
Plato describe several strategies for cultivating openness and receptivity: spending time in 
solitude, taking leisure, having an open attitude, and being wakefully attentive.  Each of these 
is a way of being that can be awoken through practical activities.  In this chapter, I will 
describe solitude, leisure, an open attitude (based on Heideggerian Gelassenheit), and wakeful 
attentiveness and show how they are conducive to critical-reflective thinking.  In addition, I 
will describe how people may develop these ways of being through practical activities.  This 
list of cultivation strategies is, admittedly, somewhat idiosyncratic.  I do not intend it, 
however, to be exhaustive.  Near the end of the chapter, I will briefly discuss how 
developing certain virtues can also make engaging in critical-reflective thinking more likely.  
 As stated, the above cultivation strategies facilitate the personal development of 
openness and receptivity for critical-reflective thinking.  Being open and receptive makes a 
person available to heed and accept prompts and to question presuppositions.  Openness 
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and receptivity, moreover, are distinct ways of being available to take part in critical-
reflective thinking.  Openness is opposed to closed-ness, which limits a person’s possibility 
of being prompted in the first place.  Being open means attending to things in ways that do 
not resist their appearing differently than they usually do.  By allowing things to appear 
differently, a person is open to challenges and prompts that might issue from them.  
Receptivity, by contrast, means welcoming the opportunity to engage in critical-reflective 
thinking by accepting prompts when they come along.  It is opposed to refusing to take part 
in critical-reflective thinking by either rejecting prompts or steering clear of considering 
presuppositions.  Receptivity is availability for critical-reflective thinking in the sense of 
greeting its occurrence.  Openness, on the other hand, is a more basic availability for critical-
reflective thinking.  I will now discuss each of these in more detail with reference to the 
cultivation strategies.   
Closed-ness afflicts those who are oblivious to the possibility of critical-reflective 
thinking because they are unmindful of their surroundings and experiences or are stuck in 
their ways.  These make a person oblivious to the possibility of critical-reflective thinking 
and unheedful of things that might prompt them.  The ox-driver and tailoress whom 
Thoreau described may have suffered from closed-ness since they seemed to have 
overlooked evidence contrary to their presuppositions though it was right in front of them.  
Although complete closed-ness is impossible (since every person has a fundamentally open 
horizon), and prompts can befall people even in the midst of mundane activities, having a 
closed comportment toward things makes it less likely that one will be prompted by them.  
Openness can be developed through adopting an open attitude, practicing wakeful 
attentiveness, and habituating oneself to be humble.  These strategies combat closed-ness by 
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so orienting a person toward things, events, and experiences as to attend to these in ways 
that allow them to appear differently than they usually do and thereby issue prompts.   
By contrast, a person who lacks receptivity is not simply unheeding or closed to 
things that might prompt her.  Instead, she does not welcome the occurrence of critical-
reflective thinking.  The unreceptive person is unavailable for critical-reflective thinking 
because she rejects or flees prompts’ invitations and/or refuses to question presuppositions.  
She may impede its occurrence actively or passively, either consciously rejecting prompts or 
casually ignoring them when they occur.  Usually, practical factors motivate a person’s lack 
of receptivity to critical-reflective thinking.  Busy-ness, for example, may cause people to 
refuse to think: busily working to finish a task (though the busy-ness is not so complete as to 
close them to prompts) makes them likely to refuse diversions of thinking, which would take 
them away from the task at hand.  The demands of other people, including pressures to 
conform to social presuppositions, also may contribute to a person’s lack of receptivity.  If a 
person expects to be interrupted by someone else, for example, she may be less likely to 
accept a prompt and begin critically-reflectively thinking.  Spending time in solitude, taking 
leisure, and having courage can help increase people’s receptivity to critical-reflective 
thinking and, thereby, increase the possibility of its occurrence.   
 Although I have assigned most of the cultivation strategies to the facilitation of 
either openness or receptivity, this is not meant to exclude the possibility that each 
cultivation strategy can also help people develop the other.  The categorization of the 
strategies points only to the fact that each of the strategies is more immediately relevant to 
openness or receptivity.  Nonetheless, having the opportunity to exercise receptivity requires 
first being open.  So, strategies that make a person more open may also encourage her to be 
more receptive.  And, vice versa, a person who is open may be even more likely to take part 
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in critical-reflective thinking if she is not only open, but also receptive.  One strategy I have 
not yet categorized is the virtue of fortitude.  Rather than facilitating openness or receptivity, 
fortitude makes one more proficient in critical-reflective thinking by increasing one’s ability 
to endure through thinking when it becomes a protracted and taxing process.  Throughout 
this chapter, I show how each strategy facilitates openness (as a basic availability for), 
receptivity (as being welcoming to), and proficiency (in carrying out) critical-reflective 
thinking.  
Before getting into a more detailed account of the strategies, a few words about the 
assumptions of this line of argument are warranted.  This approach to cultivating critical-
reflective thinking claims that self-development (and not the compulsion of prompts) can 
increase the likelihood that a person will take part in the activity and also help her gain 
aptitude for it.  No amount of self-development can, however, guarantee the occurrence of 
critical-reflective thinking, for it requires a prompt.  If prompts simply do not occur to 
someone, critical-reflective thinking will not take place.  This fact, however, should not 
dissuade people from working to develop themselves expressly for the sake of increasing 
critical-reflective thinking.  For, as Arendt says, “all events and facts” can “claim…our 
thinking attention” simply “by virtue of their existence.”292  Possible prompts, in other 
words, are ubiquitous.  Consequently, the problem is not that prompts do not occur, but 
that people are too distracted to attend to things that might prompt them or too stuck in 
their ways for prompts to appear relevant.  Given that the likelihood of prompts is high, 
cultivating critical-reflective is precisely a matter of both developing personal habits and 
putting oneself in circumstances conducive to their occurrence and accepting their 
invitations.  Though instituting personal change may sometimes be difficult, it is indisputable 
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that people can change through their own efforts and, as I will argue, develop openness, 
receptivity, and aptitudes that will make them more likely and better able to take part in 
critical-reflective thinking.  
 One possible objection to an approach of cultivating critical-reflective thinking 
through self-development is its apparent circularity.  It seems that one must become aware 
of one’s own unavailability in order to work toward altering factors (such as the way one 
usually spends time or how one approaches things) that cause it.  Although critical-reflective 
thinking can befall a person without any effort on her part to increase its possibility, this 
objection is specifically concerned with what might motivate a person to consciously work 
on cultivating its occurrence.  Reflectively noticing one’s closed-ness and/or disinclination to 
thinking and questioning their propriety could be seen as a necessary prerequisite of critical-
reflective thinking.  If so, it would appear that one must first take part in critical-reflective 
thinking in order to work on developing oneself for further critical-reflective thinking.  If, 
then, one is closed to critical-reflective thinking, entering the circle that would allow 
conscious self-development in ways conducive to critical-reflective thinking would be 
impossible.  Though a refutation of the circularity itself would obviate this consequence, it 
must also be noted that the consequence itself is unnecessary.  Even if consciously 
developing oneself were required to enter the circle, no one is ultimately and completely 
closed to critical-reflective thinking.  The assumption that a person could be utterly closed 
stands in opposition to the fundamental openness supported by an open horizonal account 
of human understanding (see Chapter Two above).  Because people have fundamentally 
open horizons, they may simply fall into the circle without attempting to make it happen.  
People are not, therefore, ultimately and utterly excluded from critically reflecting on their 
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own closed-ness, even if they are very closed.  Every person may be faced with entering the 
circle despite herself; that is, it might just happen.  
Another problem with the objection, however, is its claim that people must first 
become aware of and consider their own closed-ness in critical-reflective thought in order to 
consciously develop openness.  Although such awareness might motivate attempts at 
personal development and allow for a more targeted approach to self-development, one can 
also begin working toward more openness without encountering one’s closed-ness in critical 
reflection.  Attempts to work toward openness could spring from the recognition that one is 
somewhat closed together with a simple desire for more openness.  There are many ways, 
besides through critical-reflective thinking, that a person might become aware that he is 
closed (e.g. someone might inform him of this or he might realize that he ignored a 
possibility because he was set on something else).  In addition, one could choose to develop 
oneself by believing that openness would improve other facets of one’s life.  The desire for 
heightened awareness of one’s surroundings might be enough to make one want more 
openness.  Therefore, one need not participate in critical-reflective thinking to work toward 
openness.  The process of self-development is not circularly confined within the realm of 
critical-reflective thought.  Wanting, needing, or being eager to change the way one sees or 
goes about in the world may be prerequisite to conscious and intentional personal 
development.  These do not, however, necessarily rest upon an initial critical-reflective 
experience.   
In the four following sections, I will describe each cultivation strategy in turn and 
how it is conducive to critical-reflective thinking.  I will also describe practical activities that 
can help a person take up the way of being specified by each strategy.  Each strategy is a way 
of being.  Solitude, as described by Arendt and Thoreau, is not simply being alone, but 
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contains a dimension of being-with.  Leisure is not just having free time, but participating in 
activities with the possibility of diversion.  Having an open attitude is being available to see 
whatever one experiences in new and different ways.  And wakeful attentiveness is actively 
listening to what is going on and what it means.  As ways of being, these strategies are not 
always straightforwardly realizable.  By describing circumstances and activities through 
which people can realize them, however, Arendt, Heidegger, Thoreau, and Plato show how 
people can establish conditions for critical-reflective thinking through their own actions.  By 
practicing the ways of being described in the strategies, people can develop themselves in the 
corresponding ways.  I begin by turning to solitude as described by Arendt and Thoreau. 
SOLITUDE AND BEING-WITH 
 
Arendt writes that solitude is “the mode of existence present in this silent dialogue of 
myself with myself;” this silent dialogue defines Arendt’s notion of thinking.293  In Walden, 
Thoreau includes an entire chapter titled “Solitude.”  When he lived by Walden Pond, he 
was “as solitary…as on the prairies;” he had “a little world all to [himself].”294  Yet, he 
“experienced sometimes that the most sweet and tender, the most innocent and encouraging 
society may be found in any natural object” and such objects sometimes prompted him to 
think.295  While by himself during “long evening[s,]…many thoughts had time to take root 
and unfold themselves.”296  Though solitude is not a topic that undergoes scrutiny in 
Platonic dialogues, in the Republic, Book V, Socrates refers to “solitary walks” as the proper 
context for “feast[ing] upon [one’s] own thoughts.”297  Socrates’ habit of going off to stand 
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by himself to engage his thoughts298 also makes clear that there is something about solitude 
that made it an ideal context for his thinking.  Insofar as spending time alone makes one 
freer from distractions by other people, one can realize a kind of solitude that encourages 
receptivity to prompts that occur there.  Furthermore, one may become less inhibited by the 
need or desire to uphold society’s presuppositions and more open to questioning them when 
one gains distance from society itself and its pressures.  In this section, I will focus on 
Arendt and Thoreau since they offer explicit and detailed accounts of solitude and its 
connection to thinking.   
 When we imagine solitude, we may picture a hermit living alone in a hut or a cave 
situated far away from society, perhaps on a wooded hillside.  Indeed, being physically 
removed from other people can provide conditions favorable for critical-reflective thinking.  
Arendt and Thoreau agree that spending time in seclusion can provide space for attentive 
and deep mental engagement.  Both authors, however, complicate this representation of 
solitude.  For them, solitude is not simply being alone.  For in solitude, one is never 
completely alone299: one is still, according to Arendt, together with oneself or, in special 
cases, with other people and, according to Thoreau, with other natural beings, Nature, and 
God.  Moreover, thoughtful interaction with whatever or whoever else is present when one 
is by oneself inheres in their notions of solitude.  I will first describe Arendt’s and Thoreau’s 
characterizations of solitude.  Though they concur that solitude does not mean being 
completely alone, their views differ in what or who is still present when one is solitary.  Both 
views show how solitude, as a way of being, can facilitate active thoughtful engagement with 
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whatever is there.  In addition, they support the idea that being alone can facilitate solitude 
and, thereby, make way for critical-reflective thinking. 
Arendt defines solitude not simply as spending time alone, but as being “by” oneself.  
The word “by,” here means “with”: “Solitude means that though alone, I am together with 
somebody (myself, that is).”300  When a person is with herself in this sense, she actualizes an 
“inner dichotomy” that allows her to “ask questions of [her]self and receive answers.”301  In 
solitude, one realizes the conditions for conversing with oneself.  In fact, Arendt writes that 
thinking is solitude’s “corresponding activity.”302  This definition of solitude does not, 
however, deny the possibility that thinking can also take place when one is in dialogue with 
someone else.  For Arendt, people can take part in the solitude required for thinking in 
interpersonal conversations, though there is a caveat.  Interpersonal solitude is only possible 
when the other person is like a second self.  The other person must be intimately involved 
with thinking about the same things one had been considering by oneself.303  This model of 
interpersonal conversations parallels the solitude a person can have by herself.  In both 
cases, a self is, in effect, involved in conversing with itself; a collective self is present when 
two people are in solitude together.  When one thinks with another person, the other person 
plays the corresponding role of the second self, to whom one can pose questions and from 
whom one can receive answers.  Although thinking in conversation with other people is 
possible, for Arendt being addressed by someone else when one is in conversation with 
oneself effects a change that stops the activity of thinking.  When someone else addresses a 
person in solitude, she must respond.  This ends her discussion with herself and instead of 
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remaining two, she becomes one again.  The inner dichotomy disappears.304  Consequently, 
being away from others can help one actualize the inner dichotomy required for thoughtful 
self-conversation.   
Although critical-reflective thinking is not identical to Arendt’s notion of thinking as 
conversing, her explanation of how solitude enables thoughtful conversation provides 
evidence that solitude (as being with oneself) can also facilitate critical-reflective thought.  
When one is by oneself (or alone with another self), one can attend to and inquire into one’s 
own thoughts.  The questions one poses to oneself might prompt critical-reflective thinking.  
If one is already in conversation with oneself, one might also be able to dialogically examine 
a presupposition.   
Thoreau, too, expresses the idea that solitude is associated with the activity of 
thought when he writes, “A man thinking or working is always alone, let him be where he 
will.”305  Jeffrey Cramer, an editor and annotator of Walden, points out that in 1853 Thoreau 
wrote in his journal: “There is nothing so sanative, so poetic, as a walking the woods and 
fields even now, when I meet none abroad for pleasure.  Nothing so inspires me and excites 
such serene and profitable thought.”306  Thoreau’s also pronounces his personal love of 
solitude in Walden, where he says: “I never found the companion that was so companionable 
as solitude” and “I find it wholesome to be alone the greater part of the time.”307  He 
recognizes, however, that, for many, being alone, without company, is hardly bearable 
because it places them “at the mercy of [their] thoughts.”308  Though for Thoreau, like 
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Arendt, solitude is associated with the activity of thought, his notion of solitude differs from 
Arendt’s in an important way.  Solitude, though it makes way for thought, is not strictly 
dialogical thought with oneself or another self.   
Thoreau’s discussion of an “other self” that shows up when he is alone is radically 
different from Arendt’s description of the other self with whom one can converse. Though 
Thoreau also claims there is a “doubleness” in himself, the other self does not play the role 
of interlocutor, but spectator.309  The duality Thoreau mentions may initially appear to be 
similar to the inner dichotomy described by Arendt.  For Thoreau, however, the doubleness 
does not bring him into conversation with himself but makes him “remote from [him]self as 
from another.”310  The second aspect of himself is at once part of him and not part of him; it 
is a “spectator, sharing no experience, but taking note of it.”311  The spectator operates only 
as observer of the events of his life rather than a conversation partner with whom he can 
engage.  The spectator is strangely disinterested in what takes place, so much so that 
Thoreau claims, “When the play, it may be the tragedy, of life is over, the spectator goes his 
way.  It was a kind of fiction, a work of the imagination only, so far as he was concerned.”312  
This entity is very different from the other self that Arendt describes, i.e., another self that is 
also oneself, to whom one can pose questions and receive answers. 
In the absence of “human neighborhood,” however, Thoreau too finds society, 
though not specifically with himself.313  Though he was living alone by the pond, he remarks, 
“I had a great deal of company in my house; especially in the morning, when nobody 
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calls.”314  He also purportedly “experienced sometimes that the most sweet and tender, most 
innocent and encouraging society may be found in any natural object.”315  In an account of 
one rainy day when he began to feel lonely, Thoreau says, “Every little pine needle expanded 
and swelled with sympathy and befriended me.”316  In addition to the society he found with 
natural things, Thoreau says he had “a great deal of company in [his] house; especially in the 
morning, when nobody calls.”317  He mentions specifically “an old settler, and original 
proprietor, who is reported to have dug Walden Pond, and stoned it, and fringed it with pine 
woods” as well as an “elderly dame,[…] invisible to most persons, in whose odorous herb 
garden I love to stroll sometimes.”318  The old settler purportedly “tells [him] stories of old 
time and of new eternity” while the dame tells “the original of every fable, and on what fact 
every one is founded, for the incidents occurred when she was young.”319  The former figure 
can be taken to “represent a creative spirit or God” while the latter represents “Mother 
Nature or Demeter, the Greek goddess of agriculture, health, and birth.”320  Thoreau’s 
solitude did not make him completely alone: he was always in the company of natural things, 
God, and Nature. 
Solitude, as essentially a type of being-with, is not desolate or devoid of content.  If 
solitude meant being completely alone, it would actually block the possibility of critical-
reflective thinking.  For there would be nothing to provide a prompt or to become fodder 
for thought.  Solitude as being away from other people provides space to consider whatever 
is there.  I will discuss attentiveness more fully in “Fostering Wakeful Attentiveness” below.  
                                                
314 Ibid., 132. 
315 Ibid., 127. 
316 Ibid., 128. 
317 Ibid., 132. 
318 Ibid., 133. 
319 Ibid. 
320 Cramer, “Editorial Foototes,” 133f; Thoreau, Journal, 1: 293-294. 
 174 
Here, however, it is important to note that solitude can provide space that encourages 
attentiveness.  Being away from other people creates this space because one is less likely to 
be disturbed by others’ demands.  The presence of other people, and the need to be available 
to respond to them, can block one’s ability to begin thinking in the first place.  The need to 
respond anchors one to others and distracts from attending to thoughts and other 
phenomena.  It is difficult to solitarily slip away into self-conversation or a thoughtful reverie 
when one must tend to the addresses or needs of others.  Although people can think 
together, as Arendt claims, this is rare.  Others can also interrupt a person’s solitary 
engagement with her own thoughts.  As Philip Cafaro puts it, “being able to think for 
yourself […] may be helped by solitude, which to some degree forces us to think our own 
thoughts as the external stimuli of gossip and friendly chatter are removed.”321  Thinking can 
also be interrupted in such a way as to make returning to it very difficult or even impossible. 
Another benefit of solitude is that when one is alone, one might gain reflective 
distance from the presuppositions that prevail in society.  People often operate on the basis 
of shared presuppositions that underlie cultural practices and norms and also allow people to 
go about among one another with shared understanding.  When participating in society, one 
might be pressured to accept that society’s expectations.  This pressure can impede any 
motivation to reconsider operative presuppositions.  In addition, in conforming to a society’s 
norms and receiving praise (or even simple interpersonal understanding) for doing so, one 
might continue to default to the presuppositions in place.  Being in society can promote 
conformity rather than self-reflection and considered action.  As in Heidegger’s condition of 
das Man, without a second thought a person might simply do what the people around her 
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usually do because it is normatively accepted.  In solitude, one faces fewer pressures or 
expectations to uphold society’s presuppositions.  One may, thereby, become more receptive 
to critically reflecting upon them.   
Thoreau’s removal from society, in addition to providing him space for writing, 
allowed him to closely listen to and observe nature.  This also allowed him to become aware 
of and reflect upon many presuppositions of his society.  A recurrent locus of our inability to 
get beyond social values while in society is work, the topic John Farmer considered.  People 
in Thoreau’s Concord society, because they valued having nice houses, fine clothes, and 
foods like coffee and butter that, to Thoreau, were luxuries, had to spend much of their time 
working.  People took the value of these things and the necessity of working (and perhaps 
even the necessity of thinking about work) to get them for granted.  In, “The Bean-Field,” 
the chapter of Walden where Thoreau considers his own wage-earning labor (growing and 
harvesting beans during his first season at the pond) he poses the question: “why should not 
the New Englander try new adventures, and not lay so much stress on his grain, his potato 
and grass crop, and his orchards?—raise other crops than these?”322  The “other crops” he 
has in mind are the personal development of truthfulness, justice, and other virtues.  It might 
be objected that even in solitude people cannot really think in new ways, apart from the 
horizons within which they have grown up and that have been formed by their society and 
historical situation.  Though I agree that people cannot simply discard all of their grounding 
assumptions (or other aspects of their horizons) just by spending time alone, with being 
alone the pressure to adhere to norms may be loosened.  The way for independent thinking 
may be cleared when one gains distance from society. 
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Arendt, too, supports the idea that being away from others and alone with oneself 
can provide space where people might stop “cherish[ing] values and hold[ing] fast to moral 
norms and standards.”323  Arendt stresses the importance of being able to critically reflect 
upon and depart from social mores when one’s society institutes violence.  The people who 
turned out to be morally “reliable” during the Nazizeit were not those who measured 
themselves and their actions against the prevalent norms of Germany.324  The reliable people 
were those who “examine[d] things and [made] up their own minds,” using themselves as 
their standard “and not the world.”325  This may not have required physical separation from 
other people.  According to Arendt, however, it was solitary thought, where they posed 
questions to and received answers from themselves, that allowed them to judge themselves 
by their own compass rather than relying on the customary mores:  
they asked themselves to what extent they would still be able to live in peace 
with themselves after having committed certain deeds; they decided that it 
would be better to do nothing, not because the world would then be changed 
for the better, but simply because only on this condition could they go on 
living with themselves at all.326 
 
They inquired and answered their queries by considering the meaning of their actions apart 
from what the government demanded or what “respectable” members of society may have 
done.  They did this in solitude, without relying on the norms that guided many others. 
I have been discussing how physical separation from other people has the distinct 
advantages of providing both a space that is freer of socially normative demands and 
reflective distance from society’s presuppositions.  Being separate from other people does 
not, however, guarantee that one will gain these benefits.  Sometimes, even though one is 
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away from others, one may be unable to so shift one’s mental perspective as to gain distance 
from social presuppositions.  One might also continue to be distracted by other people even 
when alone.  This occurs, for example, when a person is preoccupied with a conversation 
that happened prior to her separation from society.  People can bring along other people and 
the distractions attached to them even when physically apart.   
People might also be uncomfortable with spending time alone due to the discomfort 
of loneliness.  It is, however, notable that for both Arendt and Thoreau solitude is not the 
same as loneliness.  Both authors contrast the existential experience of loneliness, the feeling 
of being completely alone and without others, to solitude.  For Arendt, loneliness occurs 
when one is not in thoughtful dialogue with oneself and one is also “unable to establish 
contact” with others.327  The loneliness of lacking the company of oneself or others can take 
place when one is “in the midst of a crowd” or when one is isolated from others.328  Thoreau 
relays an anecdote about his experience of loneliness:  
I have never felt lonesome, or in the least oppressed by a sense of solitude, 
but once, and that was a few weeks after I came to the woods, when, for an 
hour, I doubted if the near neighborhood of man was not essential to a 
serene and healthy life.  To be alone was something unpleasant.  But I was at 
the same time conscious of a slight insanity in my mood, and seemed to 
foresee my recovery.  In the midst of a gentle rain while these thoughts 
prevailed, I was suddenly sensible of such sweet and beneficent society in 
Nature, in the very pattering of the drops, and in every sound and sight 
around my house […]329 
 
Here, Thoreau describes that even though being alone usually did not make him lonely, on 
this occasion, solitude made him feel “unpleasant.”  His feeling cannot be equated to 
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solitude, though it grew out of his separation from other humans.  Eventually, however, as 
he tarried with his loneliness and considered whether being around humans was necessary to 
a “serene and healthy life,” he recognized the natural companions all around him.  This 
shows that, for Thoreau, loneliness is neither the same as solitude nor implied by it.   
Arendt, however, cautions us about one possible “vice of solitude.”330  Solitude can 
become a vicious loneliness wherein a person loses touch with herself, other people, and 
actual conditions of life in the world.  Loneliness can breed reliance on “the only capacity of 
the human mind which needs neither the self nor the other nor the world in order to 
function safely and which is as independent of experience as it is of thinking,” namely, 
“logical reasoning.”331  Logical reasoning is all that is left when one’s relationships to oneself 
and others have been lost and cannot be found again.  Arendt describes logical reasoning as, 
“the inner coercion whose only content is the strict avoidance of contradictions that seems 
to confirm a man’s identity outside all relationships with others.”332  If a lonely person 
reaches this extreme of disconnection from herself and others, she might slip into logical 
reasoning.  Logical reasoning poses great dangers for humans as social and political beings 
because it attempts to consider things from outside actual conditions of communality.  In 
logical reasoning, one has concern only for non-contradiction and is oblivious to actual 
conditions.  According to Arendt, loneliness and logical reasoning can even drive a person to 
tyrannical tendencies and prepare lonely masses to accept totalitarian control.333  Though I 
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find it unlikely that such consequences will obtain in many cases of loneliness, I accept the 
idea that being alone can make a person feel isolated and detached from other people and 
the world around her.  For this reason, human life may not always be benefited by separation 
from others (especially if one experiences the discomfort of loneliness or takes up logical 
reasoning as a primary way of thinking).  
Although critical-reflective thinking might often be a solitary activity, it occurs in the 
context of society and traditions. 334   In critical-reflective thinking, people consider 
presuppositions that underlie their existence in a world among others, many of which may 
also be shared by these others.  Furthermore, people’s thinking is informed by their worlds 
and experiences, which are unavoidably imbued with sociality and history.  And the 
occurrence of prompts itself often takes place through other people or phenomena in the 
world.  Critical-reflective thinking, consequently, is not a completely individual activity.  
Even when people who take part in it might consider presuppositions that are unique to 
them and come to idiosyncratic conclusions, they do not transcend the social world of which 
they are members.  So, although critical-reflective thinking can be a solitary activity and 
approaching it through solitude may seem to make it more so, practicing it does not (and 
cannot) require radical separation or radical distinction from other people.         
Those who wish to actualize solitude need not become hermits and live in caves in 
forested mountainsides.  In fact, it is not impossible to achieve the solitude Arendt and 
Thoreau describe while remaining in society, though it might be more difficult.  But being 
away from other people does increase one’s ability to engage oneself in conversation and to 
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be with other phenomena, for example, natural objects or one’s own thoughts.  People 
might achieve solitude by taking brief hiatuses from society.  People can do this by taking a 
walk or sitting in a remote area.  If remote spaces are not easily accessible, people can also 
simply remove themselves to a quiet room or a carrel in the library stacks where there are 
not many other people and those who are there are quietly engaged in their own projects.  
Though completely avoiding people may be impossible, finding a quiet and secluded space is 
usually possible and can decrease the possibility of interruptions.  Today, entering solitude by 
removing oneself from society faces the additional challenges posed by modern 
telecommunications.  The ubiquity of smartphones and other communication devices put 
people at the disposal of others at all times.  Turning off these devices, however, can easily 
cancel this constant availability to others via calls, texts, and other messages.  This simple 
step can put one out of range of the constant contact prevalent in today’s world.  Removing 
and disconnecting oneself can help one achieve solitude by limiting distraction and 
encouraging independent thought.  When one is not attending to others, one may become 
more openly attentive to thoughts and other phenomena that issue prompts or pose 
challenges to one’s presuppositions.  These aspects of separation from people increase the 
possibility of solitude as being-with.  Being with oneself, one’s thoughts, and other 
phenomena is a kind of receptive mental engagement and it can open the way for critical-
reflective thinking.    
BEING LEISURELY 
 
Similar to the way solitude can limit distraction by others and pressures to adhere to 
society’s presuppositions, leisure limits the demands of goal-oriented activity.  Leisure is a 
way of going about or performing tasks that permits diversion.  Leisure is not the same as 
free time.  Free time can be (and often is) something people fill with activities that pursue 
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specific aims and from which diversion is difficult.  Critical-reflective thinking, however, 
often requires ceasing another activity or task.  Taking up new or further activities (whether 
during free time or not) thus may obstruct the possibility of taking the divergent path that is 
thinking.  When, by contrast, one comports oneself in a leisurely way, one does not hurry 
and is not doggedly directed toward specific ends.  By permitting diversion in the midst of 
busy-ness, leisure can make a person more receptive to taking up critical-reflective thinking, 
though it might require turning away from the task at hand.  In leisure, one is available for 
what might come along and attract one’s attention and does not strictly direct energy and 
effort toward the completion of specific pre-determined tasks or goals.  This allows one to 
receptively welcome prompts rather than refusing their invitations in favor of another 
activity.   
The Greek notion of leisure, “scholé,” can assist in clarifying certain conditions that 
help a person be more leisurely in a way that is conducive to critical-reflective thinking.  
Arendt and Plato describe scholé as the condition of being free of worldly concerns (i.e. 
concerns of the body, politics, working to make money, and social demands).  Plato uses 
scholé in his dialogues to describe freedom from everyday concerns and for philosophizing.  
Arendt, too, uses this term in The Human Condition to describe freedom from work and labor.  
When one is free of these things, one can take part in activities that do not aim at (or need 
not be compelled to) achieve particular goals or complete certain tasks.  Such activities allow 
for divergence into thought if prompts come along and grant the time needed to take up 
lengthy explorations in thought.  Of course, not having to spend time taking care of the 
body, politics, work, and social demands does not in itself constitute leisurely comportment.  
One might be free from all such tasks and still anxiously seek to fill time with other activities 
that are just as inimical to thought.  In this section, I will contrast recreation, wherein a 
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person fills time with goal-oriented or rule-bound activities that do not permit diversion, 
with leisure practices.  I will also argue, however, that leisure as a comportment in which 
people are receptive to thinking cannot be attained simply be achieving scholé.  Leisure is not 
doing any particular activity, but doing an activity in a leisurely way in which one may 
welcome diversion.  If one can practice leisure, one becomes more receptive to prompts in 
the midst of other activities. 
Annette Holba, in her book, Transformative Leisure, elaborates a distinction between 
leisure and recreation.  For Holba, neither recreation nor leisure is a specific activity, but 
instead ways of carrying out an activity.  When one practices recreation, one strives to 
achieve a specific end.  A recreational activity is limited by rules and strictly oriented toward 
achieving specific goals.  Playing sports or board games is a good example of recreation.  
Each of these usually has rules and a well-defined endpoint that prescribes how to 
participate in and complete the activity.335  In a game of Clue, for example, players compete 
to be the first to find out what weapon wielded by whom and in which room resulted in the 
murder of Mr. Nobody.  Clue is the game it is by virtue of its rules and defined endpoint, and 
abiding by the rules and aiming toward the game’s goal limits availability for interruptions.  
Sports games might be even more impervious to interruptions than board games.  Even 
when a clock malfunctions or a player is injured, the remaining players must “keep their 
heads in the game,” and the game must be played to its time-limited completion.  True, 
interruptions that might lead to critical-reflective thinking can still take place in the midst of 
recreation.  Such strictly goal-oriented activities that already presume specific, well-defined 
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goals and/or a linear progression, however, largely hinder the participants’ receptivity to 
diversion.336 
Though we may think of recreation activities as free time where anything can 
happen, such activities are in reality usually closed to diversion.  Recreation practices often 
generate the same closed-ness as does everyday busy-ness: being set on a path from which 
one cannot turn away and wander onto others.  One’s orientation in recreation is not 
welcoming to the kind of diversion that is conducive to critical-reflective thinking.  In 
contemporary recreation practices, people often schedule their free time full of activities and 
tasks that can be important to personal fulfillment but do not facilitate receptivity to 
thought.   
Many people today approach free time recreationally, with specific aims to which 
they strictly adhere.  Whether they, for example, play games, work out, go hiking, meet with 
friends, make crafts, or listen to music, they usually take up these activities in a goal-oriented 
way that blocks the possibility of diversion and instantiates recreation rather than leisure.  If 
people approach free time with plans and goals from which they are determined not to stray, 
free time is purposed rather than available for what might befall them.  This is not to say that 
people cannot become leisurely in the midst of these activities.  One could also approach 
these activities in a leisurely way.  If one practices hiking, for example, in a leisurely way, one 
is less bound to achieve the goals of summiting the peak or reaching the waterfall, for 
example.  Taking a leisurely hike would mean that if some other side path catches one’s eye, 
one might take it.  Or, if a prompt occurs one might accept it and switch one’s attention 
from following the path to considering what prompts and calls for thought.  Thinking while 
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hiking does not preclude the hiker continuing hiking and even reaching the summit or falls.  
Thinking while hiking merely requires allowing one’s focus to wander and perhaps be 
claimed by prompts or other phenomena rather than committing one’s mental resources to 
keeping to the pre-chosen path.  Alternatively, one could also stop hiking while thinking and 
begin hiking again once it has run its course.   
In relation to critical-reflective thinking, leisure is a comportment that increases the 
likelihood that a person will accept prompts and take part in critical-reflective thought in the 
midst of other activities.  Both Plato and Arendt employ the term scholé (translated into 
English as “leisure”) to describe conditions that are conducive to what I am calling “leisure” 
as a way of carrying on activities.  In scholé, one is free from the concerns of the body, such 
as taking care of one’s basic needs (e.g. eating) and providing for their satisfaction (e.g. by 
earning money or shopping).  One is also free from political concerns, which are related to 
the body in that they affect one’s physical and social existence.  For Plato, scholé is requisite 
for doing philosophy.  In the Phaedo, he writes,  
Only the body and its desires cause war, civil discord and battles, for all wars 
are due to the desire to acquire wealth, and it is the body and the care of it, to 
which we are enslaved, which compel us to acquire wealth, and all this makes 
us too busy to practice philosophy.337 
 
When people are busy meeting the needs and desires of bodily existence, according to 
Socrates, they do not have time to philosophize.  Arendt further elaborates the meaning of 
scholé based on her knowledge of Ancient Greek culture.  In The Human Condition, she writes 
that it is “not simply leisure time,” but a condition in which one is free from “political 
activity,” “labor and life’s necessities,” and, even more generally, “worries and cares.”338  As 
Arendt notes, having the leisure that is scholé is not only about having enough money to take 
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care of one’s needs.  Although having financial resources might make it easier to be leisurely, 
taking part in politics as a citizen of Athens was time-consuming and could be stressful.  So 
freedom from politics was also a condition for winning scholé. 
In the Phaedrus, Plato offers an example that shows how scholé can be conducive to 
critical-reflective thinking.  In the dialogue, Phaedrus and Socrates meet by chance, and 
Phaedrus asks Socrates if “he is free [has scholé] to come along and listen.”339  Socrates agrees 
to accompany Phaedrus, and they take a walk outside the wall of the city and critically engage 
the topic of love.  Their freedom from meeting other needs by, for example, taking part in 
political debates or earning money, allowed them to spend the day talking near the edge of 
the river outside of town.340  During their walk, Phaedrus shares Lysias’s speech on the 
dangers of consorting with a lover.  According to the speech, because lovers are those who 
have been inspired by the god of love, Eros, and are therefore possessed by the madness of 
passion, they tend to exhibit erratic behavior and can even hurt or embarrass the objects of 
their affection.  Initially, both Socrates and Phaedrus agree with this assessment.  Socrates 
even gives a speech that favors many of Lysias’s ideas as presented in the speech.  After 
having expressed the dangers of spending time with a lover, Socrates intends to leave off 
speaking and walk back to the city.  Phaedrus, however, asks him to continue, and Socrates 
undergoes a prompt by his daimon.  Socrates concludes that he must stay and give another 
speech because the speech he delivered previously was “foolish” and “close to being 
impious” because it had spoken ill of the god, Eros.341  Had Socrates not had the time and 
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freedom from other concerns to walk about talk with Phaedrus, he might not have been 
available to experience and consciously accept his daimon’s prompt.   
Thoreau, too, believed that freedom from everyday concerns is a condition that 
encourages the possibility of a leisurely approach that clears the way for the activity of 
thinking.  In his journal, he wrote, “What is leisure but opportunity for more complete and 
entire action?”342  For Thoreau, complete and entire action includes such activities as writing 
poetry, becoming divinely aware, and taking part in intellectual activity. 343  One such 
intellectual activity, for which leisure afforded the opportunity and in which he took part, 
was critical-reflective thinking.  Via his move away from the town and his two-year 
“sojourn” by Walden Pond, he was able to attain leisure in the sense of scholé.  By physically 
distancing himself from the town and living in solitude, he left behind the demands of 
society.  He also, thereby, created free time wherein he was able to go about without strict 
concern for many everyday concerns.  
Although he had to plant beans during the first summer in order to have food, 
Thoreau did not have many other obligations at the pond.  He did not need to earn wages in 
order to support his lifestyle.344  This enabled him to spend his time otherwise than a city-
dweller normally would.  He recounts days when he, sat  
in [his] sunny doorway from sunrise till noon, rapt in a revery, amidst the 
pines and hickories and sumachs, in undisturbed solitude and stillness, while 
the birds sang around or flitted noiseless through the house, until by the sun 
falling in at [his] west window, or the noise of some traveller's wagon on the 
distant highway, [he] was reminded of the lapse of time.345 
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Thoreau did not consider these hours to have been spent in mere idleness or to have been 
wasted time.  For, though he “accomplished” nothing, he participated in what he calls 
“contemplation,” wherein he was simply present and aware of his surroundings.346  “During 
these seasons,” according to Thoreau, he grew “like corn in the night, and [the hours]… 
were far better than any work of the hands would have been.”347  
Thoreau’s experiment of living by the pond illustrates that leisure can facilitate 
critical-reflective thinking.  He distanced himself from the concerns and demands of the 
town and took up a lifestyle that was not always already imbued with particular goals.  
Thoreau, thereby, gained freedom from the concerns that define a specific and predefined 
trajectory for his days and became receptive to heeding and thoughtfully considering what 
presented itself and prompted thought: Nature, his own emotions, sounds, sights, etc.  
Without the pressure of time and striving to reach specific, pre-defined goals, Thoreau 
became more receptive than he probably would have been in quotidian Concord life.  
Both Socrates and Thoreau achieved a leisurely comportment that made way for 
critical-reflective thinking (among other activities such as philosophizing in conversation and 
writing).  Their leisure was not, however, only due to freedom from everyday concerns.  
Freedom from serving the needs and desires of the body does not automatically make a 
person welcome diversion.  A person might take aim at achieving other ends (e.g. having a 
well kept garden or finishing reading a book) in her free time and pursuing these tasks may 
be just as closed to critical-reflective thinking as is taking up those that serve the needs of the 
body.  Even when people have free time away from work, they often choose to fill it with 
recreation activities such as working out to achieve personal fitness goals or cooking a 
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specific recipes (whose success relies not only on attention to detail and time allotted for the 
cooking process, but also acquiring required ingredients and cookware) that are all but 
invulnerable to diversion.  Scholé, as freedom from everyday concerns, may provide material 
conditions for the possibility of realizing a leisurely comportment and even encourage its 
occurrence.  It does not itself, however, directly establish leisure.   
If leisure is not reducible to simply being free from everyday concerns, how can 
people realize it?  People can realize a leisurely comportment in almost any activity as long as 
they go into it with receptivity to diversion.  Taking up activities in which one already often 
notices that one is divert-able or interruptible might be the easiest way to realize a leisurely 
comportment.  One person’s leisure activity might be reading books, whereby she both 
engages with ideas that might prompt her and allows herself to wander off into exploring 
them (at least when reading the book cover-to-cover or finding some specific piece of 
information as quickly as possible is not the primary goal).  Another person might find 
leisure in painting or hiking or listening to music.  If her mind can take up other threads that 
present themselves while she is involved in these activities, they might allow her to be 
receptive to prompts and to accepting their invitation to think.  As when pursuing solitude, a 
person, by taking up activities that facilitate leisure, might become more attuned to her 
thoughts and the phenomena around her.  This might permit her to be more leisurely in 
general (i.e., during other activities) or to be more receptive to prompts and phenomena in 
other circumstances.   
Although I have focused on the possibility of developing receptivity through solitude 
and leisure, it should be noted that these strategies could also contribute to a person’s 
openness.  Being away from other people and being less focused on completing specific 
tasks and provide contexts wherein a person might be more mindful of other things around 
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her so that they might issue prompts in the first place.  People can, however, more directly 
strive for mindful openness to prompts.  A person can, for instance, take up an open 
attitude that allows things to appear in new ways and by wakefully attending to them.  I turn 
now to these cultivation strategies.  
AN OPEN ATTITUDE (INSPIRED BY GELASSENHEIT) 
 
A person can approach things, herself, thoughts, people, and other experiences in 
many different ways, for example, with closed-ness and hostility, with eager curiosity, with 
bored disinterest, or even with open letting-be.  Perhaps the most obvious strategy for 
cultivating critical-reflective thinking is to develop a more open attitude that makes one 
more available for prompts and considering notions one usually takes as true.  Heidegger’s 
concept, Gelassenheit, most often translated into English as “releasement,” provides a starting 
point for working out what an open attitude is and how it fosters openness.  For Heidegger, 
Gelassenheit allows people to let things be rather than forcing things to conform to 
presuppositions.  Being gelassen (or, released) is being open to things appearing in new ways.  
If things are allowed to appear in ways that contrast with a person’s present way of 
understanding, they might prompt a person to think.  Heidegger’s technical use of the term 
“Gelassenheit,” however, poses a problem.  Gelassenheit is a mood or “fundamental 
attunement” that a person realizes only when it befalls her. 348  If Gelassenheit is not something 
people can agentically develop or practice, it cannot qualify as a strategy for cultivating 
critical-reflective thinking.  Cultivating critical-reflective thinking by exercising an attitude 
akin to Gelassenheit (and inspired by Heidegger’s notion) is something Heidegger might call 
“existentiell” (i.e., it has to do with humans as entities in the world rather than with their 
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existential being).349  I propose that we can also understand Gelassenheit as an open attitude 
that can be realized through our own attempts.  By adopting this attitude, a person allows 
things to appear in ways that may not match her presuppositions about them.  In this, the 
person is open to the possibility that things she encounters will prompt her by presenting 
themselves in ways that challenge her to think.  Here, I will first describe Heidegger’s notion 
of Gelassenheit and then describe it as an adoptable attitude.  
When used in common German parlance, Gelassenheit means “‘calm composure,’ 
especially and originally that which accompanies an existential or religious experience of 
letting-go, being-let, and letting-be.”350  For Heidegger, being gelassen is not simply a matter of 
having a calm demeanor.  As noted above, it has to do with how a person relates to and 
experiences things.  When one is gelassen, one lets things be and allows them to appear from 
out of themselves rather than forcing them to conform to one’s present way of 
understanding or acting.  Gelassenheit, in effect, releases people from the way they usually 
understand things, people, their own experiences, and the world around them and opens 
them to being struck differently by these entities.  Though signs of Heidegger’s interest in 
Gelassenheit can be found throughout his corpus,351 Gelassenheit receives special attention in his 
post-war works.  The most prominent descriptions are in the “Memorial Address” and 
Country Path Conversations.  In the “Memorial Address,” Heidegger describes Gelassenheit as a 
dual releasement: from calculative thinking—which (like the essence of technology) has the 
primary characteristics of ordering things and calculating how they might be most efficiently 
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or productively used—to things themselves.  This accords with Heidegger’s description of 
phenomenology in the Introduction to Being and Time, where he defines phenomenology as 
“to let what shows itself be seen from itself, just as it shows itself from itself.” 352  
Accordingly, being released to things means letting things show themselves so that they 
appear as they are even if how they are does not correspond to one’s usual understanding of 
them. 
In his 1953 essay, “The Question Concerning Technology,” Heidegger carries out 
just such a reflection on a hydroelectric plant on the Rhine River whose energy the plant 
harnesses.  People do not often reflect upon the meanings of power plants; they usually just 
pass them by, unnoticing, as unremarkable parts of the modern world.  When a person is 
gelassen, normal, everyday objects might strike her in new ways.  In the essay, Heidegger sees 
the power plant as an exemplar of the ordering and production inherent in the modern 
technological way things are revealed.  The hydroelectric plant is the harnesser of the river’s 
energy.  This also discloses the modern technological mindset that sees the Rhine as a source 
of energy rightfully commanded by humans.353  Gelassenheit may have allowed Heidegger to 
let the hydroelectric plant and Rhine be, so that they could disclose their technological 
meanings to him.       
Gelassenheit more explicitly takes place for the interlocutors in the triadic Country Path 
Conversation.  In this Conversation, the things to which the interlocutors become released are 
the conversation itself and its topic, thinking.  The Guide suggests that the interlocutors 
participate in a sort of non-willing instead of willfully planning out the course of their 
conversation and forcing it in a certain direction.  In the course of their discussion, they 
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become released from forcefully directing their talk.  They allow the conversation to move 
on its own and allow themselves to engage in it, wherever it goes.  They become released to 
its movement and the topics that appear there.  If Gelassenheit allows people to let things be 
so that things can appear in new ways, it might allow people to experience prompts more 
readily and to follow out the thinking that can result from them.  By becoming gelassen, 
people might thus become more prone to critical-reflective thinking.   
Gelassenheit, thus, increases peoples’ openness to encountering things in ways that are 
not based on their presuppositions.  When people realize Gelassenheit, they let things be 
rather than automatically understanding them via their presuppositions.  This opens the 
possibility that something could appear in a way that would challenge their understanding.  
Such a challenge could then prompt a person to think and to consider her presuppositions.   
Heidegger offers an example of this process in the triadic Country Path Conversation, 
where one of the interlocutors, the Scientist, becomes gelassen (released) in the course of the 
conversation and leaves behind his initial understanding of thinking.  At the beginning of the 
dialogue, the Scientist understands thinking as cognition.  Once the conversation partners 
have allowed the conversation to takes its course, however, they consider other possible 
ways of understanding thinking.  Eventually, the Scientist “summarizes” what the 
interlocutors have discovered: “Thinking would then be a coming-into-nearness to the 
far.”354  By this, the Scientists means that thinking is an activity in which a thinker becomes 
closer to something that is usually far away.  What is usually far away and unapparent shows 
itself and the thinker gains insight into it.  This is a clear departure from his presupposition 
that the essence of thinking is cognition.  Furthermore, when asked by the Guide and 
Scholar how he was able to devise this new notion of thinking, the Scientist describes his 
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experience as becoming “released [losgelassen] from representing” and “released over to 
[überlassen] the open-region.”355  Though the etymological relationship between losgelassen, 
überlassen, and Gelassenheit is obvious, the Guide also clarifies what the Scientist means: “You 
attempted, if I surmise correctly, to let yourself be involved in releasement.”356  Though this 
statement may make it appear as though people can realize Gelassenheit through attempts to 
do so, the interlocutors agree that Gelassenheit has been occasioned by their conversation.  
That is, they did not cause it but were, rather, brought “onto that path which seems to be 
nothing other than releasement itself” in their conversation.357   
According to Heidegger, the difficulty in attaining Gelassenheit is that it is an 
“attunement” or “mood” (Stimmung).  Attunements cannot be realized by sheer will.  In The 
Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, Heidegger offers general descriptions of what he means by 
attunement: “Attunement is […] the way of our being there with one another” as well as 
with things.358  Attunements (e.g., liveliness or grief) affect people like moods.  They color a 
person’s atmosphere, giving it a certain quality.  “A human being who,” for example, “is in 
good humour brings a lively atmosphere with them” while one who grieves might bring 
sadness and emptiness along when encountering others and things. 359   In addition, 
attunement constitutes contexts in which people go about; it is not a “side-effect of our 
thinking, doing, and acting.  It is […] the ‘medium’ within which [such things] first 
happen.”360   
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Daniel Dahlstrom, author of The Heidegger Dictionary, interprets attunements as 
follows: “Moods are different ways in which we are oriented to this or that […].  They affect 
how the world and entities within the world appear to us, e.g. as inviting or irritating, 
enthralling or threatening.”361  An attunement (or, mood) provides a “state of mind” that 
colors how a person experiences things.362  In addition to grief and liveliness, Heidegger 
describes other attunements such as fear, anxiety, and boredom.  We can imagine how each 
of these would bear on how a person goes about.  Fear, for example, might make things 
around one appear scarier than usual and, perhaps, motivate one to avoid places or people 
that might contribute to one’s unease. When one is bored, Heidegger says, “time becomes 
drawn out” and one might attempt to escape boredom by “welcoming highly important and 
essential preoccupations for the sole reason that they take up [one’s] time.” 363   The 
attunement of Gelassenheit mediates one’s world by neutralizing how things usually appear, 
that is, on the basis of human presuppositions, knowledge, or desire.  In Gelassenheit, a 
person allows things to be and to appear from out of themselves.  
For Heidegger, attunements are neither “matters […] of our choice nor our 
making.”364  “Instead,” Dahlstrom writes, “they come over us as a part of our thrownness 
into the world,” and “if we try to adopt a certain attitude toward others, we may tap into or 
awaken latent moods, but the mere decision to adopt such an attitude cannot of itself 
produce a mood.”365  Heidegger poses the rhetorical questions: “Attunements—are they not 
something we can least of all invent, something that comes over us, something that we 
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cannot simply call up?  Do they not form of their own accord, as something we cannot 
forcibly bring about, but into which we slip unawares?”366  His answer is as follows: “If so, 
then we cannot and may not forcibly bring about such an attunement artificially or 
arbitrarily, if we are going to allow it to be an attunement.  It must already be there.”367   
Bret Davis, in his book, Heidegger and the Will: On the Way to Gelassenheit, focuses on 
the attunement at hand.  In describing Gelassenheit, Davis goes even further than Dahlstrom, 
defining it as a “fundamental attunement.”  For Davis, fundamental attunements constitute 
what we know as human life.  Fundamental attunements are more than moods that can 
change day-to-day.  They shape the way people see and go about the world so deeply that 
altering a fundamental attunement would amount to a radical shift in their way of being.  
Gelassenheit, as Davis describes it, is “non-willing,” which cannot “be determined as willing, 
not-willing, deferred-willing, or covert-wiling.”368  Each of these is still a type of willing, 
whereas non-willing involves a radical separation from the will.  Davis writes, “the prefix 
‘non-,’ as distinct from the simple negation of a ‘not-’ or the polar opposition of an ‘anti-,’ 
expresses a radical negation; and thus ‘non-willing’ would indicate a region of Gelassenheit 
outside and other than the entire domain of the will.”369  These statements represent Davis’s 
central thesis that Gelassenheit—though attempts to fully understand it without, separation 
from the standpoint of willing, which is the fundamental attunement that defines 
contemporary life and thought, are hopeless—is a state beyond “activity and passivity.”370  In 
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fact, entering this state requires “twisting free” from our contemporary way of being and a 
“leap” into a new beginning.371  According to Heidegger, radical shifts such as this are not 
possible except through a new sending of being.  A new “granting,” wherein a way of being 
and revealing of beings is granted, cannot be realized through human activities alone.372  It 
must take place as an event.373    
Though Davis argues that becoming gelassen, in the sense of non-willing, requires a 
radical shift, he also suggests that Gelassenheit could be something less extreme, namely, a 
practical stance that allows people to comport themselves toward other people and beings 
more attentively.  Gelassenheit as a practical stance is not something Heidegger describes.  To 
justify considering Gelassenheit thus, Davis notes that his project attempts to think after 
Heidegger.  In an article published in Martin Heidegger: Key Concepts, Davis considers 
Gelassenheit as it relates to the will.  At the end of the article, he writes: 
what might a “democracy to come” (Derrida) look like were it to be infused 
with an interpersonal attunement of Gelassenheit?  Presumably, such a politics 
of non-willing would take the form of a democracy based on mutually 
attentive conversation rather than intersubjective litigation, a dialogical 
sharing of voices rather than procedural compromises between will-fully 
antagonistic subjectivities.374 
 
In this passage, Davis claims that if Gelassenheit were realized in political life, people might 
more often discuss and explore matters together, rather than carrying out contentious 
proceedings that are oriented toward serving their individual agendas.  We might not wish to 
go so far—as Davis does—as to disparage willing or take up the idealistic view that people 
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might abandon subjectivity in order to work together.  Davis’s description of how 
Gelassenheit could work in a political context still, however, indicates that the term 
“Gelassenheit” is a good name for an attitude that can be adopted and developed.  Davis 
anticipates this idea and elaborates Gelassenheit along these lines.  He writes, 
But could such a political attunement be established?  How could it, after all, 
be regulated, much less enforced?  Perhaps, rather, we must continuously 
find ways to resolutely yet gently infuse the safety-net proceduralism of 
liberal democracy with a fundamental attunement of Gelassenheit through 
meditative thinking and practice, responsive education and responsible social 
critique, and the cultivation of forums for open-minded conversation 
between individuals and groups.  A fully engaged Gelassenheit would in these 
ways be always on the way to carefully letting other humans, among other 
beings, be.375 
 
Davis proposes that Gelassenheit as a political attunement can be developed through practical 
actions.  People can cultivate it, he says, through meditative thinking and practice, responsive 
education, responsible social critique, and dialogue in open-minded forums.  Even if a 
person cannot compel herself to be gripped by the attunement of Gelassenheit, she can in 
principle approach things with an attitude of Gelassenheit.  She can adopt an attitude of 
Gelassenheit by consciously inquiring into and exploring whatever she experiences rather than 
presumptively understanding and treating them as she usually does.  Inquiring into things 
with openness to the possibility that they might appear otherwise than one usually 
encounters them avails one of the possibility that they might pose challenges to one’s 
understanding and prompt critical-reflective thinking.  Such openness can contribute to 
one’s ability to exercise receptivity by more readily heeding prompts.  After the following 
section, I will return to a discussion of Heidegger’s understanding of meditative thinking and 
practice to show how it can facilitate the development of an open attitude.  I put this topic 
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on hold to first discuss wakeful attentiveness, another cultivation strategy that can also be 
developed through the practice of meditative thinking. 
FOSTERING WAKEFUL ATTENTIVENESS 
 
Arendt and Thoreau both treat actively attending to phenomena as central to 
thinking.  Indeed, by paying attention to whatever is going on around one, one is particularly 
open to things that might issue prompts.  Though Arendt calls it “attention” and Thoreau 
calls it “wakefulness,” they both describe it as a kind of “listening,” to oneself or other 
phenomena.  I have combined their terms and call this active mental awareness of 
phenomena “wakeful attentiveness.”  Being wakefully attentive is different from simply 
having an open attitude.  Whereas adopting an open attitude makes one available to see 
things in ways other than how they initially present themselves (i.e., in accord with one’s 
presuppositions), wakeful attentiveness is active listening and observation.  When a person is 
attentive, she is more aware of the things and people around her as well as her own 
experiences.  If she is both open (in the sense of Gelassenheit) and attentively aware, the 
concentrated focus she gives to things around her can facilitate their striking her in new 
ways.  Wakeful attentiveness might allow a person’s experiences to strike her as prompts or 
to offer evidence relevant to considering presuppositions.  In what follows, I will discuss 
Arendt’s and Thoreau’s views in turn and show how wakeful attentiveness encourages 
critical-reflective thinking.  
 In Willing, the second volume of The Life of the Mind, Arendt provides a description of 
how attention works at the base level of perception and shows how attentive perception is a 
prerequisite for critical examination.  For Arendt, attentiveness is fundamental to thinking 
because it allows one to perceive objects for thought, including one’s own thoughts.  In 
Willing, she describes Augustine’s views on perception.  Augustine distinguished between 
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three things that make up perception: the object perceived, the vision (or other sense 
experience) of the object, and “the power that fixes the sense […] on the object.”376  Arendt 
asserts that the power Augustine mentions is a matter of will and calls it the “attention of the 
mind.”377  She writes: “Without the latter, a function of the Will, we have only sensory 
“impressions” without any actual perceiving of them […]. The “attention of the mind” is 
needed to transform sensation into perception.”378  Here, sensation can be interpreted as 
consciousness of something while perception is thematic noticing.  This is clear when 
Arendt says “attention” “first unites our sense organs with the real world in a meaningful way, 
and then drags, as it were, this outside world into ourselves and prepares it for further 
mental operations: to be remembered, to be understood, to be asserted or denied.”379  We 
may think of perception as a fairly baseline activity, under Arendt’s description it is a 
fundamental prerequisite of more complex considerations.  Focusing attention on whatever 
appears brings it to mind so as to make it available to be examined in thought.  If one does 
not attend to the things one experiences, they might remain mere impressions, affecting one 
in some way without becoming available for reflective criticism.  According to Arendt, 
consequently, paying attention to things by bringing them into thematic awareness, is a 
prerequisite for thinking about them.  
 Augustine’s explanation of perception bears on critical-reflective thinking because 
attentiveness increases explicit awareness of objects, which in turn increases the likelihood 
that they will prompt one or that one will discover things to weigh in questioning 
presuppositions.  Arendt relates Augustine’s statements about the importance of 
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attentiveness closer to her understanding of thinking by also showing how attentiveness can 
help one have a thoughtful dialogue with oneself.  She does this by citing Kant’s Anthropology.  
In the Anthropology, Kant describes thinking as “talking with oneself […] hence also inwardly 
listening.”380  By listening to one’s own thoughts, one becomes aware of the ways in which 
one initially understands something.  This process could disclose a presupposition.  
Thematic awareness of what one takes as true can also sometimes alert one to the possibility 
that what it concerns could be otherwise.  Perhaps such attentive listening facilitated 
Arendt’s own formulation and investigation of the philosophical and political questions that 
struck her.  
 Arendt’s close attention to Eichmann’s statements and the actions of others in Nazi 
Germany allowed her to consider and critique the traditional notion of evil.  Thoreau, too, 
exhibited great self-awareness in his writing, which are highly detailed personal accounts of 
his experiences and thoughts.  In two chapters of Walden, “Where I Lived, and What I Lived 
For” and “Sounds,” Thoreau also thematically takes up wakefulness.  His account of 
wakefulness adds to the theoretical understanding of wakeful attentiveness provided by 
Arendt.  In addition, Thoreau’s description of hearing the sounds of the railroad nearby 
Walden Pond demonstrates how wakeful attention facilitated his own critical reflections. 
According to Thoreau, attentiveness is like a wakeful state wherein ideas might dawn 
on one, similar to the dawning of the sun in the morning: “Morning is when I am awake and 
there is a dawn in me.”381  For him, a person can experience the wakefulness of the morning 
anytime throughout the day since it occurs whenever she is attentively engaged with the 
world around her.  In “Where I Lived, and What I Lived For” Thoreau writes: “The 
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morning wind forever blows, the poem of creation is uninterrupted; but few are the ears that 
hear it.”382  He echoes the idea that people are not often awake enough to see, hear, read, 
experience, or contemplate the world around them when he writes, “The millions are awake 
enough for physical labor; but only one in a million is awake enough for effective intellectual 
exertion, only one in a hundred millions to a poetic or divine life.”383  The dearth of 
wakefulness in society warns of the “danger of forgetting the language which all things and 
events speak without metaphor.”384  That things and events might speak to us by virtue of 
their non-metaphorical factual existence means that they might strike us or reveal some 
meaning.  When a thing speaks to a person, consequently, she might notice it for the first 
time or see it in a new way.  A thing or event might also reveal historical connections or 
make a person aware of her own understanding.  Though a thing or event speaking to one 
might not lead to critical-reflective thinking, it can prompt thought about how one had 
understood it and prompt one to begin questioning a presupposition.  This process is less 
likely if people are not wakefully attentive to things or events. 
 Thoreau does not claim that things and events have the same things to say to every 
person.  As Jeffrey Cramer, an editor of Walden notes, Thoreau wrote in his journals that 
there are “manifold visions in the direction of every object.”385  It is not only the thing that 
speaks, but a person’s vision that makes it say something specific.  So, a thing’s significance 
varies for different people.  Being awake simply means listening to what a thing or event is 
saying.  Finding out what things or events have to say requires wakeful attentiveness: “No 
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method nor discipline can supersede the necessity of being forever on the alert.”386  For 
Thoreau, being on the alert allows things like the sounds of a train to take on meaning for 
him.  Not only do they express meanings, they also prompt him to question his previous 
ignorance of their meaning and significance in his society.  That is, they prompt him to 
critically reflect upon how he had understood the railroad prior to noticing it in his state of 
wakefulness.   
 While giving an account of the sounds he heard one day while sitting at his window, 
he remarks upon the train’s whistle and the rattling of the cars passing by Walden Pond.  
The sounds of the train had significance for Thoreau beyond the fact that a train was passing 
by.  They also meant that people and goods (groceries, lumber, berries, silk, wool, fabric, 
cotton, and books) were arriving in town.  Thoreau worries, however, that people do not use 
the new efficiency of transportation afforded by the railroad for “noble ends.”387  It ends up 
that the goods are what is important.  The importance of the goods, however, overshadows 
detrimental consequences of collecting or producing and shipping them.  Thoreau voices 
concern that “All the Indian huckleberry hills are stripped, all the cranberry meadows are 
raked into the city” and that even though the city imports more books, “down goes the wit 
that writes them.”388  Goods must be brought to the cities no matter what the consequences.  
Moreover, during Thoreau’s time, the train schedule began to regulate time in America.  
People would “set their clocks by” the trains.389  Understanding time and the activities of 
one’s day “‘railroad fashion’ […] construct[s] a fate, an Atropos, that never turns aside.”390 
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People hurry down the tracks that have been laid out before impervious to diversion.  By 
wakefully attending to the sounds he hears, Thoreau considers their meaning.  This also 
allows him to critique presuppositions that he and others around him might have held.  They 
bring on a dawn in him whereby he hears not only the whistle and rattle of the trains, but 
also their significance as commercial forces and shapers of American culture.  Such 
considerations can challenge presuppositions concerning the positivity of technological 
advancements and the consequences of such advancements for American commerce and 
culture. 
 Arendt analyzes attentiveness as a primary prerequisite of thoughtful engagement.  
Thoreau describes wakefulness as a type of mindfulness in which people are sharply aware of 
phenomena.  By encouraging the awareness of oneself and other phenomena, wakeful 
attentiveness strongly bears on critical-reflective thinking.  Being wakefully attentive means 
intentionally engaging (or at least going about with the expectation of engaging) with 
whatever strikes one.  If one is attentive, something might strike one as a prompt or, after 
one has accepted a prompt’s invitation, disclose a presupposition.  Moreover, attending to 
things allows them to become fodder for thought rather than simply passing them by 
without notice.  I have alluded to ways in which people can practice wakeful attentiveness by 
discussing Thoreau’s imperative, always be on the alert!  In the following section, I turn to a 
fuller consideration of practical methods that can encourage development of an open and 
attentive approach to the world. 
Developing Openness and Attentiveness 
 
Thoreau offers a vehemently optimistic view that people can change the way the 
world appears by taking up open and attentive approaches to what they experience.  In the 
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following passage, he expresses how a person’s practical efforts can make a difference to 
how the world appears: 
I know of no more encouraging fact than the unquestionable ability of man 
to elevate his life by a conscious endeavor.  It is something to be able to 
paint a particular picture, or to carve a statue, and so to make a few objects 
beautiful; but it is far more glorious to carve and paint the very atmosphere 
and medium through which we look, which morally we can do.  To affect the 
quality of the day, that is the highest of arts.391 
 
For Thoreau, people can affect this atmosphere by taking up an “infinite expectation of the 
dawn.”392  By this, Thoreau means that taking up the expectation that something might dawn 
on one at any moment, one colors the way experiences are mediated.  This idea echoes 
Thoreau’s notion that wakefulness can be cultivated by always being on the alert.  Going 
about with the expectation that anytime something might appear in a new way makes one 
more prone to actually experiencing prompts and/or so experiencing things as to challenge 
one’s usual understanding.   
In what ways, however, can people learn to “paint the very atmosphere and medium 
through which we look” by cultivating a new open and attentive approach to life?  Simply 
deciding to be alert may be easier said than done.  Thoreau himself places great stake in 
practicing observation.  His time in the woods provided many occasions for listening and 
watching nature around him.  In the chapter titled, “Brute Neighbors,” he discusses some of 
his experiences observing animals.  These experiences taught him that “you only need to sit 
still long enough in some attractive spot in the woods that all its inhabitants may exhibit 
themselves to you by turns.”393  One might take this as the recommendation to simply sit 
and observe what is taking place around one in order to develop attentiveness.  The 
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possibility of sitting still and attending to things is related to cultivating solitude and leisure, 
as discussed above.  People can establish material conditions that are conducive to critical-
reflective thinking.  They might physically leave society and sit somewhere alone without a 
task in mind as a way to allow prompts and presuppositions to present themselves.  
Heidegger, however, also describes a type of thinking that can help people practice openness 
and attentiveness.  The type of thinking he describes is “meditation” (or “meditative 
thinking”).  
In the “Memorial Address,” Heidegger describes meditation as a practice that people 
can take up.  Though he proposes that meditative thinking may awaken Gelassenheit, 
Gelassenheit is not a necessary bi-product of meditation.  In the following I will set aside 
Gelassenheit as attunement and instead show that practicing meditation requires adopting an 
open attitude and being attentive.  If an open attitude and attentiveness are required for 
meditation, and meditation is something people can practice, by practicing it, they can realize 
the two cultivation strategies.   
According to Heidegger, meditation is an activity with three distinctive features.  To 
meditate means to inquire into the meanings of things, to not “cling one-sidedly to a single 
idea, nor run down a one-track course of ideas,” and to “engage…with what at first sight 
does not go together at all.”394  Taking up an open attitude is required in meditative thinking 
because one must allow things to present themselves in new ways rather than forcing them 
to conform to one’s present understanding or expectations (one may not cling one-sidedly to 
an idea about them).  In meditation people also realize attentiveness precisely by inquiring 
about the meanings of specific things.  Such inquiry involves paying attention to what 
something is, what it means, and what it says to one.  The clearest example of meditation is 
                                                
394 Ibid., 53. 
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in the triadic Country Path Conversation, where Heidegger often employs the word 
“meditation” to describe what the interlocutors are doing.  In the Conversation, the 
interlocutors are involved in inquiring into the nature of thinking when they discover that 
their conversation requires not strictly clinging to this topic but, instead, exploring other 
topics that come up along the way.  They then allow themselves to converse about the topic 
of willing when it comes up in their conversation.  Although willing does not seem to be 
related to thinking, by pursuing this seemingly unrelated topic they also eventually discover 
more about the nature of thinking.           
Although the requirements of not clinging one-sidedly to an idea and of engaging 
with seemingly unconnected topics might appear to require an open mood from the start, 
one need not be gelassen prior to meditating.  In a moment of uncharacteristic optimism, 
Heidegger proclaims that all people can take part in meditative thinking by taking it up as a 
practice when he says,  
…anyone can follow the path of meditative thinking in his own manner and 
within his own limits…meditative thinking need by no means be “high-
flown.”  It is enough if we dwell on what lies close and meditate on what is 
closest; upon that which concerns us, each one of us, here and now; here, on 
this patch of home ground; now, in the present hour of history.395 
 
In the “Memorial Address,” Heidegger even suggests that he and his audience “give it a 
trial” together.396  Simply by inquiring into what lies near and what it means, people can start 
along the path of meditation.  Openness and attentiveness inhere in this practice of inquiry 
that does not hold tightly to the objects under consideration.   
 In meditative thinking, people practice wakeful attentiveness by dwelling upon 
whatever lies near.  On the occasion of the “Address,” which was a commemoration of 
                                                
395 Ibid., 47. 
396 Ibid., 53. 
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composer Conradin Kreutzer’s 175th birthday, Heidegger invites those in attendance to 
participate in a meditation on the nature of commemorative celebrations, like the one in 
which they are involved.  He instigates an attentive inquiry into this nearby phenomenon 
while remaining open to other topics that present themselves along the way.  Heidegger’s 
inquiry finds its way to the topic of thinking via an exploration of the nature of memorial 
events, which require thinking back and, thus, thinking.   
This leads Heidegger into a critique of what he considers to be the type of thought 
that prevails in the modern world: calculative thinking.  Calculative thinking stands in strong 
opposition to meditative thinking because in it, humans “plan, research, and organize” on 
the basis of “conditions that are given” in order to “serv[e] specific purposes.”397  By 
presupposing the worthiness or propriety of certain ends, calculative thinking neither stops 
to consider these aims nor its own way of approaching things.  Things are at its disposal for 
use in achieving presupposed ends.  Heidegger agrees that calculative thinking is useful in 
achieving many practical goals.  Its prevalence, however, threatens to dominate all of human 
thought and, thereby, to obstruct the possibility of meditative thinking.  Meditative thinking 
is important because it can inquire into the meaning of the aims calculative thought takes as 
given.398  By attentively and openly meditating on the commemorative celebration in the 
“Address,” Heidegger comes to the state of modern thought.  Through meditation, he both 
illuminates and critiques the modern situation.  
 If openness and attentiveness are necessary aspects of meditation, people can 
practice having an open attitude and being wakefully attentive.  Meditation is an activity in 
                                                
397 Heidegger, “Memorial Address,” 46. 
398 There are likely other types of thinking, besides what Heidegger calls “meditative 
thinking,” that similarly inquire into what people often taken as given.  Since Heidegger is 
under consideration here, I allow his description of such thinking to motivate the discussion. 
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which people can take part through their own efforts.  Though gaining skill at meditation 
may take effort and practice, people could start by looking around themselves and inquire 
into the meaning of what lies near.  By allowing their thoughts to take up other ideas as they 
come along, people can practice openness.  This could likely be achieved through 
conversation, in writing, by thinking to oneself, or taking part in self-conversation as Arendt 
and Plato propose.  As Plato suggests, thinking is merely “a talk the soul has with objects 
under its consideration.”399  A person could actualize openness in such a talk by allowing 
herself to consider other ideas that come up along the way, even if they do not seem to be 
related to topic at hand.  In the process of so meditating, one might experience an idea that 
prompts critical reflection.  Furthermore, practicing open attentiveness in this way might 
allow a person to develop skill in adopting an open attitude and being wakefully attentive in 
other contexts.  
ON VIRTUE AND HABIT 
 
 The strategies for the cultivation of critical-reflective thinking discussed above in no 
way constitute an exhaustive list.  One further strategy of which I and the other authors, 
excluding Plato, only graze the surface is self-development through the cultivation of virtues.  
Virtue theory, especially as in Plato and Aristotle, could valuably contribute to a study of 
self-development both through its method of habituation and by suggesting other traits 
whose development might encourage critical-reflective thinking.  I have described the 
possibility of cultivating openness and receptivity by practicing them in specific activities.  
The more often one practices having an open attitude and attending to things, the more 
likely these are to become part of one’s general comportment.  Arendt suggests that thinking 
itself is something people can habituate when she describes it as “the habit of examining 
                                                
399 Plato, Theaetetus, 189e. 
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whatever happens to come to pass or to attract attention.”400  A person might habituate 
herself to think, for instance, by taking part in self-conversation or meditative thinking.   
It is not just the process of habituation, but additionally the virtues such as courage, 
humility, and fortitude acquired through habituation that might help a person gain openness, 
receptivity, and aptitude for the critical examination of presuppositions.  Courage, for 
example, could combat various fears associated with or arising out of thinking: the fear of 
questioning a presupposition one deeply holds, the fear of the unknown conclusion of 
thinking, or the fear of negative repercussions that might come with defeating a 
presupposition and acting differently subsequent to thinking.  A courageous person would 
be more apt both to engage a prompt even if it is not an experience she usually undergoes 
and to consider alternative views (including that one’s presupposition could be unworthy or 
false) even if this could have many or deep implications for her life.  By being bold in 
examining presuppositions, a person exercises receptivity.  Humility, meanwhile, can make 
one more open to the possibility that one’s own view might be faulty, incomplete, or 
possible to improve.  This virtue thus facilitates a person earnestly engaging other views and 
not stubbornly holding to her own view.  Fortitude, finally, could help one forge ahead even 
when thinking presents difficulties.  Critical-reflective thinking can be a taxing process, and 
fortitude might supply the necessary endurance.  Fortitude, rather than contributing to 
openness or receptivity, increases a person’s aptitude for taking part in critical-reflective 
thinking. 
 Since these virtues foster critical-reflective thinking, we should seek to develop them.  
For Aristotle, the father of virtue theory, developing virtues requires continual practice.  
Only by acting in ways that accord with virtues can one habituate oneself to the virtues such 
                                                
400 Arendt, Thinking, 5 (my emphasis). 
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that virtuous action becomes ingrained and the virtue part of one’s character.  If one wants 
to be courageous, for example, one must practice being courageous by facing fears, which is 
not the same, of course, as acting fearlessly in the sense of being rash or foolish.401  To 
practice being courageous, one might choose something small that one is afraid of and face 
it.  To develop courage in the context of thinking, one could choose an idea that one is not 
completely comfortable questioning and examine it in thought.  One could, for example, 
take up the nihilistic moment (that Arendt says is essential to thinking) with regard to one of 
one’s own opinions and scrutinize it in thought, though doing so might make one 
uncomfortable.  
 Fortitude can also be developed through practice.  Although people cannot compel 
prompts and intentionally instigate critical-reflective thinking, they can practice other 
mentally taxing activities that would help them develop an ability to endure through its 
sometimes long or arduous course.  In Book VII of the Republic, Plato sets forth a model for 
the philosopher kings of the kallipolis.  Socrates proposes that in addition to intensive and 
lengthy physical training, study in mathematics, and a political practicum, potential kings 
should be trained in dialectic for five years.  Although, for Socrates, the main goal of training 
in argumentation is to develop the possibility of seeking the good and the true,402 such 
training can also be interpreted as practice in the movement of dialectic.  Through training in 
argumentation, a person can practice taking up one side, considering another, and defending 
what one (upon consideration) takes as true.  People can also practice mental endurance by, 
                                                
401 This refers to Aristotle’s stipulation of the “golden mean” as the only way to act 
virtuously.  Acting virtuously means practicing a virtue under proper conditions (in the right 
way, at the right time, and in the right place) and not taking a virtue’s dictates to any extreme.  
In courage, the extremes are facing a fear though one knows it would be rash and running 
from a fear because one is not completely certain that it is something one can overcome.  
402 Plato, Republic, 539c. 
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among other things, reading, writing, or performing activities that require problem solving.  
Reading can require sustained attention on ideas that are not one’s own, whereas in writing 
one can engage with one’s own thoughts.  Practicing problem solving (by, for example, 
playing games or doing projects that require abstract and creative thinking) can help one 
develop trust in one’s ability think out of tricky spots rather than giving up.  Though 
practicing problem solving in these ways may conflict with the openness and receptivity 
supplied by leisure (i.e. focusing not on reaching particular goals), having the virtue of 
fortitude does not mean continuously being involved in activities that require the 
achievement of some end.  Rather, people can bring the virtue of fortitude into leisure 
activities.  This makes it possible for a person to accept the invitation of a prompt that 
requires diversion and to then carry out thinking with endurance.  Through practice, people 
can develop habits and aptitudes, such as humility, that could make them better able to 
thoroughly question presuppositions.   
Gadamer describes humility when he writes: “The soul of hermeneutics consists in 
the possibility that the other might be right.”  Earnestly taking part in hermeneutics means 
allowing, from the start, that the other person or view might be right.  It might turn out, of 
course, that the other is not right.  But only by earnestly encountering and thinking about 
otherness can one weigh its merits and deficiencies and not obscure the possibility that it has 
something from which one can learn or is better than one’s own view.  The humility that can 
be helpful in thinking, however, does not require self-effacement.  One need not abandon 
one’s own views or presuppositions when other views present themselves and another more 
worthy view might exist.  Being humble means not accepting or embracing other views 
immediately, but instead considering whether they have merit.  The conclusion of critical-
reflective thinking can be that one’s presupposition is worth retaining.   
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In the context of thinking, as in all contexts, becoming more humble requires 
practicing humility.  One can do this by giving other views and ideas audience, allowing that 
they might be right even if one is not initially attracted to them.  Or, again, one could 
practice what Arendt described as the necessary moment of nihilism.  Arendt claimed that 
the process of thinking requires a moment of nihilism.  Her and Gadamer’s views might be 
interpreted as two sides of the same coin: allowing that another view might be right requires 
provisional skepticism of one’s own view.  
The more often and consistently one practices relevant virtues such as courage, 
humility, and fortitude, the more likely the virtues are to become part of one’s character.  
The more ensconced a virtue is in one’s character, the more likely it will affect one’s 
approach and response to situations one encounters.403  According to Aristotelian virtue 
theory, virtues can become part of one’s character via a process of habituation.  Once a 
virtue is part of one’s character, one will not have to put forth effort or consciously choose 
to practice it, for it will guide one’s actions automatically.  Even if a virtue does not become 
deeply habituated, practicing it might still increase a person’s ability to recognize how and 
when to do so.  A person who experiences a prompt might be better able to accept its 
invitation if she has practiced courage even if critical-reflective thinking is not an activity 
with which she is well acquainted.  Even if she does not know what to expect and is afraid of 
what will happen in thought, she might take it up courageously, welcoming its challenge. 
One aspect of Aristotelian virtue theory that may make it less attractive as a strategy 
for cultivating critical-reflective thinking is Aristotle’s idea that material conditions affect a 
person’s ability to develop virtues.  He writes that one’s upbringing, financial situation, and 
the amount of free time one has can affect one’s ability to develop virtues.  These factors 
                                                
403 A person must also have some amount of phronēsis in order to discern relevant situations. 
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might hamper certain people from developing virtue.  If one has not had the ideal 
upbringing, for example, one’s attempts to develop some virtues might be precluded by the 
time that one becomes aware of the desire to do so.  If Aristotle is right, it follows that 
everyone cannot develop the virtues to the same extent.  This situation should not, however, 
discourage people from attempting to develop them.  For, even if one’s upbringing, finances, 
and amount of free time are not ideal, one can still, through practice and effort, to some 
extent, habituate oneself to be virtuous.  In any case, the desire to practice and cultivate 
humility, courage, and fortitude is not likely to decrease one’s proficiency in thinking 
critically-reflectively.   
CONCLUSIONS 
 
Though I cannot do virtue theory justice here, its primary thesis that people can 
develop themselves through practice and habituation is relevant for each of the cultivation 
strategies discussed above.  By setting up material conditions that are conducive to solitude 
and leisure, and by consistently practicing activities that require the adoption of an open 
attitude and wakeful attentiveness, one may develop openness and receptivity and thereby 
increase the likelihood of critical-reflective thinking.  Furthermore, one may gain aptitudes 
relevant to critical-reflective thinking by developing skills and comportments relevant to its 
practice.   
Furthermore, if people so practice openness, receptivity, and aptitude for critical-
reflective thinking that these things become habitual, people may lead their lives more prone 
to think.  An ethos of openness and receptivity supports the continual possibility of critical-
reflective thinking.  It promotes a welcoming and attentive way of being in everyday life that 
facilitates consciously taking up critical-reflective thinking when the occasion arises.  Having 
this ethos does not, however, imply that one take up every prompt that comes one’s way.  
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Inhabiting the world with open receptivity does not necessitate leading a life of pure 
reflection but, rather, remaining available for critical, self-reflective thought and sometimes 
engaging in it.   
As described in Chapter Two, critically-reflectively examining presuppositions 
promotes growth in understanding and liberation to new and different possibilities.  These 
conditions are valuable because they allow people to more deeply understand themselves, 
others, and the world and to become aware of new ways of seeing and living.  By analyzing 
instances of critical-reflective thinking in the works of Plato, Heidegger, Arendt, and 
Thoreau, four thinkers who closely attend to phenomena, this dissertation has articulated 
and specified a particular and important aspect of human life and experience.  Beyond its 
contribution to the academic discourse surrounding the topic of thinking, this dissertation 
points ways forward regarding both the praxis and further investigation of critical-reflective 
thinking.  In the remainder of this conclusion, I will briefly elaborate three possible paths for 
further investigation into the following topics: cultivating critical-reflective thinking, critical-
reflective thinking and action, and typologizing thinking.  
The first path concerns the cultivation of critical-reflective thinking.  After having 
considered the phenomenon of critical-reflective thinking, people can, for one, facilitate 
critical-reflective thinking by taking practical steps to develop themselves in the ways 
described above.  This should not, however, limit the other important project of further 
investigating how critical-reflective thinking might be cultivated.  By further considering the 
development of openness and receptivity, people might come up with their own strategies 
beyond those discussed here.  This might include the discovery of practices that one 
personally finds helpful for developing openness and receptivity.  People might, for instance, 
discern additional circumstances that, like solitude and leisure, facilitate receptivity, as well as 
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other practical means by which they can realize an open attitude and wakeful attentiveness.  
Furthermore, people might uncover strategies that do not fit into the rubrics of openness 
and receptivity and, thus, discover that they must take up self-development in more ways 
than these in order to encourage critical-reflective thinking.  A deeper analysis of the virtues 
could also reveal additional virtues that facilitate critical-reflective thinking, just as looking 
further into virtue theory, by providing greater insight into how people develop virtues, could 
reveal further or more specific ways to acquire them.   
The second path is to consider how critical-reflective thinking is related to action in 
the world.  This is a project in which Arendt was involved throughout her career.  Arendt 
comments on the relation between thinking and acting in The Human Condition, where she 
compares the vita activa (the life of activity, composed of labor, work, and action) to the vita 
contemplativa (the life of the mind), and later in The Life of the Mind, where she contrasts 
thinking and willing.  A question I have not deeply explored in this dissertation is whether 
people are likely to act on new possibilities to which they are liberated through critical-
reflective thinking.  There is also the additional question of whether the conditions that 
facilitate critical-reflective thinking enhance taking up new possibilities as well.  An inquiry 
into these topics could include questions about what makes it more and less likely to act on 
new possibilities and what effects acting on new possibilities might have for life in the world 
and for the value of critical-reflective thinking overall.  Understanding the relation of 
thinking to action could also better situate the role of critical-reflective thinking in a human 
life that is engaged in many activities besides thought. 
The third and final path is the exploration of types of thinking.  Critical-reflective 
thinking itself could be further investigated by seeking additional instances of critical-
reflective thinking in the works of Plato, Heidegger, Arendt, and Thoreau.  Since critical-
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reflective thinking is, however, a common (though infrequent) phenomenon, examples of it 
can also likely be found in the works of other authors.  Exploring this phenomenon could 
also occasion the disclosure of other types of thinking that can be differentiated, theorized, 
and explored in their own right.  The discovery and/or elaboration of other types of 
thinking would permit a deeper understanding, not only of the various ways of thinking in 
which people participate, but also the distinct roles different types of thinking play in human 
life.  Lastly, critical-reflective thinking and other types of thinking could be related back to 
more general descriptions of what thinking itself essentially is.  This could help make sense 
of how the activities that constitute thought hang together and are all included in the singular 
phenomenon of thought.  Moreover, typologizing thinking could provide content that would 
help better clarify the broader phenomenon of human thought.  
Regardless of where the considerations taken up in this dissertation lead (e.g. to self-
development, to considering thought and action, to a typology of thinking, or even to none 
of these), the reader will still likely undergo prompts and be invited to critically-reflectively 
consider his or her presuppositions.  It is my hope that this dissertation makes people aware 
of the phenomenon of critical-reflective thinking so they might recognize it and consciously 
welcome its occurrence more often.  Awareness of critical-reflective thinking not only allows 
people to further reflect upon and attend to the human experience of this type of thought, 
but also opens the way for growth and liberation, both of which constitute a more examined 
and intentional life.  
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